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Abstract
Relational Morality
Brian D. Earp
2021

Contemporary work in moral psychology has focused primarily on judgments
concerning interactions between strangers. However, it increasingly is recognized that
much of human moral judgment takes place in the context of -- and is shaped by -multiple dyadic social relationships, such as parent-child, teacher-student, close friends,
long-term romantic partners, neighbors, teammates, and so on. In this dissertation, I
show how such relationships are associated with distinctive patterns of socially
prescribed cooperative functions (such as care, hierarchy, or mating), which can be used
to predict out-of-sample moral judgments of both blame and praise regarding various
actions in relational context. I then proceed to focus on the long-term romantic partner
relationship, showing how the ordinary concept of “true love” is likewise imbued with
normative expectations. In the final part of the dissertation, I discuss how descriptive
findings about people’s moral judgments in relational context may be used to inform
substantive moral questions about relationships in philosophy and bioethics.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Abstract
Much recent work moral psychology has framed participant judgments in terms of their
apparent adherence to abstract moral principles, such as the utilitarian requirement to
impartially maximize welfare or Kant’s categorical imperative. Moreover, participants
often are asked to make judgments about cases involving hypothetical interactions
between strangers. But most of our moral judgments in the real-world concern neither
abstract principles nor strangers; rather, we tend to make concrete judgments about the
behavior of those with whom we regularly interact – people we know, and with whom
we stand in particular social relationships. Recognizing this, a growing number of moral
psychologists are shifting their focus to the study of moral judgment in social-relational
context. In this chapter, I give a brief overview of recent work in this vein, highlighting
both strengths and weaknesses, and setting up a new ‘relational norms’ model of moral
judgment which my co-authors and I have developed and tested over the past few years.
To situate this discussion, I also draw on influential philosophical theories of human
morality that foreground relational context. I suggest that these theories, in addition to
those such as utilitarianism that have shaped so much of the literature on moral
psychology, should perhaps be given more attention by moral psychologists than has
so far been the case.
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Introduction

An out-of-control trolley is barreling down the track. Five workers will be
killed if it continues on its way. You are standing by a switch that, if flipped, will
redirect the trolley to a side-track, where a single worker would be killed instead.
Should you flip the switch? (adapted from Foot, 1967).
In one sense, this is a familiar scenario. Readers of the contemporary moral
psychology literature will have encountered countless papers focused on ‘trolley
dilemmas’ like the one just described. Starting with a classic line of studies by Greene
and colleagues (Greene et al., 2001), participant responses to such hypothetical
dilemmas conventionally have been divided into two main categories,
consequentialist and deontological. When participants choose the option that is
stipulated to maximize expected welfare—e.g., by saving the most lives—they are
said to have made a ‘consequentialist’ judgment. When they fail to choose that option
if it requires causing instrumental harm to an innocent person, especially through upclose-and-personal physical contact, they are often said to have made a
‘deontological’ judgment (Greene, 2015; Greene et al., 2004).
The basis for this division and the extent to which the two categories
meaningfully correspond to their namesake theories in moral philosophy is
controversial (Berker, 2009; Kahane, 2015). Nevertheless, more than a decade of
research and hundreds of studies employing this paradigm have converged on the
view that consequentialist judgments (so conceived) are characteristically associated
with deliberative mental processes driven by such considerations as explicit costbenefit analyses, whereas deontological judgments (so conceived) are
characteristically associated with more reflexive mental processes driven by emotion
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or intuition (Crockett, 2013; Cushman, 2013; Greene, 2008, 2015; Greene et al., 2004,
2004; Patil et al., 2019).
On this basis, it has been claimed that such dual mental processes should be
understood as psychological natural kinds: dissociable patterns or modes of moral
thinking that are deeply rooted in our cognitive architecture and thus part of the
fundamental structure of our moral minds (Greene, 2008). Alongside other leading
theories in moral psychology, including the Universal Moral Grammar theory (Dwyer
et al., 2010; Harman, 2008; Hauser et al., 2008; Mikhail, 2007) and the Social
Intuitionist/ Moral Foundations theory (Haidt, 2001, 2007)—each of which will be
discussed in later sections—this Dual Process theory has become massively
influential in the cognitive science of moral judgment and behavior (Demaree-Cotton
& Kahane, 2018)
In recent years, critics have raised various concerns about the methodology
underlying the Dual Process model. For example, Kahane and colleagues (Kahane,
2015; Kahane et al., 2015, 2018; Kahane & Shackel, 2010) have argued that
participant responses to ‘sacrificial’ moral dilemmas of the kind exemplified by the
famous trolley problem—sacrificial because at least one innocent life typically must
be sacrificed to save a greater number—cannot reliably be used to infer either
consequentialist or deontological motivations on the part of participants (for
additional methodological critiques, see Berker, 2009). But even if the dilemmas can
in fact be used to draw such inferences (Conway et al., 2018), or perhaps to reliably
assess participants’ moral intuitions in some other way, there still would be good
reason to expand our methodological toolkit beyond the use of such dilemmas.
One reason goes like this: however familiar the trolley dilemmas have become
in one sense—the sense noted previously, based on their widespread use—there is
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another, perhaps more important sense in which they are unfamiliar, and hence
unlikely to elicit common moral intuitions (Bauman et al., 2014; Fried, 2012; Gold et
al., 2014). Apart from emergency first-responders, police officers, soldiers in
wartime, or similar personnel, relatively few people in real life ever will face such a
stark decision to sacrifice the life of a stranger to save a greater number. Indeed, even
during the height of the COVID-19 global pandemic, when hospital staff, for instance,
faced very real ‘triage dilemmas’ about how best to allocate life-saving medical care
(Kneer & Hannikainen, 2020), it was not in the capacity of ‘strangers’ that these
decisions were made. Rather, upon entering the hospital in need of care, the stranger
becomes a patient, and the hospital staff their doctor – thus, a doctor-patient
relationship is created, with all the special obligations this relationship entails (Gillon,
1986)
People do sometimes encounter strangers in need of help. But the way they
respond to such strangers might often differ from how they would respond if the same
individuals were ones with whom they stood in a more personal relationship (Lee &
Holyoak, 2018). If one’s parent, child, or romantic life-partner were on the side-track
in the opening scenario, for instance, one presumably would be much less inclined to
divert the trolley, even if more lives would be saved. Although study participants do
seem to behave in a moderately generous way toward strangers under experimental
conditions—for example, while playing the Dictator Game (Engel, 2011)—it has
been proposed that unknown individuals with whom one has had no prior contact, and
with whom one does not expect to interact in the future, more typically will fail to
register as particularly important, or even relevant to one’s moral intuitions, under the
more ordinary conditions of real life (Bloom, 2011).
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Thus, while we may have considerable evidence concerning the various
factors that bear on hypothetical decision-making in uncommon or unrealistic
scenarios with ostensibly moral connotations, we do not have comparably strong
evidence—from the mainstream moral psychology literature, at least—of the factors
underlying more common moral decisions that people make in real life. If our aim is
to understand how the ‘moral mind’ works, therefore, we need to shift our focus away
from one-shot interactions with anonymous individuals taking place under unusual
conditions (Gray & Keeney, 2015), and toward interactions with particular
individuals in relational context under the conditions of daily life (Clark & Boothby,
2013; Hofmann et al., 2014).

Taking a Relational Turn

Most of our moral decisions in everyday life have little to do with strangers. Instead,
they concern people with whom we stand in some kind of prior, often personal
relationship; with whom we have had multiple previous interactions; with whom we
expect to continue interacting in the future; and with respect to whom the moral issues
at stake do not typically have life-or-death significance (Clark et al., 2015). Indeed,
within the literature on prosocial behavior, there are many studies showing that
relational context matters a great deal for shaping moral responses, and that relational
context shapes whether a given decision is even considered to be a moral one in the
first place (for an overview, see Clark, Boothby, Clark-Polner, & Reis, 2015). To see
this in an intuitive way, consider a very different scenario from the trolley problem at
the start of this chapter. The scenario first was introduced by Gopnik (2009), and later
adapted by Bloom (2011). Bloom’s version is as follows:
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A young woman meets a much younger [male] and takes him into her home.
He suffers from terrible limitations. He cannot walk or talk or even sit up; he
cannot be left alone and must be carefully fed. He often needs attention at
night, and she spends the first years with him in a sleep-deprived fog. Still,
this is the most important relationship of her life. She would die for him. She
spends many years nursing him as he gradually becomes able to walk, to toilet
himself, and to express and understand speech. After they have been together
for a decade, he becomes interested in other women and begins to date, and
eventually he leaves her home and marries someone else. The woman
continues to love and support him, helping to raise the children that he has
with his new wife. (p. 26).
If we imagine that the much younger male in this story is an adult stranger
whom the woman recently met on the street, her actions would seem
incomprehensible. But if we imagine instead that he is her son, to whom she has just
given birth—and thus ‘met’ as a baby—our moral intuitions change completely. Far
from seeing her caretaking behavior as befitting only a saint or a madwoman, we now
see it as perfectly normal and even expected. Indeed, if she failed to exhibit such care
and sacrifice for her son, treating him as she would an actual stranger, her behavior
would be judged to be deeply immoral (Bloom, 2011, p. 27).
This example highlights the importance of taking relational context into
account if we want to make sense of moral motivations, behavior, and judgment in the
real world (Bloom, 2011; Clark et al., 2015; Korsgaard, 1993; Lee & Holyoak, 2018;
Mason, 2014; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Shabo, 2012; Simpson,
Laham, & Fiske, 2016; Strawson, 1962). Everyday experience, bolstered by the very
large empirical literature on the psychology of close relationships (for an overview,
see Clark, Lemay, & Reis, 2018), reveals that one and the same act, or sequence of
actions, may be regarded as morally appropriate or inappropriate depending upon—
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among other things—the identity of the actor (or the social role the actor is occupying
in a given context or society), the identity or social role of the person with whom the
actor is interacting, and, crucially, the nature of the relationship between them,
whether existing or desired (Clark et al., 2015, p. 330; for a related discussion, see
Earp, Douglas, & Savulescu, 2017). Indeed, across societies, a given act will be
judged as good, fair, virtuous, honorable, morally correct, and so forth, when it takes
place in a certain social-relational context, and as bad, unfair, lacking in virtue,
dishonorable, or morally wrong (etc.) when it occurs in certain other social-relational
contexts (Rai and Fiske, 2011, p. 57).
In practical terms, this means that one should be able to hold an act constant
and manipulate the social role or relationship between individuals, and dramatically
alter how one sees the moral status of the act in question (as well as the moral
character of the actor) (Marshall et al., 2020; McManus et al., 2021). For a simple
illustration of this phenomenon, consider the following scenarios from Clark et al.
(2015, p. 229):

1. Jim has a demanding job and very limited vacation time. Nonetheless, he
takes a full day off from work to help a total stranger move across town.
2. Tasha and Elaine have been best friends since childhood, and they often
share their most private thoughts and feelings. When Tasha calls Elaine in
distress late one evening with an urgent need to talk to her friend, Elaine says,
“I’m happy to talk to you Tasha, but could you call back tomorrow, during
normal business hours?”
3. Anne runs out of gas on her drive home from work. She calls her sister, who
promptly picks her up and brings her to a nearby gas station to buy a canister
of gas. Once they’ve ensured that the car is running again, Anne’s sister hands
her a bill for her time and labor.
7

These cases are supposed to strike the reader as strange. Although each of the
scenarios involves prosocial—and thus ostensibly moral—activity of one kind or
another (helping someone move, comforting someone in distress, rescuing someone
who is stranded), some of the activity seems puzzling or even inappropriate.
Intuitively, there is mismatch between the actor’s behavior and the type of
relationship the actor is described as having with the beneficiary of that behavior.
Why would Jim miss work to help a complete stranger move across town? Why
would Elaine make her close friend call back during business hours? Why would
Anne’s sister expect to be compensated for helping out with the gas?
If one changes the relationship context, however, such puzzles are
immediately resolved. Instead of a stranger, suppose that Jim is helping his fiancé
make the move across town; instead of a lifelong friend, suppose that Elaine is
Tasha’s therapist; and instead of her sister, suppose that the person helping Anne is an
employee from a roadside assistance company (Clark et al., 2015, p. 330). Now their
behavior does not seem quite so strange.
What these examples suggest is that we cannot fully understand, or even begin
to understand, the moral status of an action in a given social context unless we know
who is performing the action, who is affected by it, and the nature of the relationship
between them. By ignoring relational context, therefore, we remove the factor with
perhaps the greatest explanatory power from our models of moral judgment and
behavior (Clark et al., 2015; Rai & Fiske, 2011). And yet most current research in
moral psychology does not take this context into account. Instead, relationshiporiented considerations are often treated as ‘noise’—distorting factors that must be
filtered out with a focus on one-time interactions between strangers (Hester & Gray,
2020).
8

Such approaches appear to rest on the assumption that there must be an
underlying source of moral judgment whose realization in a particular context might
be biased by social or relational factors (Rai and Fiske, 2011, p. 58). But in reality, the
opposite is true: social-relational factors must be taken into account to accurately
predict moral judgment in a given situation. Thus, we suggest, they should be treated
as the data or signal, rather than experimental noise. In summary, the time is ripe for
moral psychologists to focus more heavily on theories and studies that do not filter
out, but rather are rooted in, common, real-life behaviors and activities taking place
between individuals in interpersonal relationships (of which the relationship between
strangers is but one particular type) (Clark & Boothby, 2013; Hofmann et al., 2014;
Rai & Fiske, 2011).
Recognizing this, some psychologists who study moral judgement and
behavior have indeed begun to steer their research programs in a more relationshiporiented direction: the beginnings, perhaps, of a broader ‘relational turn’ in moral
psychology. In a later section, we will survey some of the major work that has been
done in this vein so far, calling attention both to strengths and weaknesses. First
however, we will lay out a theoretical roadmap to give shape to this relational turn.

Philosophical Foundations

Casual readers of the moral psychology literature could be forgiven for having
the impression that there are two, and only two, explicit theories of morality discussed
by philosophers that might be relevant to their empirical work. These would be the
consequentialist or utilitarian theories most closely associated with Bentham (1789)
or Mill (1863), and the deontological theories most closely associated with Kant and
his interpreters (Kant 1785/1997). Despite often being characterized as competing, or
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even contradictory visions of right and wrong, the two theory-types have much in
common.
One shared feature is a dominant focus on universalizing, abstract moral
principles, designed to apply every person in any situation at all times (Randall,
2019). Classical act utilitarianism, for example, holds that the morally correct action
is the one that reasonably is expected to bring about the greatest happiness for the
greatest number of people, without regard to one’s personal relationship to any of the
people in question. And Kant’s categorical imperative (for a classic discussion, see
Foot, 1972) famously holds that one should always act in accordance with moral
maxims that one rationally can will to become a universal law. Neither of these
formulations rules out taking relational context into account in deciding what to do in
a specific situation: for example, what it is that maximizes welfare often depends on
who will be affected the decision or action and their relationship(s) to the actor.
Nevertheless, there are other important philosophical theories of morality that take
relational factors more centrally into account. Moreover, in addition to determining
what is typically judged to be morally required in a given situation, as we touched on
in the previous section, these theories hold that the social and relational context
determines what is in fact morally required—that is, from a substantive or
“normative” perspective (Noddings, 2013; Randall, 2019). According to Tan and
Snell (2002, p. 362), in predominately Chinese societies, for instance,

morality is both role and act dependent. Morality deriving from Confucian
teachings emphasizes virtuous personal qualities (e.g., loyalty, honesty,
obedience, sincerity, etc.) required in performing roles, and regards rights,
privileges, claims, immunities, expectations, obligations, and responsibilities
as particularistic, relationship-based and role-related. In this moral tradition,
required moral behavior varies according to a person’s role, position and

10

relationship with the other role-players in a highly differentiated and
hierarchical social nexus.
Within the Western tradition, Strawson (1962), for example, explicitly
grounded his moral theory in relational or intersubjective terms. Specifically, he
grounds them in the “non-detached attitudes and reactions of people directly involved
in transactions with each other; of the attitudes and reactions of offended parties and
beneficiaries; of such things as gratitude, resentment, forgiveness, love, and hurt
feelings” (p. 5). Strawson argues that intimate relationships of the kind almost
everyone values are not psychologically possible1 without such ‘reactive’ attitudes,
and that such attitudes imply certain genuinely normative, rather than merely
descriptive, moral commitments or practices: for example, practices of holding one
another morally accountable.
Building on Strawson’s insights, Darwall has argued in an extensive body of
work that utilitarian-style considerations of benefit and harm cannot, even indirectly,
ground the existence of moral rights or duties; and that, among other things, the very
concept of moral blame cannot be understood from outside what he calls the ‘secondperson standpoint’ – the standpoint that two parties to a relationship (a ‘you’ and an
‘I’) necessarily take toward each other when engaging in such practices as assigning
responsibility, making claims on one another, and holding each other accountable
(Darwall, 2009, 2010, 2018; Dill & Darwall, 2014).
Similarly, Korsgaard (1993), argues that basic values—by which she means
moral values with real or binding normative force—are ultimately grounded in, and
supervenient upon, the structure of interpersonal relationships. She calls her view

1

See Sommers (2007) for an objection to this view. See Mason (2014) for a response. See also Kelley
et al. (2003) for a psychological ‘atlas’ of interpersonal relationships and their structure and
significance.
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intersubjectivism. On this view, the subject matter of morality is not what we should
aim to do or bring about in the abstract, based on some invariant maxim or principle,
for example, but rather it is how we should relate to one another (p. 25). Korsgaard
argues that individual, subjective interests or values become intersubjective values
when we take an attitude toward each other that impels us to recognize—and share—
each other’s ends in a given context (see also Kelley, 1979, for a psychological
perspective).
Scanlon (2008) also grounds his theory—known as contractualism—in
relationships. Contractualism holds, most basically, that “an act is wrong if its
performance under the circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for
the general regulation of behavior that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for
informed, unforced, general agreement” (Scanlon, 1998, p. 153). Thus, like
utilitarianism and Kant’s categorical imperative, there is a universalized statement of
the view. But Scanlon’s contractualist account is not primarily focused on
determining, on such abstract grounds, which actions are right and wrong. Rather, it is
focused on the reasons for acting, and on the types of reasons that can be justified to
others. Thus, as with Korsgaard (1993), there is a central role for reasons (or ends)
that are shared between oneself and others with whom one stands in some kind of
relationship. It follows, then, that the reasons for acting that will in fact be justifiable
to those others will depend on who they are—and on the nature of their relationship to
the agent.
According to this way of thinking, to make a sensible moral judgment, it is not
enough to give an abstract analysis of an agent’s intentions, actions, and/or the causes
or consequences of those actions. Rather, the permissibility of a given act depends, in
large part, on the reasons for which it was performed within the context of a given
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relationship: on what Scanlon (2008) calls its “meaning.” This refers to the
significance of the action, for the agent as well as others affected by it (whether
directly or indirectly), of the agent’s willingness to perform the action on behalf of
particular reasons. To say that an act is blameworthy, therefore, is to make a claim
about its meaning: specifically, it is to claim that the act indicates something about the
agent’s attitudes that impairs her relations with others, such that to blame someone “is
to understand one’s relations with that person as modified in the way that such a
judgment holds to be appropriate” (p. 6). As a consequence of this, contractualist
blame “only makes sense within a relationship, such as friendship or family
relationships. Impairment must be judged against the standard of what is
appropriate within that relationship” (Ashford & Mulgan, 2018, emphasis in original).
Our aim in the present work is, in large part, to give a theory supported by empirical
results that can explain what is and is not appropriate (in this sense) in different
relationships.
None of this focus on personal relationships is to say that we do not have
moral obligations toward strangers, nor they toward us. Although the nature of the
relationship between strangers often will differ in important ways from the nature of
the relationship between, for example, close friends or family members, it is
nevertheless the case that all individuals stand in some relationship to one another,
characterized by such minimal values as mutual recognition of (and giving weight to)
each other’s interests. Such a bare-bones moral relationship can be thought of as “a
normative ideal, like a normative ideal of friendship that specifies attitudes and
expectations that we should have regarding one another [such that] morality requires
that we hold certain attitudes toward one another simply in virtue of the fact that we
stand in the relation of ‘fellow rational beings’” (Scanlon 2008, pp. 139–40). Thus,
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there are certain fundamental attitudes that we rightly expect even from strangers, and
we may be justified in blaming them if their behavior appears to indicate a lack of
such attitudes, including a basic level of care or respect (Ashford & Mulgan, 2018).
How can moral psychologists contribute to this discussion? If the source of
normativity is in fact second-personal accountability, as Strawson (1964) and Darwall
(2009) suggest, and this normativity supervenes on the structure of interpersonal
relationships, as Korsgaard (1993) suggests—what exactly is that structure? What is
its underlying logic? How might it have come about? Why did it evolve? What
predictions does this structure make for real-life moral judgments and behavior? And
if Scanlon (2008) is right that moral judgements such as blame only make sense in
terms of what is appropriate for a given relationship—how is appropriateness
determined? Why are some things seen as appropriate in certain relationships, but not
in others?
In his classic work, Strawson (1962) anticipated such questions. In order to
develop a more robust moral theory on the basis of interpersonal relationships, “we
should think of the many different kinds of relationship which we can have with other
people – as sharers of a common interest; as members of the same family; as
colleagues; as friends; as lovers; as chance parties to an enormous range of
transactions and encounters” (p. 6, emphasis added). Although we typically expect at
least some degree of cooperation or goodwill on the part of those with whom we stand
in such relationships, the specific antecedents, content, and consequences of such
cooperation will vary significantly from one relationship to another. In our work, we
offer a model of relationship ‘kinds’ that we think can explain such systematic
variation, based on a set of cooperative functions that different relationships within a
society must serve in order to solve recurrent coordination problems of our species.
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Evolutionary Beginnings
If the philosophical views just surveyed are on the right track, then to
understand human morality, whether descriptively or normatively, we should be very
interested in exploring the ‘structure’ of interpersonal relationships (Kelley, 1979;
Kelley et al., 2003). Moreover, we should expect that structure, and the reasons for
acting that will be justifiable to others, to vary from relationship to relationship—
leading to different ‘reactive attitudes’ depending on the nature of the relationship
between each of us and those with whom we are interacting.
Evolutionary theory may shed some light here. Presumably, our moral
psychology did not evolve primarily to guide our thoughts and behaviors in
interactions with anonymous strangers. Rather, it likely evolved to help us avoid
common causes of interpersonal conflict with familiar others that would threaten our
evolutionary fitness, or otherwise help us solve coordination problems among those
with whom we interacted on a regular basis (Bloom, 2011). In the environment of
evolutionary adaptation (EEA; Bowlby, 1982; Volk & Atkinson, 2013), such
coordination problems almost certainly would have involved—first and foremost—
our immediate family and other close kin, but also friends, mating partners, and other
members of our social group with whom we might seek to form an alliance, whether
temporary or more enduring.
There are several plausible accounts of how this evolutionary process may
have played out (Cosmides & Tooby, 2006; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010; Kitcher, 2011;
Machery & Mallon, 2010; Pettit, 2015; Isern-Mas & Gomila, 2020); but they all share
a similar basic thrust: those ancestors who were motivated to strategically cooperate
with others in their immediate environment, find alternatives to violence in situations
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of competing interests, punish defectors, and so forth, would have had greater
reproductive success than those who did not have such motivations, and that is why
we have such motivations today. According to Baumard and colleagues (Baumard et
al., 2013), our moral motives are—more specifically—an adaptation to an
environment in which individuals regularly competed to be chosen for mutually
beneficial interactions with those around them.
On this ‘partner choice’ model, an instinct toward cooperative behavior would
evolve for a very specific reason. Those with a reputation for having a reliable motive
to cooperate in a mutually advantageous way—neither exploitative nor subject to
exploitation—would tend to be preferred as social partners in contexts where
cooperation, rather than defection, would enable them to reap the greatest
reproductive benefit over the long run. And the most efficient, secure way to gain a
reputation for having such a reliable motive, Baumard et al. (2013) argue, is simply to
have the motive—that is, to sincerely believe that the ‘right’ thing to do is to behave
in a cooperative (or otherwise moral) manner, and to feel negative emotions such as
guilt for failing to behave in such a way. This, then, would explain how our moral
instincts could have evolved over evolutionary time.
This theory has been critiqued on various grounds, including for purporting to
give an account of our ‘moral’ sense while giving instead an account of our ‘fairness’
sense, which is but one part of our moral psychology. And it has been critiqued for
ignoring relational context (Clark & Boothby, 2013). Thus, although the core of the
theory is plausible, it could be improved by incorporating a recognition that
cooperative motives rarely are impartial, in the sense of being indifferent to the type
of relationship one has, or desires to have, with a potential cooperation partner. In the
EEA, there would have been a strong reproductive advantage to showing favoritism in
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cooperation (and other forms of moral behavior) toward friends, family, romantic
partners, and others in one’s close emotional sphere (Bloom, 2011). And even within
that sphere, it would not have been adaptive to follow a single, consistent, or uniform
moral norm in each relational context; rather, it would make adaptive sense to follow
different norms in different contexts depending on the specific nature of the
relationship—whether existing or desired—as well as its developmental stage, with
these factors shaped, in turn, by the underlying evolutionary functions the
relationship-type would be expected to serve in the given environment (Clark et al.,
2015).
Rather than a generalized ‘moral’ sense, therefore, a friends-and-family
cooperation bias, with more specific norms applied to particular relationships and
even relationship-stages, must have played a large role in shaping our intuitive moral
psychology. This lesson applies more generally. Consider the Universal Moral
Grammar (UMG) theory championed by Mikhail and others (Dwyer et al., 2010;
Harman, 2008; Hauser et al., 2008; Mikhail, 2007). This theory holds that our moral
emotions reflect the evolutionary design and output of an innate moral faculty or
‘organ’—an unconscious, computational system that maps input about agents,
patients, intention, causation, and action onto underlying representations of moral
principles—akin to a grammar with set rules or parameters—to produce an intuition
about whether the action is permissible, obligatory, or forbidden.
Again, the core idea is plausible. Yet as with the Dual Process model
discussed in the introduction, much of the empirical support for this theory comes
from testing it against trolley problems in a dizzying array of permutations (Mikhail,
2007). To explain people’s moral intuitions about more common scenarios, it will be
necessary to be much more specific about the ‘agents’ or ‘patients’ involved, and to
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build in information about the nature of the relationship between them (Hester &
Gray, 2020; Schein, 2020). This will require theoretically grounded studies into moral
judgment and behavior that systematically vary relational context.

Prior Significant Empirical Work Taking Relational Context into Account
One of the earlier studies to manipulate relational context while holding moral
behavior constant was conducted by McGraw and Tetlock (2005). These researchers
found that “moral outrage” and “cognitive confusion” could be invoked by asking
participants to engage in what they call a taboo trade-off. This refers to any mental
comparison or social interaction that violates a deeply-held intuition about the nature
of given relationship and the values that undergird it (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005, p. 3).
For example, they found that a substantial proportion of participants refused to name
an acceptable selling price for a gift that was said to have been acquired in the context
of a close relationship. Why might it be taboo to name such a price?
In a large body of work (beginning with Clark & Mills, 1979), Clark and her
collaborators have shown that different relationships operate on different underlying
values. One such value difference is between what she calls communal versus
exchange relationships. In communal relationships, the giving of a benefit in response
to a need for that benefit is seen as appropriate, whereas in exchange relationships, the
giving of a benefit in response to past (or future, anticipated) receipt of a similarly
valued benefit is seen as appropriate. One way to create a taboo trade-off, then, would
be to ask someone to perform an action within the context of one such relationship
that is governed by the underlying values of the other.
For example, one might apply a market-based heuristic to the transfer of goods
or services within a relationship characterized by a norm of communal sharing (Clark
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& Mills, 2012). Indeed, this is exactly what we saw with Anne—the stranded
motorist—and her sister in an earlier section, and it explains why her sister’s behavior
seemed so strange. As Fiske and Tetlock (1997) argue, people in general tend to view
such trade-offs as morally impermissible, and will respond with indignation when
forced to assess the value of an action or entity that is normally governed by the rules
and expectations of one relational model by the rules or expectations of a disparate or
otherwise conflicting relational model (p. 256).
The relational models employed by McGraw and Tetlock (2005) in their
experiments were the ones proposed by Fiske in a seminal paper (1992), building in
part on the earlier work by Clark (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1979). According to Fiske,
there are four fundamental relationship structures or schemas that can be combined in
various ways to describe and make sense of the socially meaningful features of nearly
any social situation across cultures. These are: communal sharing, authority ranking,
equality matching, and market pricing. As summarized by McGraw and Tetlock
(2005):

Communal sharing (CS) slices the social world [into classes that] differentiate
in-groups and out-groups without degree of distinction. Everyone in a
community—which could be as small as a romantic dyad or as large as a
nation state—shares certain rights and incurs certain duties. Nonmembers may
be excluded entirely. Within the relationships, people give as they can and
take as they need.
Equality matching (EM) defines socially meaningful intervals that can be
added or subtracted to keep score in social interaction. The social prototype is
collegial or friendship networks in which in-kind or tit-for-tat reciprocity is a
dominant exchange norm [and in which members must] calibrate degrees of
indebtedness and strive for balance.
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Authority ranking (AR) imposes an ordinal ranking on the social world that
permits lexical decision rules. One’s location in this ranking scheme
determines one’s relative status in a collective and the prevailing direction of
accountability for decision making. Military ranking serves as the social
prototype …
Market pricing (MP) makes possible ratio comparisons of the values of
diverse entities through the use of a single value or utility metric. This
structure underlies capitalism and monetary transactions that range in
sophistication from simple loans to [much more complex] financial
instruments. (p. 3).

In more recent theoretical work with Rai (Rai & Fiske, 2011), Fiske explicitly
ties such relational structures to a discrete set of hypothesized moral motivations,
resulting in what those authors term the Relationship Regulation Theory of moral
psychology (RRT). According to RRT, Communal Sharing is associated with Unity
(described as a motive to provide care and support to members of an in-group based
on need or compassion rather than desert, and to protect the integrity of the group’s
boundaries by neutralizing the threat of contamination); Equality Matching is
associated with Equality (a motive for in-kind reciprocity, balance, fair treatment, and
equal opportunity); Authority Ranking is associated with Hierarchy (a motive to
respect social rank, such that superiors are entitled to deference but must also guide
and protect subordinates); and Market Pricing is associated with Proportionality (a
motive for merit-based rewards and punishments, calibration of benefits to
contributions, and cost-benefit analyses on a utilitarian framework) (p. 57).
Rai and Fiske (2011) claim that all cultures base their moral judgments and
behaviors on this same underlying set of motives; that these motives exist for the
purpose of regulating social relationships; and that these shared relational structures
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and corresponding motivations explain the existence of apparent universals in moral
beliefs and behavior across cultures. By the same token, moral diversity and
disagreement, they claim, stems from the deployment of different relational models in
a single circumstance, or the different implementation of a given relational model in
one or more circumstances.
To date, there have been few empirical tests of this theory in terms of the
predictions it makes for specific patterns of moral judgment. In part, this might be due
to the difficulty one may have in formulating precise predictions. Although RRT
posits just four fundamental moral motives—Unity, Equality, Hierarchy, and
Proportionality—the actual content or descriptions of these motives, and the examples
used to illustrate them, suggest a more complicated, and somewhat less coherent
picture.
In a recent collaboration with Simpson and Laham (Simpson, Laham, and
Fiske 2016), for instance, Fiske states that, according to RRT, moral judgment largely
depends on the “varying activation” of the four moral motivations used to coordinate
various interpersonal relationships (Simpson et al., 2016, p. 595). This, in turn, leads
to the broad hypothesis that “varying the relational context of moral violations should
predict variability in wrongness judgments independently of other factors relevant to
moral judgment” such as gender, political ideology, and religious affiliation (Simpson
et al., 2016, p. 597).
In an attempt to derive more specific predictions, the authors import a set of
norm violations from Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) (Haidt, 2007). This theory
proposes five innate ‘modules’ for moral cognition that are hypothesized to have
evolved to serve certain adaptive ends. These have been summarized by Suhler and
Churchland (2011), in a critical piece, as follows:
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Harm/Care — protect and care for young, vulnerable, or injured kin
Fairness/Reciprocity — reap benefits of dyadic cooperation with non-kin
Ingroup/Loyalty — reap benefits of group cooperation
Authority/Respect— negotiate hierarchy, defer selectively
Purity/Sanctity — avoid microbes and parasites

Simpson et. al (2016) reasoned that Harm/Care violations from MFT would be
judged to be more wrong in relationships prototypically characterized by Communal
Sharing (Unity motive, in particular the aspect concerned with empathy and provision
of care) than any of the other relationship types; that Fairness/Reciprocity violations
would be judged least wrong in such relationships; that Authority/Respect violations
would be judged most wrong in prototypically Authority Ranking relationships
(Hierarchy motive); and that Ingroup/Loyalty and Purity/Sanctity violations would be
judged to be most wrong in Communal Sharing relationships (due to the postulated
aspect of the Unity motive concerned with protecting the group from outside
contamination).
Violations were expressed as short sentences of the form “Person A does X to
B” where X violates one of the MFT foundations (e.g., “Person A borrows $20 from
Person B’s bag without asking” as a violation of Fairness/Reciprocity), and Person A
and B are everyday relationship pairings, such as brother-sister, student-professor, or
customer-salesperson. Simpson et al. (2016) found mixed support for their specific
predictions. For example, relational context did not consistently or uniquely predict
wrongness judgments of care violations, which they took to suggest that relational
context is not especially important for judging the moral status of physically or
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emotionally harmful transgressions (p. 605). There was, however, a large main effect
for relationship context, such that manipulating context explained variability in moral
judgment above and beyond such potent predictors as gender, political ideology,
religious affiliation, and even explicit endorsement of MFT foundations. As Simpson
et al. (2016) concluded, “if we want to gain a thorough understanding of why
individuals vary in their moral judgments, relational context cannot be ignored” (p.
605).
There are clear limitations to the studies by Simpson et al. (2016), as they
acknowledge: (1) they used a small number of relationship exemplars (e.g., StudentProfessor), with each one chosen to represent a single relationship model (e.g.,
Authority Ranking) in an all-or-none fashion (i.e., no consideration of degrees); (2)
only wrongness judgments were assessed, in response to violations of moral
foundations (no corresponding assessments were made of praiseworthy judgments
based on morally positive behaviors); and (3) relationship models were assessed in
isolation (presumably, the combination of certain relationship models will provoke
the strongest moral judgements, for example, when they are at cross-purposes within
a single dyad, as Simpson et al. point out). Nevertheless, these authors have called
vital attention to, and begun to explore the contours of, an enormous gap in the
existing moral psychology literature—most of which does not even consider
relationship context, much less manipulate it in a systematic way.
More recently, Tepe and Aydınlı-Karakulak (2018) sought to test the RRT,
predicting that moral judgments would not be based on such considerations as
harmfulness or impurity alone, but rather that violations of relational motivations
would underlie perceptions of moral wrongness of harmful or impure behaviors. To
test this, they compared the relative utility of harm, impurity, and relational motive
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violation in predicting ratings of perceived immorality of various acts. Their first step
was to develop scenarios that would theoretically violate one of the four RM
principles (moral motivations) while also exhibiting either harmful or impure content.
For example, the action “kissing passionately” was adapted to the four relational
models situated in different scenarios: two siblings kissing each other passionately
(Communal Sharing context), a boss and a subordinate kissing each other
passionately (Authority Ranking context), two colleagues kissing each other
passionately (Equality Matching context), and a salesperson and customer kissing
each other passionately (Market Pricing context).
They chose sixteen such scenarios based on participant ratings of the extent to
which each moral motive was violated by each scenario in a pilot study (see Table 1
for a sample of 8 of these scenarios, taken from Appendix C of Tepe and AydınlıKarakulak, 2018). In the main study, participants were asked to rate each scenario in
response to the question, “Is this behavior morally wrong?” (1 = No, not at all wrong
to 7 = Yes, definitely wrong). A regression analysis was conducted with RM
violation, harmlessness violation, purity violation, and participant country of origin
(Turkey or United States) entered as predictors in the first step, and all possible twoway interactions entered in the second step. They found that moral wrongness was
predicted by RM violation (β = 0.66, t(256) = 10.39, p < .001) and harmfulness scores
(β = 0.15, t(256) = 2.36, p = .02), [R2 = .62 (95% CI [.54, .68]), F(4, 256) = 102.24, p
< .001], with no significant two-way interactions.
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Table 1
Eight selected scenarios from Tepe and Aydınlı-Karakulak (2018)

In a subsequent study, they developed a new set of 13 RM scenarios based on
pilot testing to see whether the predictive power of harmfulness on judgments of
moral wrongness would be affected by RM violation, expecting that its predictive
utility would decrease when the degree of RM violation was low. A linear regression
was performed with centered scores for harmfulness and RM violation entered as
predictors in the first step, and their interaction entered in the second step. The
interaction was significant, with a slopes test revealing that the relationship between
harmfulness and wrongness was significant when RM violation was either strong (β =
0.30, 95% CI [0.10, 0.50], t(121)= 3.02, p < .01) or moderate (β = 0.20, 95% CI [0.01,
0.38], t(121)= 2.13, p = .04), but non-significant when RM violation was low (β =
0.10, 95% CI [- 0.12, 0.31], t(121) = 0.87, p = .38).
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Several interesting findings emerged from their experiments. For example,
they found that violations of the hierarchy motive fell into two distinct categories:
top-down violations (committed by a superior) and bottom-up violations (committed
by a subordinate). While both categories could be seen violations of the same
relational motive, participants in their studies responded differently depending on the
‘direction’ of the action. This suggests that asymmetrical relationship dyads (in terms
of power, for example) may need to be theorized in a more specific manner.
Another finding was that the proportionality motive could be seen as vague or
technical, and hard to distinguish from other motives. Participants generally saw
proportionality violations as violations of equality or as an abuse of power (i.e.,
violations of top-down hierarchy). For example, proportionality violations in the
workplace were attributed to an exploitive management style (a top-down violation of
authority), whereas disproportionate resource distributions were often seen as unequal
treatment (a violation of equality). Hence, they suggest that the proportionality motive
may need to be reconsidered or at least more clearly differentiated from other RMs.
Finally, like Simpson et al. (2016), each relationship dyad was chosen to
represent a single relational model and associated motive violation in an all-or-none
fashion, when many real-life relationships may involve different motivations to
different degrees: for example, a parent-child relationship may involve both Unity or
provision-of-care motivations as well as Hierarchy motivations, especially when the
child is relatively young, and even Equality motivations when the parent and child are
on equal footing in a given context, for example, when playing a game together
(Bugental, 2000). Also consistent with Simpson et al. (2016), only judgments of
moral wrongness were assessed, with no assessments made of moral
praiseworthiness.
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From Types to Functions
While Rai and Fiske (2011), Simpson et al. (2016), and Tepe and AydınlıKarakulak (2018) – among others – have rightly drawn attention to relational context
in moral judgment, there are some important weaknesses in the theoretical foundation
for that work that must be addressed to move this area of research forward. Of
particular concern is the relatively descriptive, typological nature of RRT, which does
not allow for clear explanations of moral judgments or behavior because it gives
insufficient attention to the functions served by social relationships of various kinds.
In line with this more functional approach, which we use as the basis for our own
work, Bugental (2000) has theorized five domains of social life, understood as
algorithms—that is, effective procedures for solving particular problems (in this case,
the recurrent problems of social coordination likely faced by our ancestors over time).
Drawing together evidence from cognitive, social, biological, evolutionary,
and developmental psychology, Bugental (2000) takes care to articulate the specific
adaptive problems to be solved, the characteristic information an algorithm would
need to solve those problems, the approximate timing of the emergence or
development of associated capacities within a lifespan, the psychological processes
involved in exercising those capacities (primarily if-then contingencies), and the key
neurohormonal regulators of the relevant emotions and behaviors. As she notes, her
model differs from the taxonomy proposed by Fiske (1992) in several ways, including
in its focus on the processes by which a given algorithm is acquired and the relevant
biological mechanisms mediating its function (Bugental, 2000, p. 192). In pursuing
this focus, Bugental identified a different relational structure to that captured by the
RRT, such that different divisions had to be drawn between postulated functions or
domains in order to account for the totality of the data.
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The finished Bugental (2000) model includes an Attachment function (for
safety maintenance and the promotion of fundamental welfare needs, characterized by
co-evolved careseeking and caregiving roles); a Mating function (for acquiring and
maintaining a sexual partner, characterized by mate guarding behavior and pairbonding); a Reciprocity function (for maximizing joint outcomes among functional
equals, characterized by conscious or unconscious recordkeeping and tit-for-tat
exchanges); a Hierarchical function (for optimizing welfare and the balance of
control between those of unequal power or status, characterized by dominant and
subordinate roles); and a Coalitional function (for acquiring and defending shared
resources and territory especially in the face of out-group threats, characterized by
norms of coordination and conformity and the establishment of a group-level
identity).
This model differs from the RRT in several ways. For example, whereas the
Communal Sharing component of the RRT model collapses care and attachment
functions, on the one hand, and coalitional functions, on the other hand, in the
Bugental model, these functions are kept distinct. Moreover, the RRT model does not
include a mating function, despite the centrality of this function to reproductive
success, whereas this is a core function of the Bugental model.
Unlike the RRT, Bugental’s (2000) model also does not propose a unified
moral motivation for each relationship domain or function. But this is only
appropriate. Pre-theoretically, one should not expect that moral judgments and
emotions would have a one-to-one, abstract relationship with such domains. Rather,
one should expect that the relationship between these factors would depend on the
particular combination of social-relational functions that are in play in a given
situation, and on how these functions are distributed among the various parties to the
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interaction (as in the example of a parent and child playing a game, which would
contextually trigger an equality-based or reciprocal function).
This suggests a plausible first step for making predictions about people’s
moral intuitions as a function of relational context. Specifically, it seems necessary to
build a map of ways in which particular relationships or relationship dyads (parentchild, professor-student, brother-sister, customer-seller, and so on) are intuitively seen
as fulfilling or ideally serving the different underlying functions described by
Bugental (2000) in a given society.
In order to build such a map, of course, it would be important not to assume
that a given dyad—such as professor-student—solely exhibits, or can be used to
study, a single underlying relationship type or function—much less such a function
conceived of as operating in an all-or-none, or present-or-absent fashion. Instead,
common intuitions about the degree to which each relevant function is ideally served
by a given relationship should systematically be measured, and the resulting data used
to formulate predictions. This is the approach we take in this work, described in this
thesis.
Conclusion
Much recent work moral psychology has framed participant judgments in
terms of their apparent adherence to abstract moral principles, such as the utilitarian
requirement to impartially maximize welfare or Kant’s categorical imperative.
Moreover, participants often are asked to make judgments about cases involving
hypothetical interactions between strangers. But most of our moral judgments in the
real-world concern neither abstract principles nor strangers; rather, we tend to make
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concrete judgments about the behavior of those with whom we regularly interact –
people we know, and with whom we stand in particular social relationships.
Recognizing this, a growing number of moral psychologists are shifting their
focus to the study of moral judgment in social-relational context. In this chapter, I
have given a brief overview of recent work in this vein, highlighting both strengths
and weaknesses, and setting up a new ‘relational norms’ model of moral judgment we
have developed and tested over the past few years. To situate this discussion, I also
drew on influential philosophical theories of human morality that foreground
relational context. I suggest that these theories, in addition to those such as
utilitarianism that have shaped so much of the literature on moral psychology, should
be given more attention by moral psychologists than has so far been the case.
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Chapter 2
How Social Relationships Shape
Moral Wrongness Judgments
Abstract
Judgments of whether an action is morally wrong depend on who is involved and the
nature of their relationship. But how, when, and why social relationships shape moral
judgments is not well understood. We provide evidence to address these questions,
measuring cooperative expectations and moral wrongness judgments in the context of
common social relationships such as romantic partners, housemates, and siblings. In a
pre-registered study of 423 U.S. participants nationally representative for age, race, and
gender, we show that people normatively expect different relationships to serve
cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, reciprocity, and mating to varying degrees. In
a second pre-registered study of 1,320 U.S. participants, these relationship-specific
cooperative expectations (i.e., relational norms) enable highly precise out-of-sample
predictions about the perceived moral wrongness of actions in the context of particular
relationships. In this work, we show that a ‘relational norms’ model better predicts
patterns of moral judgments across relationships than alternative models based on
genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence, demonstrating how the
perceived morality of actions depends not only on the actions themselves, but also on
the relational context in which those actions occur.
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Introduction
Moral psychology has been dominated by studies of judgments and behaviors
concerning strangers: individuals who stand in no particular relationship with one
another, and who may or may not interact in the future (Hester & Gray, 2020).
Researchers conducting such studies commonly ask participants to make decisions
that impact anonymous others (Batson et al., 1997; Bowles, 2008; Crockett et al.,
2014) or to judge the moral acceptability of hypothetical actions taken by thinlydescribed agents, as in sacrificial dilemmas where participants must judge the
permissibility of killing one person in order to save a greater number (Conway et al.,
2018; Greene, 2008; Kahane et al., 2015; Mikhail, 2007). Of course, people often do
encounter strangers as they go about their lives, and the interpersonal standing
implied by such encounters can be seen as a bare-bones social relationship involving
certain minimal obligations: for example, a “duty of easy rescue” in the case of
emergencies (Sterri & Moen, 2020). The copious research on moral judgments in the
context of stranger-stranger relationships thus sheds important light on at least one
important aspect of our moral psychology.
However, the vast majority of our moral judgments in everyday life do not
concern strangers. Rather, they concern familiar others with whom we stand in
particular, often ongoing relationships (Clark et al., 2015). The stakes of such moral
judgments for the maintenance of our personal social networks typically are higher
than the stakes of analogous judgments pertaining to strangers. Moreover, moral
judgments about interactions between strangers often will differ in systematic ways
from judgments about interactions between friends, family members, or other familiar
individuals in the same situation (Bloom, 2011; Clark & Boothby, 2013; Ko et al.,
2020). For example, consider someone who could easily feed a hungry individual but
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fails to do so. If this person is a mother failing to feed her own child, she likely will be
seen as highly blameworthy. But if the person is a local restaurant owner failing to
feed a non-paying customer, the same behavior likely will not be seen as
blameworthy under ordinary conditions (Clark et al., 2020).
A number of theorists have highlighted relational context as likely to be
important for understanding moral judgment and behavior (Bloom, 2011; Clark et al.,
2015; Isern-Mas & Gomila, 2020; Rai & Fiske, 2011; Schein, 2020; Tomasello,
2020). In line with these developments, there is now a small but growing empirical
literature which explores how moral judgments of particular actions vary across
different types of social relationships (Everett et al., 2018; Koleva et al., 2014; Lee &
Holyoak, 2020; Mammen et al., in press; Marshall et al., 2020; McGraw & Tetlock,
2005; McManus et al., 2020; Rowe et al., 2020; Selterman et al., 2018; Simpson et al.,
2016; Simpson & Laham, 2015; Sunar et al., 2020; Tepe & Aydınlı-Karakulak, 2019;
Waytz et al., 2013; Weidman et al., 2020). How these relationships are theorized
depends on the study. For example, one recent study characterized relationships in
terms of the genetic relatedness of the interaction partners, and showed how varying
this factor affects moral judgments about helping behavior (McManus et al., 2021).
Another recent study characterized relationships in terms of the authors’ intuitive
sense of the social closeness and relative interdependence of the interaction partners –
regardless of genetic relatedness – and tested the influence of these factors on
judgments about violations of care (Gilead et al., 2018). Researchers have also sought
to predict moral wrongness judgments of actions in relational context from a single
cooperative function thought to characterize a given relationship (e.g., care for a
sibling relationship, hierarchy for a teacher-student relationship, and so on) (Simpson
et al., 2016).
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These studies demonstrate that moral judgments of one and the same action
often differ across different types of relationships, depending on how relationship
“type” is understood. What is missing, however, is a systematic, data-driven account
of the multiple cooperative functions that can characterize any given social
relationship (Clark et al., 2020), and an explicit comparison of how well such
cooperative functions predict relationally-situated moral judgments relative to
alternative models such as genetic relatedness, social closeness, and
interdependence. We aim to fill that gap with the present research.
In contrast to genetic relatedness, which can be determined objectively, and
the constructs of social closeness and interdependence, both of which have been
carefully defined within the relationship science literature, there is no agreed-upon set
of cooperative functions prescribed for different social relationships to solve
characteristic coordination problems. Recognizing both the theoretical overlap and
diversity among the various existing taxonomies of cooperative functions (Curry et
al., 2019; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011), we build on work by Bugental
(2000). This work describes a distinctive set of cooperative functions that serve to
coordinate behavior in interpersonal relationships. Each function represents an
efficient, socially acceptable solution to a particular type of recurrent coordination
problem (Curry et al., 2019), enabling cooperation partners to mutually benefit over
repeated interactions (Baumard et al., 2013; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Sznycer &
Lukaszewski, 2019). We focus here on four cooperative functions that solve dyadic or
two-party coordination problems: care, reciprocity, hierarchy, and mating (Table 1).
As has been noted previously, any given relationship may serve multiple
cooperative functions, either characteristically or in a specific context (e.g., Bugental,
2000, p. 192; Rai & Fiske, 2011, p. 60). We propose that within a given society, there
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are prescriptive norms for the set of cooperative functions different relationships
should serve (‘relational norms’). In the present work, we sought to (i) describe
patterns of relational norms for a large set of common dyadic relationships in a U.S.
cultural context; (ii) use these patterns of relational norms to predict out-of-sample
judgments of moral wrongness for actions that violate those norms across
relationships; and (iii) to compare this ‘relational norms’ model with alternative ways
of characterizing dyadic relationships, i.e., in terms of genetic relatedness, social
closeness, and interdependence.
Table 1
Cooperative functions of dyadic relationships, adapted from Bugental (2000)
Cooperative function
Care
Reciprocity
Hierarchy
Mating

Coordination problem to be solved
Securing basic welfare needs through non-contingent provision (or
acceptance) of help or support; maintaining safety; encouraging learning
Coordinating behavior between individuals with functionally similar (or
equal) status, power, authority, or claim on a resource
Coordinating behavior between individuals with different (unequal)
status, power, authority, or claim on a resource
Finding and maintaining sexual partners; ultimately, producing and
ensuring the survival of offspring

Note: the care function is based on the work of Clark and colleagues concerning “communal”
relationships (e.g., Clark & Mills, 1993); it conceptually overlaps with, and replaces, the “attachment”
function in Bugental’s model. Because our model is focused on dyadic interactions, we also do not
include Bugental’s group-level “coalition” function in this table (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section
1.4.3. for data pertaining to the coalition function).

With respect to aims (i) and (ii), we predicted that relational norms would
robustly predict moral judgments about the wrongness of actions in relational context.
The basis for this prediction is straightforward: the more a particular set of
cooperative functions matters for a given relationship, the morally worse it should be
judged to be to neglect or frustrate those same functions within that relationship.
Because relationships vary in terms of the set of cooperative functions they are
expected to serve, a given action may be judged to be seriously wrong in the context
of one relationship but entirely acceptable in the context of another.
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We further predicted that our relational norms model would better explain the
variance in moral judgments across relationship dyads than genetic relatedness, social
closeness, and interdependence, which we believe offer incomplete predictive
accounts of moral judgments in relational context. To illustrate, imagine that Person
A fails to behave in a deferential manner toward Person B. Insofar as the relationship
is normatively expected to be governed by the hierarchy function (see Table 1), with
Person A in the subordinate position, such behavior will likely be judged as morally
wrong. By contrast, consider how genetic relatedness might explain the wrongness of
this action. Some genetically close relationships, such as the parent-child relationship,
may, indeed, normatively rely on the hierarchy function to coordinate behavior, and to
the extent they do, the action might be judged to be wrong. However, other
genetically close relationships, such as siblings of a similar age, are less likely to rely
on the hierarchy function, while some genetically distant relationships, such as a
typical boss-employee relationship, might be equally or even more likely to rely on
the function. Thus, genetic relatedness may ultimately prove to be largely independent
of the question of what makes certain actions liable to be judged morally wrong.
In summary, unlike most prior work in moral psychology, which has been
designed to predict moral judgments from features of actions regardless of who
performs the action or their relationship to the affected other, here we consider
features of common social relationships that we predict will shape moral judgments of
actions that occur in the context of specific relational dyads. We show that the
similarity between relationship dyads in terms of their prescribed cooperative
functions—or relational norms—corresponds to similarity in moral judgments
between relationships. Put another way, dyads with similar relational norms within a
given society are associated with similar patterns of moral judgments across actions,
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whereas dyads with dissimilar relational norms are associated with divergent patterns
of moral judgments across actions. Finally, we show that relational norms more
strongly predict patterns of moral judgments across relationships than alternative
predictors, including genetic similarity, social closeness, or interdependence.
Results.
Relational norms vary across common dyadic relationships. We first
measured relationship-specific patterns for prescribed cooperative functions (i.e.,
relational norms) for a set of common dyadic relationships in the U.S. (study design,
sampling plan, and exclusion criteria pre-registered at https://aspredicted.org/).
Participants (final n = 423, U.S. nationally representative for age, race, and gender;
“Sample 1”) rated 20 common dyads on the extent to which each is normatively
expected to serve the functions of care, reciprocity, hierarchy, mating, and coalition.
Results for all 20 relationships across the four functions from Table 1 are depicted in
Figure 1 (for coalition data, see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 1.4.3.).
As can be seen in Figure 1, relational norms varied markedly across dyads in
several respects. The reciprocity function was generally prescribed for most dyads (M
across dyads = 54.23, SD = 49.64; higher than scale midpoint with Bonferroni
corrected alpha = .0125, t(1,422) = 100.47, p < .001, d = 1.09; note that all tests
reported in the manuscript are two-sided). Meanwhile, the mating function was
negatively prescribed (i.e., proscribed) for most dyads (M across dyads = -63.02, SD =
62.01; lower than the scale midpoint with same correction, t(1,422) = -93.48, p <
.001, d = -1.02), with a few obvious exceptions (romantic partners, M = 95.12, SD =
12.94; friends-with-benefits, M = 58.43, SD = 51.21). Participants demonstrated
higher levels of agreement about whether dyads were expected to serve the mating
(SDmean across relationships = 32.26) and care (SDmean across dyads = 37.82)
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functions, relative to the reciprocity (SDmean across dyads = 42.25) and hierarchy
(SDmean across dyads = 53.72) functions.

Figure 1. Prescribed cooperative functions. Kernel density plots of prescribed cooperative
functions for 20 common relationship dyads. Dots represent the population mean prescription for
each cooperative function within each relationship, caps represent +/- one standard deviation. The
height of the curve represents density: the likely proportions of scores (relative to each function)
that fall within the given range along the x-axis.
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Figure 2 depicts the four-dimensional relational norm profiles (i.e., sets of
prescribed cooperative functions) for a subset of relationships studied, and illustrates
several additional features of our data (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 1.4.4. for
functional profile plots for all 20 relationships). First, some relationships are highly
functionally “polarized,” showing substantial deviation in mean prescriptions across
the four cooperative functions, with at least one function anchored at an extreme end
of the scale. An example is the parent and under-18 child relationship (SD across
cooperative functions = 85.33, 85.2 for the mother-child and father-child relationship,
respectively), which is characterized by a strongly positive expectation for care and a
strongly negative expectation for mating. By contrast, other relationships are less
functionally polarized, such as the relationship between strangers (SD across
functions = 37.93). In these relationships, prescribed cooperative functions are
relatively evenly spread across the measured spectrum.
Second, some relationships are functionally “specific,” that is, they are only
strongly expected to serve a single cooperative function. For example, the
roommate/housemate relationship is strongly expected to serve the reciprocity
function (M = 87.30, SD = 21.71), but less so the care (M =24.9, SD = 43.64),
hierarchy (M = -4.48, SD = 63.00), and mating functions (M = -52.39, SD = 49.85).
Similarly, the boss-employee relationship is strongly expected to serve the hierarchy
function (M = 84.75, SD = 24.68), but less so reciprocity (M = 29.14, SD = 58.93) or
care (M = 7.86, SD = 50.21), and not at all mating (M = -92.17, SD = 23.98). By
contrast, other relationships are functionally “pluralistic,” that is, they are strongly
expected to serve multiple cooperative functions. A key example is the romantic
partner relationship (M across functions = 64.61), which is strongly expected to serve
three of the four cooperative functions: care (M = 92.43, SD = 17.06), mating (M =
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95.12, SD = 12.92), and reciprocity (M = 84.95, SD = 27.28) but not, in this sample
from the United States, the hierarchy function. See Appendix 1, Supplement Sections
1.4.1. and 1.4.2. for the rankings of all 20 relationship dyads on the dimensions of
polarization and specificity.
We also find gender differences in prescribed cooperative functions across
relationships. After scaling the raw scores to each participant’s mean rating, we built a
mixed linear effects regression model controlling for relevant demographic
information (age, income, religiosity, and political orientation entered as fixed
effects), including participant and relationship dyad type as random effects. With a
Bonferroni correction (alpha = .0125 for each of the following effects), the model
revealed that women (M = 0.43, SD = 0.75), compared to men (M = 0.37, SD = 0.79),
reported stronger average expectations that relationships will serve a function of care
(p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .10]), consistent with the existing literature (43–46). This
divergence was most apparent for the roommate/housemate (Mfemale - Mmale = 0.17),
customer-seller (Mf - Mm = 0.15), teacher-student (Mf - Mm = 0.14), neighbor (Mf - Mm
= 0.14), and colleague/classmate (Mf - Mm = 0.13) relationships. Regarding mating,
the opposite pattern was found, also consistent with the existing literature (Jonason et
al., 2015; Mark et al., 2015). Men (M = -1.12, SD = 0.97), compared to women (M = 1.2, SD = 0.89), reported stronger average expectations that relationships will serve a
mating function (p < .001, 95% CI [.03, .11]). This divergence was most apparent for
the friends-with-benefits (Mm - Mf = 0.27), roommate/housemate (Mm - Mf = 0.25),
acquaintance (Mmale - Mfemale = 0.24), close friend (Mm - Mf = 0.24),
colleague/classmate (Mm - Mf = 0.21), stranger (Mm - Mf = 0.17), and neighbor (Mm Mf = 0.17) relationships. Additional demographic analyses are reported in the
Appendix 1 Supplement Section 1.4.5.
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Figure 2. Relational norm profiles for a subset of 10 relationships. Pink represents care, black
represents hierarchy, green represents mating, blue represents reciprocity. The raw data (n = 423
independent ratings per function per relationship; total n = 8,460) are shown in individual dots; error
bars represent the mean (dot) and +/- 1 SD (caps). Note: Mother/Father and under-18 child have been
combined into a single plot. Plots for all 20 relationships are in the Appendix 1, Supplement Section
1.4.4.

Common relationships are hierarchically clustered around relational norms.
Next, we sought to quantify the distinctiveness of each relationship in fourdimensional relational norm space. Because in many instances patterns of prescribed
cooperative functions were not normally distributed in our study population (see
Figure 1), characterizing relationship differences in terms of their average relational
norm scores would sacrifice considerable information. We therefore calculated the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance statistic (a quantification of the difference in
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overall shape between any two empirical distributions) for each cooperative function
for each possible pair of relationships, and averaged across functions to calculate the
overall dissimilarity in relational norms for each relationship pair. This approach is
conceptually similar to representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008),
but incorporates information about the shapes of the relational norm distributions in
addition to distribution means.
We used the relational norm dissimilarity values to conduct a hierarchical
clustering analysis using a farthest-point algorithm: d(u,v)=max(dist(u[i],v[j]))
(Voorhees, 1985). This revealed four main clusters, depicted in Figures 3a and 3b,
which align with intuitive relational categories. The first cluster consists of sexual
relationships (romantic partners and friends-with-benefits). The second cluster
consists of hierarchical relationships with highly unequal authority between
individuals (parents and their minor children, teacher-student, boss-employee). The
third cluster includes relationships characterized largely by reciprocal interactions
between equals (e.g., customer-seller, roommates/housemates, strangers). And the
fourth, final cluster includes familial or other caring relationships (e.g., siblings,
extended family members, parents and their adult children).
Based on these analyses, we identified a subset of 10 relationships with
relatively distinctive relational norms (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 2.1. for
the selection procedure). This subset included long-term romantic partners, friends
with benefits, boss and employee, colleagues or classmates, mother/father and under18 child, siblings, close friends, roommates or housemates, teammates, and strangers.
Relational norm profiles for these relationships are depicted in Figure 2. We next
sought to predict moral judgments of actions performed in the context of these
relationships on the basis of their relational norm profiles.
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Neighbors
Colleagues / Classmates
Roommates / Housemates

Friends-with-Benefits
Romantic Partners
Boss - Employee
Teacher - Student

a

Strangers
Acquaintances

Father - Child (under 18 y/o)
Mother - Child (under 18 y/o)

Close Friends
Doctor - Patient
Political Party Members

Extended Family Members

Customer - Seller
Siblings
Teammates
Mother - Child (over 18 y/o)

Father - Child (over 18 y/o)

b

Figure 3. Hierarchical clustering of relationships. Circular dendrogram visually representing the mean
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance between relationships in four-dimensional relational norm space,
clustered hierarchically according to the Voorhees (1985) method (a); relationships selected for Study
2 are highlighted in a darker shade. Radar plots derived from the hierarchical cluster model are
depicted in the bottom half of the figure (b). The left panel shows the overlapping clusters; the right
panel shows each cluster on its own set of axes. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.

Relational norm profiles predict relationship-specific moral judgments out
of sample. To test the hypothesis that relational norm profiles would predict patterns
of moral judgments across common relationships, we first assembled a set of common
behaviors that would plausibly weaken or violate one or more of the cooperative
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functions. Fifteen trained judges rated 86 action statements of the form “Person A
does X to Person B” on the extent to which each described action would
characteristically weaken (that is, violate or impair) or strengthen each of the
cooperative functions, setting moral questions aside (that is, they were instructed not
to think about whether an action might be right or wrong in any relationship, but only
whether it would weaken or strengthen each function). There was very high interrater
agreement in these ratings (ICC(3, k) = .97). Using these data, we selected a final set
of 12 characteristic function-violating action statements, with 3 statements for each of
the 4 dyadic functions (see Methods for the algorithm used to select the final sub-set).
See Figure 4.
As can be seen in Figure 4, each action was rated by the judges as having both
a main (i.e., “target”) effect on a given function, as well as “side effects” on the other
cooperative functions. For example, “Person A sees Person B crying and walks away
from them” was rated as most characteristic in weakening the care function (M = 87.9, SD = 15.5), but also was rated as characteristically weakening the mating
function, albeit to a lesser extent (M = -40.1, SD = 35.0). The fact that one and the
same action might simultaneously weaken several interpersonal functions is to be
expected, depending on the “logic” of each function and the nature of the action. To
account, then, for the specificity of each action as a function-violator, we computed a
“target specificity” variable (i.e., main effect minus the mean of side effects) for each
action for use in subsequent analyses.
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Actions judged to characteristically
weaken one or more cooperative
functions

Care

Hierarchy

Mating

Reciprocity

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

1

Person A sees Person B crying and walks away
from them

-87.9 (15.5)

-15.9 (24.3)

-40.1 (35.0)

-19.0 (32.3)

2

Person A keeps checking their cellphone while
Person B tells a sad personal story

-75.1 (27.8)

-22.1 (29.6)

-36.5 (39.1)

-35 (35.1)

3

Person A watches passively while Person B
carries several heavy boxes up the stairs, even
though they could easily help

-73.9 (28.6)

-27.9 (31.3)

-17.4 (29.4)

-29.1 (28.6)

4

Person A refuses to follow a reasonable order
from Person B

-22.1 (29.5)

-89.5 (17.7)

-10.7 (13.1)

-16.9 (24.6)

5

Person A repeatedly interrupts Person B while
they are speaking

-42.2 (28.5)

-71.6 27.7)

-15.9 (20.3)

-50.3 (37.0)

6

Person A decides to skip a meeting scheduled
with Person B without a good excuse

-42.5 (34.7)

-69.8 (30.8)

-21.3 (31.0)

-38.4 (32.4)

7

Person A refuses to have sex with
Person B

-9.3 (17.7)

-10.7 (32.6)

-95.3 (10.7)

0.1 (2.1)

8

Person A repeatedly turns down Person B’s
offer to go on a romantic date

-10.5 (20.2)

-15.3 (19.4)

-77.7 (23.3)

-9.9 (34.3)

9

Person A invests time and energy in a romantic
relationship with someone other than Person B

-26.5 (34.8)

-4.5 (27.6)

-74.0 (28.8)

-31.9 (35.8)

-37.1 (31.3)

-27.0 (33.9)

-12.4 (17.8)

-85.2 (26.7)

10 Person A decides not to pay Person B back,
hoping Person B won’t remember
11

Person A decides not to return Person B’s nice
favor

-35.5 (29.9)

-9.2 (24.1)

-22.7 (21.6)

-82.0 (21.8)

12

Person A charges Person B $50 for an item
worth $25

-34.9 (27.9)

-28.1 (31.2)

-13.4 (23.6)

-69.4 (30.7)

Figure 4. Characteristic function-weakening actions. Heatmap showing mean ratings of judges (n = 15) of the extent
to which each action would characteristically neglect or weaken the care, hierarchy, mating, and reciprocity functions,
respectively, between any two people (i.e., not stating whether the relationship between “Person A” and “Person B”
should in fact serve any of those functions). These items were chosen as experimental stimuli from a much larger set
by an algorithm using the judges’ ratings, where -100 represents the most characteristic function-weakening effect (see
Methods). Darker shades represent more extreme ratings. Note: when rating actions on the “hierarchy” dimension,
judges were asked to imagine that Person A was in a subordinate role, specifically; when rating actions on the “care”
dimension, judges were asked to imagine that Person A was in a caregiving (as opposed to care-seeking) role,
specifically.

Having identified a set of actions, drawn from everyday life, that were judged
to characteristically weaken or violate one or more prescribed cooperative functions,
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our next step was to assess moral judgments concerning those actions in the context
of specific relationships. To do this, we recruited a new group of participants (online
US convenience sample, final n = 1,320; “Sample 2”), after pre-registering our
hypothesis, study design, sampling plan, exclusion criteria, and analysis approach at
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=ta5yj5. These “naïve” Sample 2 participants were
given no information about cooperative functions. Rather, each participant was
assigned randomly to consider 1 of the 10 functionally distinctive relationships
identified above, and was asked to rate the moral wrongness of all 12 actions listed in
Figure 4 in the context of that relationship (e.g., “Imagine that an employee refuses to
follow a reasonable order from their boss. How morally wrong would that be, if at
all?”). We also asked participants to rate each action on how likely it would be to
occur in real life, in order to be able to control for violations of nonmoral (i.e., socialconventional) expectations (Turiel, 2008) in a pre-registered secondary analysis (see
“action likelihood” variable below). For each participant, we computed the mean
moral wrongness rating for each of the four cooperative function-violation categories
within their assigned dyad. See Figure 5 for distributions of moral wrongness ratings
for each function-violation for each relationship (for demographic analyses, see the
Appendix 1 Supplement Section 2.5.1.).
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Figure 5. Moral wrongness judgments: Sample 2 moral wrongness judgments for cooperative function
violations in different relationships: kernel density plot of wrongness judgments (0 = not at all morally
wrong, 100 = very morally wrong) concerning characteristic function-weakening actions for each of
four dyadic cooperative functions across 10 relationships. Dot represents the mean, with 95%
confidence intervals. Height of the curve represents density (see Figure 1 for explanation). This
experiment was conducted once, with all data shown here. Note that actions which weaken the mating
function (e.g., refusing to have sex with someone) were judged closer to “not at all wrong” than “very
wrong” for all dyads apart from the romantic partner relationship. Otherwise, the relative lack of
visually dramatic differences in the shape of the moral wrongness judgment distributions between
relationships can likely be explained by the mild or ‘everyday’ nature of the function-weakening
actions employed in this study (see Figure 4). Such actions were deliberately chosen to contrast with
the more extreme, unusual, or bizarre actions often studied in moral psychology; thus the ability of our
model to predict even subtle variance in moral wrongness judgments between relationships for
common, non-extreme actions (see analysis below) can be seen as a strength.

We turn now to our main, pre-registered hypothesis. As a first approach, we
sought to predict Sample 2 moral wrongness judgments (i.e., for violating each of the
four cooperative functions) directly from Sample 1 relational norm profiles in a linear
mixed regression model. Sample 2 participants were entered as the highest-level
grouping variable, with relationship dyad and function-violation type then entered as
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crossed random factors. This variance structure accounts for the fact that for each
relationship a judgment was made for every function-violation type (i.e., a crossed
design). The mean relational norm estimates from Sample 1 were entered alongside
both “action likelihood” and “target specificity” as continuous fixed factors for the
reasons given above.
The results from this model supported our hypothesis. Relational norms
derived from Sample 1 significantly predicted the moral wrongness judgments of
Sample 2 participants (p < .001, 95% CI [15.63, 16.88]), accounting for 63% of the
variance in mean moral wrongness judgments according to an R2 analysis (Nakagawa
& Parker, 2015). Breaking the model down further, we find that target specificity was
positively correlated with moral wrongness judgments (p < .001, 95% CI [.34, .40]),
indicating that the more “on-target” the effect of an action in violating a given
function, the more harshly that action was judged. Action likelihood was also
negatively correlated with moral wrongness judgments (p < .001, 95% CI [-.21, .18]), indicating that rarer actions were judged more harshly, consistent with past
research (Lindström et al., 2018). These results are robust when controlling for
demographic factors. For the full regression tables, see Appendix 1, Supplement
Section 2.5.2.
The “action likelihood” variable serves an additional, theoretically important
purpose. As we alluded to previously, it can help account for the variance in moral
judgments that is due to potentially non-moral violations of social-conventional
expectations (i.e., deviations from what is socially expected, whether or not the
expectation tracks a perceived moral obligation) (Turiel, 2008) as opposed to
violations of relational norms specifically. By comparing the R2 effect size estimates
and AIC goodness-of-fit scores (i.e., of relational norm versus action likelihood
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models) we can judge the relative impact of each metric in explaining moral
judgments across relationships. We find that, in a model with no information about
relational norms, action likelihood alone does significantly predict moral wrongness
judgments in the absence of other predictors (p < .001). However, this model explains
much less variance, with a poorer goodness-of-fit score (marginal R2 = .08, AIC =
136,496.9) than a model based only on relational norms (marginal R2 = .30, AIC =
130,804). Moreover, the beta value for relational norms (16.26) is more than 80 times
larger than that for the action likelihood ratings (-.20) when both are included in the
same model (see Appendix 1, Supplementary Table #11f in Supplement Section
2.5.2.). This shows that relational norms explain moral judgments in this study far
better than do merely conventional norms regarding what is socially expected.
Having confirmed that relational norms predict between-relationship variation
in moral judgments, over and above mere uncommonness or unexpectedness of
behavior, we sought to further explore the nature of this predictive relationship.
Specifically, we sought to predict the distance between each pair of relationships in
moral judgment space (based on Sample 2 patterns of moral judgment) from their
corresponding distances in four-dimensional relational norm space (from Sample 1).
To do this, we relied on the same K-S distance approach as described above,
comparing the moral judgment distributions for each type of function violation for
each possible pair of relationships, and averaging across functions to produce an
overall moral judgment dissimilarity score for each relationship pair. We then ran a
Spearman’s correlation between these moral judgment dissimilarity values and the
previously computed relational norm dissimilarity values, hypothesizing that the
average K-S distance between every pair of relationships in relational norm space
would predict the corresponding K-S distance between the same pairs of relationships
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in moral judgment space. As can be seen in Figure 6, this hypothesis was confirmed (r
= .43, p = .003). Looking at the same K-S distances, but on a function-by-function
basis (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 2.5.3. for the corresponding scatterplots),
we find that the positive correlation between prescribed cooperative functions and
moral judgment K-S distances holds for care (r = .48, p < .001), mating (r = .73, p <
.001), and hierarchy (r = .31, p = .041), but not for reciprocity (r = -.13, p = .39). We
will return to this unexpected result for reciprocity in the general discussion.

Figure 6. Relational norm and moral judgment dissimilarity. Scatterplot showing the predicted
correlation in K-S distance between each pair of relationship dyads in relational norm space (xaxis) and the K-S distance between those same dyads in moral judgment space (y-axis).
Spearman’s r = .43, p = .003. Note that the color of each relationship reflects the cluster in
which it is located from Figure 3.

Relational norms explain more variance in moral judgments than
alternative models. Prior work has sought to predict relational variance in moral
judgments from factors such as genetic relatedness (Burnstein et al., 1994), social
closeness (Mills et al., 2004), and degree of interdependence (Berscheid et al., 1989)
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of the interaction partners. How do these alternative predictors compare to relational
norms in terms of explaining variance in relationally situated moral judgments?
To address this question, we asked a third sample of participants (online US
convenience sample; final n = 85) to rate the extent to which a well-functioning
instance of each of the 10 distinctive relationship dyads would be characterized by
social closeness and interdependence. More specifically, for social closeness, we
asked how much the partners would “deeply understand each other,” “accept and
validate each other’s natures,” and “strive to care for and promote each other’s overall
well-being” (taking the mean of these three items). For interdependence, we asked
how “frequently,” “strongly,” and in “how many ways” each partner would affect the
other’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors across different situations (ditto). Genetic
relatedness for each relationship was determined objectively.
We then entered genetic relatedness, social closeness, and interdependence
ratings as predictors in separate linear mixed models similar to those described
previously, regressing moral judgments on relational norms. We found no relationship
between mean moral wrongness judgments and any of social closeness (p = .11, 95%
CI [-.04, .39]), interdependence (p = .14, 95% CI [-.05, .38]), or genetic relatedness (p
= .78, 95% CI [-12.41, 9.27]). By contrast, relational norms remained significantly
predictive of moral wrongness judgments (p < .001, 95% CI [.10, .15]), even
controlling for the other factors. In addition, measures of model fit suggest that the
relational norms model (marginal R2 = .69, AIC = 841) performed substantially better
than any of the alternative models: social closeness (marginal R2 = .44, AIC =
908.04), interdependence (marginal R2 = .44, AIC = 908.00), and genetic relatedness
(marginal R2 = .44, AIC = 910.33). See Appendix 1, Supplement Section 3.4. for the
full regression tables.
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Discussion.
Several scholars have stressed the importance of taking relational context into
account in understanding our moral psychology. Yet the way that relational context
has been conceptualized so far has suffered from certain limitations. Most commonly,
relational context has been understood to vary in a one-dimensional way: for example
in terms of the genetic relatedness of the interaction partners (McManus et al., 2021),
or their social closeness or interdependence (Gilead et al., 2018). A more promising
approach, we think, is to conceptualize relationships in terms of the distinctive
cooperative functions they are normatively expected to rely upon for coordinating
behavior in a given society (Bugental, 2000; Clark et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2016).
Although a number of authors have proposed various taxonomies of cooperative
functions (Curry et al., 2019; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011) that overlap
theoretically with the set employed here (Bugental, 2000), it has remained unclear
how these functions actually are embedded in different types of relationships.
Consequently, we undertook to measure relationship-specific patterns of prescribed
cooperative functions (i.e., relational norms) in a U.S. cultural context and to
demonstrate how these relational norms predict relationship-specific moral
judgments.
To do this, we first measured prescribed cooperative functions for a large set
of common dyadic relationships, yielding four-dimensional relational norm profiles
for each relationship. Quantifying the distinctiveness of these relationships in terms of
their relational norms revealed several distinct clusters of relationship types spanning
the domains of care, hierarchy, mating, and reciprocity. Consistent with our
predictions, such relational norms predicted out-of-sample moral judgments in
relational context, and explained more relational variance in moral judgments than
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genetic relatedness, social closeness, or interdependence of relationship partners. This
suggests that moral judgments of actions within a given relationship are guided by the
extent to which the actions thwart or neglect prescribed cooperative functions for that
relationship. Moreover, relationships with more similar relational norms showed more
similar patterns of moral judgments (Figure 6). These findings reveal a robust
underlying structure of expected relational obligations which shape our moral
judgments.
Lewin famously argued that behavior is a product of the person and the
situation (Lewin, 1951). In a similar spirit, our data confirm that judgments of moral
behavior cannot be understood solely with reference to a given act or actor, but rather,
must be interpreted in light of the situation, which, in this case, is the type of
relationship existing between two individuals. Relationships in a given society can be
characterized by distinctive profiles of cooperative norms. They will, therefore,
typically be one of the most important situational factors in terms of explanatory
power (Clark et al., 2018). Although relationship theorists have, for decades, worked
to characterize the structural elements of various close relationships (Kelley et al.,
2003) and have sometimes categorized relationships in terms of cooperative functions
necessary for human thriving (Bugental, 2000; Clark & Mills, 1993), here we
systematically described lay perceptions of the ideal functional make-up of a wide
range of relationships as identified by ordinary language. Moreover, we were able to
use this information to make accurate out-of-sample predictions of moral judgments
concerning various actions. We hope that our approach will inspire further research in
this vein, both theoretical and empirical, at the interface of relationship science and
moral psychology. Ideally, such research will help to integrate and enrich work in
both domains, which has so far remained largely separate.
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From a theoretical perspective, one aspect of our current account that requires
further attention is the reciprocity function. In contrast with the other three functions
considered, relationship-specific prescriptions for reciprocity did not significantly
predict moral judgments for reciprocity violations. Why might this be so? One
possibility is that the model we tested did not distinguish between two different types
of reciprocity. In some relationships, such as those between strangers, acquaintances,
or individuals doing business with one another (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005), each
party tracks the specific benefits contributed to, and received from, the other (Clark et
al., 1989). In these relationships, reciprocity thus takes a tit-for-tat form in which
benefits are offered and accepted on a highly contingent basis. This type of
reciprocity is transactional, in that resources are provided, not in response to a real or
perceived need on the part of the other, but rather, in response to the past or expected
future provision of a similarly valued resource from the cooperation partner. In this, it
relies on an explicit accounting of who owes what to whom, and is thus characteristic
of so-called “exchange” relationships (Clark & Mills, 1993).
In other relationships, by contrast, such as those between friends, family
members, or romantic partners – so-called “communal” relationships – reciprocity
takes a different form: that of mutually expected responsiveness to one another’s
needs. In this form of reciprocity, each party tracks the other’s needs (rather than
specific benefits provided) (Clark et al., 1989) and strives to meet these needs to the
best of their respective abilities, in proportion to the degree of responsibility each has
assumed for the other’s welfare (Clark & Mills, 1993). Future work on moral
judgments in relational context should distinguish between these two types of
reciprocity: that is, mutual care-based reciprocity in communal relationships (when
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both partners have similar needs and abilities) and tit-for-tat reciprocity between
“transactional” cooperation partners who have equal standing or claim on a resource.
A further limitation of the current studies is that they only concern moral
wrongness judgments, based on actions that weaken one or more of the expected
relational functions. What about judgments of moral rightness, goodness, or
praiseworthiness as these relate to actions which strengthen one or more of the
functions (Anderson et al., 2020)? Will people be judged positively for “merely”
meeting functional expectations, as when a parent-child relationship fulfills the care
function, or will such judgments be reserved for so-called supererogatory behaviors,
going above and beyond the call of duty (Archer, 2016)? Either way, we expect that
praiseworthiness judgments for a given action will depend, among other things, on the
relational context (functionally understood).
Much of the prior literature in moral psychology has focused on judgments of
strangers involved in moral dilemmas that pit distinct ethical principles against one
another: for example, a utilitarian imperative to maximize welfare, versus a
deontological rule that forbids using individuals as a mere means to an end (Conway
et al., 2018). A key tenet of utilitarianism is that welfare should be maximized
impartially, rather than prioritizing the well-being of family members (for example)
over distant strangers (Mill, 1863). Descriptive research on moral dilemmas shows
that many people are not in fact impartial in this sense (Kahane et al., 2018),
consistent with our observations here that people have different cooperative
expectations for different relationships, leading in turn to different moral judgments
depending on relational context. One intriguing possibility is that individuals who
more strongly endorse impartial beneficence will have more uniform prescriptions for
cooperative functions across relationships, leading to more uniform moral judgments
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across relational contexts. This perspective also suggests possible antecedents of
impartial beneficence. Because care is normative in close relationships (with family,
friends, and romantic partners), caring for partners in these relationships does not
typically elicit special approbation. Perhaps those who find a sense of purpose or
belonging not in tending to close relationships, but in widely being admired (Hirsch &
Clark, 2019), tend to “distribute” care across a broader set of relationships (thus
showing relatively impartial beneficence).
We note that the generalizability of our findings may be limited in several
ways. First, apart from relational role and gender (for mothers and fathers), we did not
consider the possible impact of such target characteristics as race, religion, politics,
age, and social class, on moral judgments. Each variable itself may impact moral
judgments (Hester & Gray, 2020; E. F. Jones et al., 1999) and interact with relational
context in systematic ways. Second, again apart from gender, we did not
comprehensively evaluate how observer (i.e., participant) characteristics along those
same demographic lines shape moral judgments, thereby impacting the
correspondence between relational norms and moral judgments in relational context.
Other individual differences among participants, for example in their relative
tendency to engage in different styles of moral reasoning (Kahane et al., 2018) will be
important to assess in future research. We see our work as a starting point that may
launch further investigations into how both target and observer relational qualities
interact with each other and with other kinds of characteristics in shaping moral
cognition.
Because we studied participants in the U.S., it also will be important to
investigate whether our results generalize across different cultures (Awad et al.,
2018). Although we expect that humans in all cultures form (or stand in) relationships
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which rely on one or more of the underlying cooperative functions we have
highlighted, the patterning of relational norms likely will vary by culture. Indeed,
long-standing programs of research have documented such differences using
alternative theoretical frameworks. Hindu research participants from the city of
Mysore in southern India, for instance, expected care from a broader array of people - from parents, friends, and even strangers -- than did research participants from the
city of New Haven in the United States (Miller et al., 1990). The same difference
applied to reciprocity (Miller & Bersoff, 2016). In another study, U.S. American
wives felt that husbands should care more for them than for their mothers whereas the
reverse held true for Egyptian wives (Pataki et al., 2013). Future studies might also
compare how “tight” (that is, lacking in variance across situations) relational norms
are in each culture (Gelfand et al., 2011).
Our primary goal for this research has been simple: to investigate how
relational context – in particular, the functional cooperative norms that prescriptively
govern dyadic interactions of various kinds – shapes moral judgments. A secondary
goal has been to push researchers studying human moral psychology to look at
behaviors and associated judgments that are more characteristic of people’s day-today lives than heretofore has been the case. Much remains to be done, including more
precise and sophisticated analyses of which cooperative functions apply to which
relationships, how these functions relate to one another, and how they can be used to
predict praiseworthiness judgments (not just judgments of moral wrongness as we
have undertaken here). As we and others pursue work that places the study of
morality in both geopolitical and relational cultural context, we anticipate the
emergence of a more nuanced literature on human morality that becomes better
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integrated with broader and long-standing programs of research on relationships and
prosocial behavior.
Methods.
All studies were reviewed and approved by the Yale University Institutional
review board (protocol #20000022385); informed consent was obtained from
participants in each instance prior to data collection. We have posted all study
materials, pre-registration forms, raw data, and analysis code on the Open Science
Framework (https://osf.io/zxjt6/). For complete study descriptions and supplementary
findings, see the Appendix 1 Supplement.
Stage 1. For Stage 1, the design, measures, sampling plan, and exclusion
criteria were pre-registered at aspredicted.org (#26400). We used an online polling
software (https://www.nbrii.com/our-process/sample-size-calculator/) to determine
that at least 385 participants would be needed to obtain population estimates of
functional expectations with a 5% margin of error and 95% confidence level.
Anticipating participant exclusions, we over-sampled by about 15% and aimed to
recruit 450 U.S. participants via the Prolific Academic platform (Prolific); 493
ultimately took the survey, each of whom was paid at a rate of $7.25 per hour.
Seventy (70) participants were excluded based on the pre-registered exclusion criteria,
leaving us with a final sample of 423 participants (“Sample 1”) who completed an
online survey. Participants were given descriptions and definitions of all five
cooperative functions adapted from Bugental (57): care, coalition, hierarchy, mating,
and reciprocity (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 1.2.1. for the full descriptions).
To ensure that participants were thinking of the functions in the way we intended,
participants were not able to advance to the main part of the study before passing
multiple comprehension checks.
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We then asked participants to indicate how much each of 20 common
relationships should ideally serve each of the five cooperative functions, specifying:
“if this kind of relationship was the best possible relationship of its kind it could be
[i.e., according to general societal standards], how much should it serve each of those
5 relationship functions?” Participants rated each relationship type in random order.
For each relationship type, we included a brief description (see Appendix 1,
Supplement Section 1.2.2. for the descriptions). Then, for each combination of
relationship and function, participants rated how much the relationship ideally should
serve the given function on a sliding scale from -100 (definitely should not serve) to
+100 (definitely should serve). Since every participant assessed all five functions for
all 20 relationships, we obtained 100 data points per participant. Finally, we collected
a battery of demographic measures (described next) as well as exploratory measures
for future studies not included here.
In analyzing the demographic information, we first excluded the coalition
ratings for the reasons described in the main text. We then used a linear mixed model
to regress prescribed cooperative function scores on participant gender (female, male;
4 participants who marked ‘other’ were excluded) for each of the four remaining
functions. Reported annual income (“low” = $35K or less, “high” = more than $35K;
split based on U.S. median income), religiosity (“high” versus “low” based on a mean
split), and both social and economic political ideology (ditto) were entered into the
model as categorical covariates. Full model summaries are in Appendix 1,
Supplement Section 1.4.5.
Stage 2. For Stage 2, the hypothesis, design, measures, sampling plan,
exclusion criteria, and analysis approach were pre-registered at aspredicted.org
(#31592). Two main steps were involved: first, selection of a subset of relationships
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from Stage 1 plus the generation of “action items” to be rated for subsequent use; and
second, the actual study, collecting ratings from a new sample (“Sample 2”). As
before, the Sample 1 coalition data were excluded.
Using the (remaining) Sample 1 cooperative function scores for all 20
relationships, we performed an analysis that is conceptually similar to a
representational similarity analysis (RSA), except that it relies on the KolmogorovSmirnov (K-S) distance statistic rather than distribution means. The goal of this
analysis was to identify relationships with relatively dissimilar relational norm
profiles, so that 10 of the least functionally redundant relationships could be used in
the current Stage. For the RSA-like analysis, each relationship was compared to every
other relationship on the dimensions of care, hierarchy, mating, and reciprocity. The
mean of the four corresponding K-S distance statistics was used for this comparison.
Next, we ranked each pair of relationships by its mean K-S distance, from least to
most distant (that is, from most functionally redundant to least functionally
redundant). We then dropped the relationship from each pair that had the lowest mean
K-S distance from all other relationships in the set. Note: for theoretical reasons (i.e.,
to allow gender comparisons) we decided in advance to retain both the father-child
and mother-child relationships in case they faced off. The final set of relationships
identified by this procedure is shown in Figure 2 of the main text.
We then created a set of 86 “action statements” describing behaviors that
would plausibly weaken or violate specific cooperative functions based on their
underlying logic (i.e., how each function solves its corresponding coordination
problem). To determine the extent to which certain actions would characteristically
weaken (or strengthen) each of the four dyadic cooperative functions, we had 15
trained judges rate all 86 action items in our set. These judges were recruited among
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lab members and colleagues and were given extensive training, either in-person or
using an online video conferencing platform, to ensure high quality ratings. They
were instructed to consider only the functional implications of each action, setting any
potential moral considerations strictly aside.
Ratings were obtained via an online survey. The survey included the same
formal descriptions of cooperative functions used in Stage 1. Following multiple
comprehension checks, the judges were shown the 86 action statements, in random
order, in the format “Person A does X to Person B.” For each action and function
combination, they made their judgment on a sliding scale ranging from “Would
characteristically weaken [the function]” (-100) through “It depends / Would neither
weaken nor strengthen” (0) to “Would characteristically strengthen” (+100).
Next, we created an algorithm to select 12 action items that were rated among
the most characteristic in weakening each of the four cooperative functions (three
statements per function). First, for each function, the algorithm ranked the actions, in
ascending order, by their mean weakening “characteristicness” rating and randomly
selected 3 out of the seven most characteristic actions. Second, it computed the mean
rating across the three selected actions, yielding one mean score per function. Third,
the algorithm computed the standard deviation of the four function-specific means
generated in the previous step. Finally, steps one to three were repeated 10,000 times
to find the combination of three action statements that yielded the lowest standard
deviation of scores across functions. The second iteration of the algorithm was
subjected to two further constraints so that we could ensure consistency with potential
function-strengthening items planned for testing in future studies (‘strengthen’ set).
The first constraint was that the minimum mean score in the ‘weaken’ set could not be
lower than the minimum mean score in the ‘strengthen’ set. The second constraint
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was that the average of the final ‘weaken’ scores could not be more than one point
lower than the average of the final ‘strengthen’ scores. So that future studies can be
straightforwardly compared with the present study, we selected the ‘weaken’ action
items so that they would weaken the cooperative functions to a similar degree as
future ‘strengthen’ items would strengthen the cooperative functions. The reason for
doing this is because we wanted to make sure that we identified a set of ‘weaken’
items that were not more extreme (in the ‘weaken’ direction) than future ‘strengthen’
items (in the ‘strengthen’ direction). This process resulted in a final set of 12 functionweakening action statements, with three per function, as shown in Figure 4.
Proceeding to the second main part of Stage 2, a set of naive/lay participants
(Sample 2) was recruited, this time on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). To
power for the same confidence and margin of error as in Sample 1, but this time with
a between-subjects design, it was determined that we would need ratings from 1,551
participants (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 2.2. for the full rationale). Based on
the Sample 1 exclusion rate, we over-recruited by about 10% and thus aimed to
recruit 1,706 participants; 1,822 ultimately filled out at least part of the survey (not all
finished), each of whom was paid $1.00. Five hundred and two (502) participants
were excluded based on pre-registered exclusion criteria, leaving us with a final
sample of 1,320 participants. As in Stage 1, they were shown brief descriptions of
their assigned relationship. They were told that they would be asked to rate the moral
wrongness of various actions within the relationship. To orient them to the rating
scale, we clarified that none of the actions they would see would be extreme (e.g.,
murder), but would rather all be actions that might plausibly occur within the course
of day-to-day life.
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After passing several attention and comprehension checks, participants were
shown, in random order, all 12 action items, tailored to their assigned relationship.
For instance, if they were assigned the romantic partner relationship, one of their
items was: “Imagine that someone keeps checking their cell phone while their
romantic partner tells a sad personal story. How morally wrong would that be, if at
all?” Responses were recorded on a sliding scale from “Not at all morally wrong" (0)
to "Very morally wrong" (100). Finally, we collected exploratory data about how
likely or unlikely it was that each of the rated actions would happen in real life, and
administered the same battery of demographic measures as were used in Stage 1.
For the K-S distance analysis reported in the main text, please note that the
functional ratings from Sample 1 were first z-scored to each Sample 1 participant in
order to account for individual differences in scale use; for the moral wrongness
ratings, no such z-scoring was performed because each Sample 2 participant made
only 12 ratings (on account of the between-subjects design). For the linear mixed
regression model reported in the main text, although the moral wrongness variable
was not normally distributed, Q-Q plots indicated that this did not violate the
normality assumption of the model. See Appendix 1, Supplement Section 2.5.1 for
details.
Stage 3. For Stage 3, we powered to have as many observations per
distribution as were obtained in Stage 1. Given design differences between the
studies, we determined that we would need ratings from 150 participants for the
current study (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 3.1. for the full rationale). This is
the number we recruited on MTurk; ultimately, 149 participants completed the
survey, each of whom was paid $1.00 for their time. Sixty-four (64) participants were
excluded based on the predetermined exclusion criteria, leaving us with a final sample
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of 85 participants. Participants were shown the same descriptions of relationships
used in Stage 2 and asked to rate them along three dimensions each of social
closeness and interdependence (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 3.2.1. for the
precise wording). Responses -- regarding the extent to which a well-functioning
instance of each relationship would be characterized by each dimension of both
constructs -- were recorded on a sliding scale from 0 to 100, labelled appropriately for
each dimension. Similar demographic measures to those used in the previous studies
were administered. Please note that, given the unexpectedly large proportion of
excluded participants in this study, we performed a sensitivity/robustness analysis
with no exclusions (see Appendix 1, Supplement Section 3.4.2. for details), and the
results remain substantively the same.
Data availability. All original data (anonymized) and study materials are available on
the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/zxjt6/. Source data are provided with
this paper.
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Chapter 3
Praise and Blame in Relational Context
Abstract
Contemporary work in moral psychology has focused primarily on judgments
concerning interactions between strangers. However, it is increasingly recognized that
much of human moral judgment takes place in the context of -- and is shaped by -multiple dyadic social relationships, such as parent-child, teacher-student, close
friends, long-term romantic partners, neighbors, teammates, and so on. In the recent
literature, relationship ‘type’ has been understood in various ways, including in terms
of the genetic relatedness or social closeness of the interaction partners. An alternative
approach, based on distinctive patterns of cooperative functions (such as care,
hierarchy, or mating) that different relationships are normatively expected to serve,
has recently shown promise for predicting moral wrongness judgments for a wide
range of behaviors taking place in relational context (see Chapter 2). However, this
work has focused solely on actions that characteristically impair or neglect
(“weaken”) cooperative functions, and on associated moral wrongness judgments.
Actions that characteristically promote or fulfill (“strengthen”) cooperative functions,
as well as corresponding judgments of moral goodness or praiseworthiness, remain
understudied.
In the present work we begin to address this gap. In Study 1 (N = 388, U.S.
nationally representative for age, race, and gender) we measured normative
cooperative expectations (“relational norms”) regarding care, hierarchy, mating, and
transaction for 20 common social relationships. We then used these relational norms
to predict out-of-sample moral judgments of blameworthiness and praiseworthiness
for actions that characteristically weaken (Study 2, N = 1,660) or strengthen (Study 3,
N = 1,431) one or more cooperative functions. Implications and future directions are
discussed.
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Introduction

Until recently, the psychology of obligation -- our sense of what we owe to
one another, morally speaking -- has not received much attention from moral
psychologists (Tomasello, 2020). Nor has the way in which our sense of obligation is
shaped by social-relational context received much attention (Clark et al., 2015, 2020).
Instead, within moral psychology, the focus of research largely has been on
judgments about interactions between strangers, as exemplified by so-called trolley
problems and other similar paradigms (Bostyn et al., 2018; Conway et al., 2018;
Goldstein-Greenwood et al., 2020; Greene, 2015; Greene et al., 2001; Kahane et al.,
2015, 2018). However, it is increasingly recognized that much of human moral
judgment takes place in the context of -- and is shaped by the nature of -- multiple
social relationships, such as those between parents and children, bosses and
employees, customers and sellers, and so on; thus, a single morally relevant action
may be judged very differently depending on the social relationship within which it
occurs (Bloom, 2011; Clark & Boothby, 2013; Simpson et al., 2016). A growing
empirical literature is bearing this out (Berg et al., 2021; Earp et al., 2020; Haidt &
Baron, 1996; Lee & Holyoak, 2020; Mammen et al., 2021; Marshall, MerminBunnell, et al., 2020; Marshall, Wynn, et al., 2020; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005;
McManus et al., 2020, 2021; Rowe et al., 2020; Simpson et al., 2016; Sunar et al.,
2021; Tepe & Aydınlı-Karakulak, 2019; Waytz et al., 2013; Yudkin et al., 2021).
For example, in a recent study, an agent who helped a stranger was judged as
more morally admirable than an agent who helped a close relative under similar
conditions, whereas an agent who helped a stranger instead of helping a relative was
judged to be morally worse (McManus et al., 2021). This pattern of results can be
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explained by the fact that kin, compared to strangers, are widely seen as having a
stronger moral obligation to help one another (Crimston et al., 2016; Ko et al., 2020).
In other words, while the agent who helped a stranger in the first scenario might be
seen as going above and beyond the call of duty, thereby eliciting a positive moral
judgment, the agent who helped a stranger in the second scenario could do so only by
failing to meet an even weightier obligation, thereby eliciting a negative moral
judgment (Law et al., 2021).
Along the same lines, but regarding friendship rather than family ties, another
recent study found that, among older children and adults, an unhelpful friend was seen
as “meaner” than an unhelpful stranger (Marshall, Wynn, et al., 2020). This is
consistent with the fact that, when compared to strangers, friends -- like family -- are
typically regarded as having a stronger mutual obligation of care. A similar pattern
applies to a larger set of relationships: parent-child, boss-employee, strangers,
siblings, long-term romantic partners, friends-with-benefits, close friends, teammates,
and roommates/housemates. In this study, the more a relationship was normatively
expected to be governed by a norm of care -- based on the ratings of one group of
participants -- the more morally wrong a second group of participants judged it to be
for someone within that relationship to fail to be caring (Earp et al., 2020). Clearly, in
many cases, judgments about the moral status of an act (or actor) will depend on who
performs the action, who is affected by it, and the type of relationship between them.

Types of Relationships

But how should relationship ‘type’ be understood? Social relationships -- as
identified by lay language terms such as friend, sibling, or teammate -- vary along
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multiple dimensions, any number of which might be relevant for understanding the
perceived moral obligations embedded within them. Relative expectations of care are
only the tip of the iceberg. Thus, in the recent empirical literature, relationship ‘type’
has been understood -- and experimentally manipulated -- in different ways. In the
study by McManus et al. (2021), relationships were defined in terms of the degree of
genetic relatedness of the interaction partners (e.g., strangers, distant relatives, close
relatives). Other recent studies have categorized relationships in terms of the social
closeness of the interaction partners (Berg et al., 2021; Gilead et al., 2018; Yudkin et
al., 2021). And still others have conceived of relationships in terms of various
cooperative functions -- including, but not limited to, care -- that each might
normatively be expected to serve within a given society (Earp et al., 2020; Simpson et
al., 2016; Tepe & Aydınlı-Karakulak, 2019).
Let us consider each classification in turn. The link between genetic
relatedness and a perceived obligation of care is straightforward. Classic work on kin
altruism predicts that individuals who are more closely genetically related to each
other should feel more strongly inclined to unconditionally promote each other’s
welfare (i.e., care for them) than should individuals who are more distantly
genetically related, all else being equal (Burnstein et al., 1994; Ko et al., 2020; Foster
et al., 2006). This inclination has undoubtedly become codified within many human
cultures, serving as a normative expectation or moral norm (Isern-Mas & Gomila,
2020). The widespread value of being loyal to one’s family above most or all others is
a reflection of this (Lee & Holyoak, 2020; Waytz et al., 2013).
However, in complex modern societies, family isn’t everything. For example,
a person might have a tighter affiliation or cooperative bond with a close friend than
with a distant cousin, say -- and therefore feel a stronger obligation of care toward the
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friend -- even though the cousin is more closely genetically related (McManus et al.,
2021). Depending on the society, this stronger perceived obligation to the friend may
be more or less culturally sanctioned. And to the extent that it is culturally sanctioned,
it might seem that it is the degree of social closeness of the interaction partners -- a
quality that tends to overlap with genetic relatedness, but which also often comes
apart from it -- that more directly explains the perceived obligation. Indeed, within the
relationship science literature, the construct of social closeness is, itself, partly
defined in terms of the strength of one’s caring disposition toward another (i.e.,
motivation to promote their well-being) (Berscheid et al., 1989; Mills et al., 2004),
lending some support to this approach.
But just as there is more to care than family loyalty, there is more to human
morality than care. Instead, as several theorists have emphasized, our sense of moral
obligation goes far beyond a concern for helping (or avoiding harming) certain
people; it also covers concerns about fairness or reciprocity, respect for authority, and
sexual propriety among other considerations (Bugental, 2000; Haidt & Hersh, 2001;
Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011).
One way to understand these concerns is that they reflect certain cooperative
functions that different relationships and different combinations of relationships
within a society must serve to solve recurrent coordination problems of our species
(see Figure 1). For example, if interaction partners have highly unequal knowledge or
skill with respect to a joint task that needs doing, this could create a coordination
problem if the less able partner insisted on being in charge. The cooperative function
of hierarchy provides a solution to this kind of problem: in such a situation, the more
able partner should have final say about how to proceed, while also, ideally, providing
leadership in helping the less able partner to grow in their knowledge and skill. The
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less able partner should cooperatively follow the leader. If the partners successfully
cooperate on this basis, they will be more likely to achieve their joint goal.
Other cooperative functions -- including care, mating, and transaction (a
specific form of reciprocity in which benefits are exchanged on a tit for tat basis and
records are kept informally or formally) -- are discussed below. The point for now is
that different social relationships within a society may typically or chronically face
different kinds of coordination problems, and so will characteristically be expected to
employ these different functions to different degrees (Earp et al., 2020; Rai & Fiske,
2011). In each case, the moral obligations that are widely perceived to be associated
with the relationship can be expected to track the relationship’s characteristic
cooperative functions (albeit with certain of these functions coming to the fore or
receding into the background depending on the situation) (Yudkin et al., 2021).
There is now preliminary evidence that this last, cooperative-functional
account -- described in more detail in the following sections -- can successfully
predict, and explain more variance in, moral wrongness judgments for a range of
potentially objectionable behaviors in relational context than can accounts based on
genetic relatedness or social closeness alone (Earp et al., 2020). However, whether
such an account can predict or explain judgments of moral goodness or
praiseworthiness for positive behaviors is not yet known. We discuss this issue in the
following section.
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Cooperative function

Coordination problem to be solved

Care

Securing overall welfare through non-contingent provision (or
acceptance) of benefits or resources in response to need

Transaction

Balancing contingent provision and acceptance of benefits for
mutual gain over repeated interactions; avoiding exploitation

Hierarchy

Coordinating behavior between individuals who have unequal
authority over one another

Mating

Finding and maintaining sexual partners; ultimately, producing and
ensuring the survival of offspring

Figure 1. Cooperative functions of dyadic relationships, adapted from Earp et al. (2020), building on
Bugental (2000) and Clark (e.g., Clark & Mills, 2012). The care and transaction functions, in particular, are
based on the work of Clark and colleagues concerning “communal” and “exchange” relationships,
respectively (Clark & Mills, 1993, 1979; Clark & Taraban, 1991). Note that in our original model, transaction
was defined more broadly in terms of generalized reciprocity (coordinating behavior between functional
equals) rather than, as here, in terms of the tit-for-tat logic of exchange-based cooperation. Hierarchy was
also defined more broadly, in terms of unequal power, status, or responsibility rather than, as in the present
model, more specifically in terms of unequal authority of the interaction partners over one another. See the
section entitled “Model Updates” for a discussion of the reasoning behind these changes.

Predicting Positive Moral Judgments

The aforementioned lack of knowledge regarding judgments of moral
goodness or praiseworthiness in relational context is consistent with a wider ‘blind
spot’ in contemporary moral psychology research. This research has,
overwhelmingly, focused on agents and behaviors deemed to be morally bad, and thus
on judgments of moral wrongness, assignment of blame, and associated motivations
or decisions to punish perceived offenders (Anderson et al., 2020; Guglielmo &
Malle, 2019). Although it is understandable to be especially concerned with the worst
of human nature -- our ability to hurt, harm, and offend one another -- the sphere of
human morality is much broader than this. To work toward a better world, or simply
to understand ourselves in a more comprehensive way, we also need to make sense of
our ability to do good: to help, support, and show respect to one another or more
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generally to cooperate and promote each other’s flourishing (Curry, Mullins, et al.,
2019; Law et al., 2021).
How do moral judgments factor into this? In a theoretical paper drawing
together findings from social, cognitive, developmental, and consumer psychology,
Anderson, Crockett, and Pizarro (2020) propose that blame and praise, while
conceptually opposed, are not in practice simple opposites or mirror-images of one
another. Rather, they suggest, moral praise is “a fundamentally unique form of moral
attribution” that serves a different social function in our lives: “while blame is
primarily for punishment and signaling one’s moral character, praise is primarily for
relationship building” (p. 694). For example, praise may be used to strengthen an
affiliative bond or alliance to secure or promote more effective cooperation. It is
striking, then, relatively little empirical work has looked at moral judgments of praise
in the context of different kinds of relationships (Marshall, Wynn, et al., 2020;
McManus et al., 2021).
In this paper we begin to address this gap. In the following sections, we
introduce a “relational norms” model of moral judgment based on one particular set of
cooperative functions -- care, hierarchy, mating, and transaction -- that different
relationships and different combinations of relationships within a society might serve.
We then explain how behaviors that characteristically weaken or strengthen these
functions might tend to elicit judgments of praise or blame depending on the
relationship within which they occur. We then test these predictions in two main
studies: one focused on actions that characteristically weaken one or more of these
cooperative functions, and a second one focused on actions that characteristically
strengthen one or more cooperative functions.

72

Broadly speaking, we predict that weakening a cooperative function that is
strongly normatively expected -- i.e., prescribed -- within a given relationship (for
example, a parent failing to care for their child) will be judged more harshly than
weakening the same function in relationships for which the function is less strongly
prescribed (for example, a roommate failing to care for another roommate) (consistent
with Earp et al., 2020). We also anticipate that weakening a function that is negatively
expected -- i.e., proscribed -- within a relationship (for example, a doctor refusing to
engage in ‘mating’ behavior initiated by a patient) will be judged positively, perhaps
even being seen as praiseworthy.
When it comes to strengthening cooperative functions, a similar logic applies:
actions which serve to strengthen a cooperative function that is prescribed within a
relationship should be seen as neutral or praiseworthy, whereas strengthening a
function that is proscribed within a relationship should be seen as blameworthy.
However, particular patterns of moral judgment will differ from function to function,
as we emphasize below in laying out our more specific hypotheses. First, we describe
our relational norms model.

Cooperative Functions and Relational Norms

We humans are fundamentally social creatures, who must cooperate with one
another to survive (Curry, Jones Chesters, et al., 2019; Curry, Mullins, et al., 2019;
Gellner et al., 2020). As such, almost all of us are situated within complex networks
of relationships -- some entered into voluntarily; others given by nature or
circumstance (Bayer et al., 2020; Brinberg et al., 2021; Clark et al., 2020; Clark &
Boothby, 2013; Fei, 1992). To understand and coordinate our behavior within these
relationships, we often make use of recognized social categories or relational roles,
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such as parent-child, boss-employee, neighbor, teammate, long-term romantic partner,
or sibling. Such roles typically are not merely descriptive, but rather, carry with them
certain normative expectations for how individuals who occupy the roles should, or
should not, behave toward one another under various conditions (Haidt & Baron,
1996; Rowe et al., 2020). So, for example, the role of ‘parent’ is both a descriptive
concept, referring to someone who contributes genetic material to an offspring or
adopts a child, but also a normative concept pointing to a particular set of relational
obligations, including a special duty to care for the child, discipline them, and support
their learning and development (Shweder, 1992).
Some of the characteristic prescriptions and proscriptions embedded within
such relational roles are social-conventional in nature (Turiel, 2008), having to do
with matters of politeness or etiquette, for example. However, others reflect more
basic cooperative functions -- such as care, hierarchy, mating, or transaction -- that
different relationships within a society must serve in order to solve recurrent
coordination problems of the species (Bugental, 2000; Curry, Mullins, et al., 2019).
Fulfilling or violating these more basic cooperative expectations, then, will tend to
elicit not only social-conventional judgments of approval or disapproval, as might be
the case for certain errors of etiquette, but rather, moral judgments of praise or blame
-- often as a precursor to rewarding or punishing the actor for their perceived
cooperativeness or lack thereof.
To make sense of moral judgments in these cases, a necessary first step is to
identify a core set of cooperative functions that societies use to solve recurrent
coordination problems (see Figure 1). Various sets of functions have been proposed
along these lines, often with overlapping theoretical content (Bugental, 2000; Clark &
Mills, 1993; O. S. Curry, Jones Chesters, et al., 2019; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai &
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Fiske, 2011b; Shweder et al., 1997). We have adapted a set from Bugental (2000)
with modifications based on Clark (Clark & Mills, 1993, 2012), as we discuss in
greater detail below. For a summary, see Table 1.
Table 1
Descriptions of relationship functions (as shown to Study 1 participants)
Function

Description

Care

Full version: This function coordinates behavior between people to ensure that their
overall well-being is secure, without any strings attached to the giving or receiving of help
(like expecting direct compensation or favors in return, or feeling an explicit debt). In
other words, it ensures that people have someone in their corner they can truly count on
for aid and support, in good times and bad.
When relationships serve this function, each person pays attention to the genuine needs of
the other, and strives to ensure that those needs are met to the best of their respective
abilities.
When needs and abilities are equal, the individuals may take turns helping each other, or
otherwise share burdens equally.
When needs and/or abilities are unequal, one person may have to do more to help the
other, but this does not create a specific debt to be repaid.
Brief version: the function of giving or receiving support based on need, without creating
a debt

Hierarchy

Full version: This function coordinates behavior between people in situations where they
have different authority over -- and hence different responsibility for -- one another. In
many situations, it is most effective for one person to be in charge or have final say about
what happens. So the hierarchy function involves assigning people roles based on their
respective authority and responsibility in a given situation, in order to coordinate behavior
in a more efficient manner and help accomplish goals.
When relationships serve the hierarchy function, there are two main roles: the person who
is ultimately in charge (or who has more say about what happens) and the person who is
not in charge (or who has less say about what happens).
Brief version: the function of coordinating behavior between people with unequal
authority over one another

Mating

Full version: This function coordinates behavior between people to allow them to find
and maintain a sexual partner. For our ancestors, the ultimate point of mating was to
produce healthy offspring, so that we could pass on our genes and continue as a species.
Of course, today we have birth control, and people often have sexual relationships without
consciously planning to have children. But the underlying "logic" of the mating function
--in terms of the feelings and motivations it tends to inspire remains the same: to attract
and secure a mate and stay with that person long enough to at least potentially have
children together.
Brief version: the function of establishing and maintaining a sexual partnership
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Transaction

Full version: This function coordinates behavior between people in situations where they
do not have a special responsibility for helping each other unconditionally, but when they
can still mutually benefit through cooperation or exchange.
When relationships serve this function, each person asks "What's in it for me?"
Accordingly, each individual pays close attention to who has contributed what to a joint
activity or agreement, and strives to ensure that the respective benefits are proportional to
what each has contributed.
"You get back what you put in" -- or "you get what you paid for" -- is the logic of this
function.
When contributions or claims on a benefit are equal, the fairest solution will be to share
equally, take turns enjoying the benefit, or trade comparable benefits with one another. In
any case, it's important to keep track of who owes what to whom, so the scales don't get
out of balance.
Brief version: the function of balancing mutual benefits by keeping track of who owes
what to whom

Given their usefulness for solving cross-culturally common interpersonal
coordination problems, cooperative functions such as these2 are ubiquitous in human
societies. However, to predict moral judgments in relational context, it is not enough
to identify an abstract set of functions. Recent research suggests that, over the course
of development, children learn that particular relationships within their social
environment are normatively associated with different cooperative functions -- or
concomitant moral obligations -- to different degrees (Chalik & Dunham, 2020;
Mammen et al., 2021; Marshall, Mermin-Bunnell, et al., 2020; Marshall, Wynn, et al.,
2020). By adulthood, they will need to understand, at least implicitly, that one and the
same action might be judged quite differently depending on (a) the relationship within
which it occurs, (b) the specific pattern of cooperative functions that is normatively

2

Note: we do not suggest that these are the only cooperative functions that humans use to solve
common (dyadic) coordination problems. For example, Curry, Mullins and Whitehouse (2019) suggest
that possession (recognition of prior resource possession or property rights) might also be a culturally
universal cooperative function, although they do not propose how this or any other function might be
normatively embedded within any particular social roles. We do not take a stand on that issue here; our
claim is simply that the cooperative functions in our model are likely to be among the most important
functions for resolving recurrent two-party coordination problems across a wide range of human
cultures, while staying open to the possibility that there may be other important functions as well.
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expected for that relationship in their society, and (c) how the action bears on the
‘logic’ of each embedded cooperative function, either working to strengthen it -- for
example, by facilitating the successful execution of the function in the appropriate
social-relational context -- or to weaken it, for example, by failing to execute the
function and/or executing the ‘wrong’ function given the context.
One reason why children need to learn these associations, is that relationshipspecific patterns of normatively expected cooperative functions -- what we call
“relational norms” -- often vary between societies (Argyle et al., 1986; Atari et al.,
2020; Deng et al., 2021; Kaspar et al., 2016; Miller et al., 1990; Miller & Bersoff,
2016; Rai & Fiske, 2011); and they may change over time in response to
sociopolitical reforms, economic developments, or (other) processes of cultural
evolution. To predict and explain moral judgments of praise or blame within the
context of any given relationship or society, therefore, the currently-prevailing
relational norms of the relevant culture or subculture must be taken into account (Earp
et al., 2020).
Consider an example. In many modern societies, an ideal boss-employee
relationship is characterized by a particular profile of relational norms, involving,
roughly, a strong expectation of both hierarchy and transaction, a weaker expectation
of care, and a strongly negative expectation of mating (Chuang, 1998; Earp et al.,
2020; Judge & Piccolo, 2004; Williams et al., 1999). As such, the employee should
usually follow the boss’s instructions, not the other way around (hierarchy); the
employee should provide their labor only if fairly compensated, while the boss should
pay the employee only insofar as the latter does the agreed-upon work (transaction);
the boss should be sympathetic to the personal needs of the employee, but generally
should not go out of their way to provide unconditional support (care), and bosses
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should not make sexual passes at their employees, nor should employees try to date
their bosses, at least while under contract (mating).
By contrast, an ideal relationship between long-term romantic partners within
the same societies typically will be characterized by a very different relational norm
profile: roughly, negative expectations of both hierarchy3 and transaction and strongly
positive expectations of mating and care (Earp et al., 2020). It follows from these
contrasts (among many others that could be used for illustration) that one and the
same kind of behavior taking place within these different relationships could elicit
very different moral judgments from observers. For example, if a boss in
contemporary U.S. society offers to give their employee a sensual massage at the
office, this is likely to be seen as objectionable and even downright blameworthy;
whereas, if someone in the same society offers to give a sensual massage to their
long-term romantic partner, this is likely to be regarded much more positively (all else
being equal).
Or suppose that an employee declines to spend the weekend helping their
boss with an important personal project, unless the boss is willing to pay them. This is
unlikely to be seen as morally objectionable, since, as noted, a typical boss-employee
relationship is expected to be governed by a norm of transaction, more so than by a
norm of care. Whereas, declining to help a long-term romantic partner with an
important personal project unless one is directly compensated is likely to be seen as
much more problematic.

3

In mainstream contemporary U.S. culture, at least, such a relationship is not expected to be strongly
hierarchical (Earp et al., 2020). In some other (sub)cultural or historical contexts, by contrast, greater
asymmetry in authority between romantic partners may indeed be normatively expected, often in
spousal relationships along the lines of gender, in line with patriarchal marriage norms (Bartkowski,
1997; James-Hawkins et al., 2017; Siraj, 2010).
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From a theoretical perspective, such contrasting moral judgments for identical
behavior suggests an advantage to thinking about relationship ‘type’ in terms of
relational norms based on cooperative functions -- rather than, say, genetic
relatedness. After all, members of a boss-employee relationship vs. a long-term
romantic partnership are typically equally genetically (un)related. Yet they
characteristically serve very different cooperative functions, plausibly giving rise to
different relationship-specific obligations. A similar point can be made about social
closeness -- another relational dimension that has been manipulated in recent studies,
as mentioned previously (Berg et al., 2021; Gilead et al., 2018; Yudkin et al., 2021).
One aspect of social closeness is a motive of benevolence. Given this aspect, such a
construct may be useful for predicting moral judgments concerning actions that
strengthen or weaken the care function. But it is less clear how it could be used to
predict judgments concerning hierarchy, mating, or transaction.
Consider hierarchy as an example. Some socially close relationships, such as a
typical parent-child relationship, are also characterized by asymmetrical authority.
Children are thus expected to behave in a relatively subordinate or deferential manner
toward their parents, and failure to do so (without adequate excuse) is liable to earn
them a rebuke. But other socially close relationships, such as siblings of a similar age,
are not normatively expected to be significantly hierarchical in many societies.
Accordingly, the failure of one sibling to behave in a consistently subordinate manner
toward the other is less likely, in the relevant societies, to be judged as morally
wrong. And yet this likely difference in judgments regarding similar behavior cannot
be explained by appealing to social closeness, as this quality is typically roughly
comparable between the two relationships (Earp et al., 2020, Supplement Section
3.4.3). It can, however, be explained by appealing to one or more cooperative
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functions, such as hierarchy, that are differently embedded (i.e., with different
strengths) within their respective relational norm profiles.4
To summarize, if we want to answer the question, “How good or bad is it for
Person A to do X to Person B,” we need to know, not only what X -- the behavior -is, but also, who Person A and Person B are. In particular, we need to know the nature
of the relationship between them, including the social roles they respectively occupy
as well as the underlying cooperative functions that are normatively associated with
those roles (i.e., relational norms) in the relevant culture.

Model Updates

Before turning to our specific hypotheses for this paper, we should highlight
some key updates to our relational norms (RN) model as described in our earlier
publications (Clark et al., 2020; Earp et al., 2020). The first update concerns the
hierarchy function. In our previous model (call it RN 1.0), hierarchy was defined
more broadly as a function for coordinating behavior between people of different
status or power (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). However, we came to realize that two
people merely having different status or power – i.e., in general, as opposed to over
one another -- does not necessarily create a coordination problem between them. To
see this, suppose that Person A is directing a theater production, while Person B is
serving as one of the actors. Now suppose that Person B (the actor) is both wealthier
and more popular than Person A (the director) and thus generally more able to exert
influence over others so as to achieve various desired outcomes.

4

An additional potential advantage of this latter approach is that moral judgments concerning actions
that bear on the logic of multiple functions -- for example, highly transactional behavior that (also)
undermines care -- can in principle be explained within this framework.
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In the context of the rehearsal room, none of that should matter. Rather, what
matters for coordinating behavior effectively with respect to the cooperative task at
hand -- namely, putting on a high-quality play -- is that the person occupying the
social role of director requires greater authority, in the relevant context, than the
person occupying the social role of actor, if they are to have the best chance of
achieving their shared goal. Accordingly, it is the assignment of interaction partners
to a dominant versus subordinate decision-making role that is central to the hierarchy
function, rather than simply coordinating behavior between people who happen to
have different status or power (Rai & Fiske, 2011). This is now reflected in the
definition of hierarchy in the current version of our model (call it RN 2.0).
The second update is more substantial. The cooperative function termed
“reciprocity” in RN 1.0 has been replaced in RN 2.0 with a function we call
“transaction.” In RN 1.0, reciprocity was conceived broadly as a cooperative function
used to solve coordination problems “between individuals with functionally similar
(or equal) status, power, authority, or claim on a resource” (Earp et al., 2020, p. 3).
However, in contrast to the other cooperative functions we tested -- care, hierarchy,
and mating -- we were not able to predict moral wrongness judgments for actions that
had previously been rated as characteristically weakening the reciprocity function.
Based on these null results, we reasoned that our model had failed to distinguish
between two different types of reciprocity. As we noted (Earp et al., 2020, p. 16):

In some relationships, such as those between strangers, acquaintances, or
individuals doing business with one another (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005), each
party tracks the specific benefits contributed to, and received from, the other
(Clark et al., 1989). In these relationships, reciprocity thus takes a tit-for-tat
form in which benefits are offered and accepted on a highly contingent basis.
This type of reciprocity is transactional, in that resources are provided, not in
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response to a real or perceived need on the part of the other, but rather, in
response to the past or expected future provision of a similarly valued resource
from the cooperation partner. In this, it relies on an explicit accounting of who
owes what to whom, and is thus characteristic of so-called “exchange”
relationships (Clark & Mills, 1993).
In other relationships, by contrast, such as those between friends, family
members, or romantic partners – so-called “communal” relationships –
reciprocity takes a different form: that of mutually expected responsiveness to
one another’s needs. In this form of reciprocity, each party tracks the other’s
needs (rather than specific benefits provided) (Clark et al., 1989), and strives
to meet these needs to the best of their respective abilities, in proportion to the
degree of responsibility each has assumed for the other’s welfare (Clark &
Mills, 1993)
We concluded that subsequent work on moral judgments in relational context should
distinguish between these two types of reciprocity: “that is, mutual care-based
reciprocity in communal relationships (when both partners have similar needs and
abilities) and tit-for-tat reciprocity between ‘transactional’ cooperation partners who
have equal standing or claim on a resource” (Earp et al., 2020, p. 16).
As indicated above, our new transaction function now captures the distinctive
tit-for-tat contingencies of the latter type of reciprocity, whereas the former, care-base
type of reciprocity is -- as that description suggests -- already reflected in our care
function, whose description we have slightly modified to more explicitly focus on
needs and abilities (see Table 1). Moreover, the “functional equality” aspect of
reciprocity as conceived of in RN 1.0 is, in effect, represented by our hierarchy
function, which we now characterize as coordinating behavior between people who
have unequal authority over one another. As such, a low normative expectation for
hierarchy already implies that the interaction partners should have similar or equal

82

‘say’ in the situation, which suggests that the latter quality does not need to be
measured separately.
A further advantage of this approach is that, rather than having hierarchy and
reciprocity defined, somewhat redundantly, in opposition to each other (as in RN 1.0),
hierarchy and transaction are now conceptually orthogonal (similar to Hamilton &
Sanders, 1981; Chuang, 1998). Thus, it should now be possible more accurately to
capture, empirically, the relational norm structure of social role pairings that are both
hierarchical and transactional (such as a typical boss-employee relationship) as well
as those that are transactional without being hierarchical (such as a typical roommate
or housemate relationship). It should now also be possible to capture, empirically, the
relational norm structure of social role pairings that are both hierarchical and carebased (such as a typical parent-child relationships) as well as those that are care based
without being hierarchical (such as relationships between friends). So too should it be
possible more clearly to distinguish between relationships that are ideally
characterized by care-based reciprocity (such as a typical long-term romantic
partnership) and those that are ideally characterized by transactional reciprocity (such
as a typical customer-seller relationship), even when comparing cases -- such as those
just mentioned -- in which the parties to either kind of relationship are normatively
expected to have similar or equal ‘say’ in most cooperative situations.
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Figure 2. A new theoretical model. Model of proposed conceptual relationships among the four cooperative
functions to be tested in the current research. There are three main dimensions along which relationships might
vary: their degree of communal strength (i.e., how motivated the partners are to respond to one another’s needs)
(Mills et al., 2004), their degree of asymmetrical authority over one another (Hamilton & Sanders, 1981;
Chuang, 1998), and their degree of eligibility for forming a socially acceptable mating relationship (Frayser,
1989). In principle, any social dyad could be normatively located within this three-dimensional space, raising
characteristic coordination problems and -- in well-functioning relationships -- activating the associated
cooperative-function schemas (anchored at the corners of the figure) for guiding behavior between the partners,
inclining them toward mutually beneficial solutions to the coordination problems in question. For example, a
typical relationship between a parent and young child might normatively be located near the top-right corner of
the figure (with mating eligibility set to zero along the “Z” axis), suggesting that both the hierarchy and care
functions should characteristically be strongly activated, but not the mating or transaction functions.

The Present Studies
The goal of the present studies is to improve, validate, and extend the
theoretical scope of our initial relational norms model (RN 1.0) for predicting moral
judgments in the context of various social relationships.5 In RN 1.0, we used

5

Note that whereas for purposes of this dissertation I focus on RN 2.0 and its links to judgments of
morality, RN 2.0 should also prove useful for understanding other types of judgments and behaviors.
For instance, we are currently examining its applicability to understanding when various emotions will
be experienced and expressed as well as when the expression of various emotions will be deemed
appropriate.
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population estimates of relational norms for 10 such relationships to predict the moral
wrongness judgments of a separate sample of participants, regarding a set of
behaviors previously rated as characteristically weakening the cooperative functions
of care, hierarchy, mating, and reciprocity. On a function-by-function basis, we were
able to make highly precise predictions for care, hierarchy, and mating, but not for
reciprocity (Earp et al., 2020). In the present studies, in addition to testing an updated
model with a new transaction function replacing reciprocity (RN 2.0), we aim to
predict not only negative moral judgments as before, but also positive moral
judgments of praiseworthiness. Moreover, we aim to do so not only with regard to
actions that characteristically weaken one or more cooperative functions, but also
with regard to actions that characteristically strengthen one or more cooperative
functions.
With respect to weakening functions, we hope to replicate our previous results
(but for all four functions, including the new transaction function): roughly, by
replicating our previous results, we mean that we expect to find that the more a given
relationship is normatively expected to serve one or more cooperative functions, the
morally worse it should be judged for someone within that relationship to perform an
action that characteristically weakens those very functions. However, whereas in our
previous study participants registered their judgments on a unipolar scale ranging
from “not at all morally wrong” to “very morally wrong,” in the present study, they
will register judgments on a fully bipolar scale ranging from “very blameworthy” to
“very praiseworthy.” This should allow us to capture more variance in participant
appraisals of actions that weaken certain functions -- such as mating -- that are
negatively expected (i.e., proscribed) in various relationships. In our previous study,
the most participants could say about a doctor, for example, refusing to have sex with
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their patient -- thus weakening the mating function between them -- is that such a
refusal is “not at all morally wrong.” However, given the opportunity, they might
have wanted to express that such behavior is a positive moral good or even
praiseworthy; in the present study, they will be able to do so.
With respect to strengthening functions -- not evaluated in our previous work - our pre-registered hypothesis is as follows: “the more a function is normatively
expected within a cluster of relationships, the higher the moral judgment rating for
strengthening that function [within the relevant relationships] will be on the blame-topraise scale.” By implication, the less a function is normatively expected within a
cluster of relationships -- including negative expectations or proscriptions -- the lower
the moral judgment for strengthening the function should be on the same bipolar
scale, potentially crossing over the midpoint (thus representing judgments of
blameworthiness).
This prediction is most straightforward for the mating function: in
relationships for which mating is strongly proscribed, such as close kin relationships,
performing an action that characteristically strengthens the mating function (such as
sexually propositioning the other person) will likely be seen as highly blameworthy.
Whereas, in relationships for which a function is less strongly proscribed, or perhaps
only weakly prescribed -- as might be the case for transaction or hierarchy in various
relationships -- actions that strengthen those functions might more likely be seen as
mildly blameworthy, or at best ‘relatively less praiseworthy’ (i.e., when compared to
relationships for which the functions are strongly prescribed).
Finally, the care function may present an anomaly: whereas mating behavior is
straightforwardly inappropriate in normatively platonic relationships; and whereas
hierarchical behavior (such as subordinating oneself to an interaction partner or,
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conversely, ordering them around) may be inappropriate in normatively egalitarian
relationships; and whereas transactional behavior (such as requesting direct
compensation for helping with a task) may be inappropriate in normatively communal
relationships (Clark & Mills, 1979; McGraw & Tetlock, 2005); caring behavior
(definitionally: promoting another’s welfare by striving non-contingently to meet their
needs) might seem to break the mold. Unlike mating, hierarchy, and transaction, care
is almost always welcomed irrespective of relational context.6 Moreover, it may be
precisely those relationships in which care is least normatively expected -- such as the
relationship between strangers or acquaintances -- wherein acts of care are liable to be
seen as supererogatory (going above and beyond the call of duty) and thus as
especially praiseworthy (consistent with McManus et al., 2021).
We will return to these predictions in due time. First, we need to measure the
currently-prevailing U.S. relational norms for a set of common social relationships
with respect to the theorized cooperative functions of care, hierarchy, mating, and
transaction. That is the goal of Study 1.

Study 1: Measuring Relational Norms
Method.
Ethics review and open science. All studies in this paper were reviewed and
approved by the Yale University Institutional review board (protocol #2000022385);
informed consent was obtained from participants in each instance prior to data

6

A possible exception to this is suggested by the work of Clark and colleagues (Clark & Mills, 1979;
Clark & Waddell, 1985), who find that the desirability of transactional vs. caring behavior among
strangers or acquaintances depends, crucially, on whether the parties want or expect the relationship to
become more communal (for example, by moving toward friendship) or whether one or both of them
prefers or expects to keep at a distance (for example, by maintaining a strictly transactional
relationship). However, testing the influence of desired or undesired relational development goes
beyond the scope of the present work.
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collection. We have posted all study materials, pre-registration forms, raw data, and
analysis code on the Open Science Framework at https://osf.io/zxjt6/. The design,
measures, sampling plan, and exclusion criteria for Study 1 were pre-registered at
aspredicted.org (#53912).
Participants. We used an online polling software
(https://www.surveysystem.com/sscalce.htm) to determine that at least 385
participants would be needed to obtain U.S. population estimates of normative
cooperative functional expectations (i.e., relational norms), nationally representative
for age, race, and gender, with a 5% margin of error and 95% confidence level.
Anticipating participant exclusions, we over-sampled and aimed to recruit 450 U.S.
participants via the Prolific Academic platform (Prolific); 451 ultimately completed
the survey, each of whom was paid at a rate of $7.25 per hour. Data from 63
participants were excluded prior to data analysis based on the pre-registered exclusion
criteria (see Appendix 2, Supplementary Table 1 for details), leaving us with a final
sample of 388 participants (see Table 2 for key demographics).

Table 2
Key demographics of Study 1 participants
Age

N (%)

Race

N (%)

Gender

N (%)

18 - 27

60 (15.46%)

White

272 (70.10%)

Woman

203 (52.32%)

28 - 37

85 (21.91%)

Black/
African American

53 (13.66%)

Man

175 (45.10%)

38 - 47

54 (13.92%)

Asian

23 (5.93%)

Other

10 (2.58%)

48 - 57

65 (16.75%)

Multiracial

17 (4.38%)

88

58 +

124 (31.96%)

Hispanic/Latinx

16 (4.12%)

Missing

0 (0.00%)

American Indian/
Alaska Native

2 (0.52%)

Other

3 (0.77%)

Prefer not to say

2 (0.52%)

Procedure. Participants were first given descriptions and definitions of all four
relationship functions used in this study: care, hierarchy, mating, and transaction (see
Table 1 above for full descriptions). To ensure that participants were thinking of the
functions in the way we intended, participants were not able to advance to the main
part of the study before passing multiple comprehension checks. We then asked
participants to indicate how much each of 20 common relationships (from Earp et al.,
2020) would, if well-functioning, serve each of the four relationship functions,
specifying: “We just want your best, honest judgment about how much a good
relationship of each type would serve 1 or more of the 4 relationship functions, if the
relationship were working as well as it could for the kind of relationship it is.” The
relationships included in this study were: long-term romantic partners, mother and
under-18 child, father and under-18 child, mother and over-18 child, father and over18 child, siblings, strangers, close friends, boss-employee, acquaintances, extended
family members, roommates/housemates, teacher-student, work
colleagues/classmates, political party members, friends-with-benefits (Bisson &
Levine, 2009), doctor-patient, teammates, neighbors, and customer-seller.
Participants rated each relationship type in random order. For each
relationship type, to reduce ambiguity, we included a brief, specific description of
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what we meant by the relationship. For example, for the acquaintance relationship, we
specified: “This refers to people who know each other, and interact now and then, but
don’t consider one another to be friends. It includes people one might know from
work, school, or the neighborhood” (see Appendix 2, Supplementary Table 2 for full
descriptions). Then, for each combination of relationship and cooperative function,
participants rated how much a maximally well-functioning instance of each
relationship would characteristically rely on the given function on a sliding scale from
-100 (“definitely WOULD NOT”) to +100 (“definitely WOULD”). Finally, we
collected a battery of demographic measures, including age, gender, ethnicity,
relationship status, parental status, education, self-ascribed socioeconomic status,
social and economic political ideology, and religiosity, as well as exploratory
individual difference measures for future studies not included here (see Appendix 2,
Supplementary Section 1.1.2. for details).

Results.
Relational norms vary across common dyadic relationships. As can be seen
in Figure 3, relational norms varied markedly across dyads in several respects. The
care function was generally prescribed, at least to some extent, for almost all dyads
apart from the customer-seller relationship (M = -25.99, SD = 63.47) (M across dyads
= 50.16, SD = 55.49; this is higher than the scale midpoint with a Bonferroni
corrected alpha of .0125), t(7,759) = 178.22, p < .001, d = 2.02 (all tests reported in
the manuscript are two-sided). In our previous model, RN 1.0, the reciprocity function
was also generally prescribed for almost all relationships, leading to a relatively high
mean expectation (RN 1.0 reciprocity M across dyads = 54.23, SD = 49.64; higher
than the scale midpoint with a Bonferroni corrected alpha of .0125), t(8,459) =
100.47, p < .001, d = 1.09. In RN 2.0, however, the transaction function -- which
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explicitly codifies a tit-for-tat dynamic rather than being solely about the equal
standing of the interaction partners (see “Model Updates” for details) -- is now
negatively prescribed (i.e. proscribed) for several relationships, including the mother
and under-18 child relationship, (M = -53.72, SD = 59.99), father and under-18 child
relationship (M = -49.72, SD = 61.189), the long-term romantic partner relationship
(M = -28.53, SD = 63.49), the mother and over-18 child relationship (M = -26.73, SD
= 64.18), the father and over-18 child relationship (M = -21.11, SD = 61.85), and the
teacher-student relationship (M = -21.1, SD = 64.41), leading to a much lower mean
expectation across relationships: M across dyads = 9.19, SD = 66.69; this is lower
than the mean expectation for reciprocity from the previous model (reported above),
t(16,218) = 14.55, p < .001, d = .23.
Similar to RN 1.0, in RN 2.0, the mating function was also proscribed for
most dyads (M across dyads = -54.63, SD = 66.47; lower than the scale midpoint with
the same Bonferroni correction), t(7,759) = 217.3, p < .001, d = 1.70, with a few
obvious exceptions (long-term romantic partners, M = 91.88, SD = 20.87; friendswith-benefits, M = 61.31, SD = 50.85). With respect to hierarchy, there was wide
variation between relationships, with some relationships rated as distinctly
hierarchical in expectation, for example, the boss-employee (M = 83.93, SD = 29.20),
teacher-student (M = 76.15, SD = 34.84), father and under-18 child (M =66.48, SD =
42.13), and mother and under-18 child (M = 62.01, SD = 48.50) relationships, while
others were normatively expected not to be hierarchical, for example, the friendswith-benefits (M = -44.99, SD = 54.99), close friend (M = -44.38, SD = 59.34),
neighbor (M = -42.80, SD = 58.79), and long-term romantic partner (M = -42.23, SD
= 62.83) relationships.
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Figure 3. Prescribed cooperative functions. Kernel density plots of prescribed cooperative
functions for 20 common relationship dyads. Dots represent the population mean prescription for
each cooperative function within each relationship, caps represent +/- one standard deviation. The
height of the curve represents density: the likely proportions of scores (relative to each function)
that fall within the given range along the x-axis. Figure caption adapted from Earp et al. (in press).

Compared to RN 1.0, wherein hierarchy was defined solely in terms of
unequal power or status, in RN 2.0, where hierarchy is defined more specifically in
terms of unequal authority between the interaction partners (see “Model Updates”),
we find that hierarchy in this latter sense is more strongly proscribed in several
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relationships, leading to a lower overall mean for hierarchy in the new model (M
across dyads = 6.37 in the current model vs. 21.42 in RN 1.0, SDs = 69.28 vs. 63.94
respectively), t(16,218) = 3.92, p < .001, d = .06). For demographic results, see
Appendix 2, Supplementary Section 1.2.

Figure 4. Relational norm profiles for a subset of relationships. Pink
represents care, black represents hierarchy, green represents mating,
blue represents reciprocity. The raw data (n = 388 independent
ratings per function per relationship; total n = 7,760) are shown in
individual dots; error bars represent the mean (dot) and +/- 1 SD
(caps). Note: Mother/Father and under-18 child and Mother/Father
over-18 child have each been combined into a single Parent-Child
plot, because these relationships were not significantly different from
one another in terms of expected cooperative functions: MannWhitney U tests, all ps > .07. Plots for all 20 relationships are in
Figure 1 of Appendix 2, Supplementary Section.
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Figure 4 is derived from the same ratings as Figure 3, but with the data
organized to highlight the four-dimensional relational norm profiles (i.e., sets of
prescribed/proscribed cooperative functions) for a subset of 10 relationships selected
for predictive modeling in Studies 2 and 3 (see below for details).
Common relationships are hierarchically clustered around relational norms.
Next, we sought to quantify the distinctiveness of each relationship in fourdimensional relational norm space. Because in many instances the ratings were not
normally distributed (see Figure 3), characterizing between-relationship differences in
terms of their mean relational norm scores would be misleading and lose considerable
information. We therefore calculated the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance
statistic (a quantification of the difference in overall shape between any two empirical
distributions) (Fabbri & De León, 2017) for each cooperative function for each
possible pair of relationships. We then averaged across functions to quantify the
overall dissimilarity in relational norms for each relationship pair. This approach is
conceptually similar to representational similarity analysis (Kriegeskorte et al., 2008),
but incorporates information about the shapes of the relational norm distributions in
addition to distribution means.
We used the relational norm dissimilarity values to conduct a hierarchical
clustering analysis using a farthest-point algorithm: d(u,v)=max(dist(u[i],v[j]))
(Voorhees, 1985). This revealed five main clusters, depicted in Figures 5a and 5b,
which aligned with our theoretical expectations (see Figure 2). The first cluster
consists of sexual relationships (long-term romantic partners and friends-withbenefits). The second cluster consists primarily of relationships that are both
hierarchical and caring (e.g., teacher-student, parents and children). The third cluster
includes relationships that are both hierarchical and transactional (e.g., boss-
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employee, doctor-patient). The fourth cluster includes relationships that are
transactional without being hierarchical (e.g., neighbors, roommates/housemates).
And the fifth, final cluster is characterized by relationships that are caring without
being hierarchical (e.g., siblings, close friends, teammates).
Based on these analyses, we identified a subset of 10 relationships with
relatively distinctive relational norms, taking care to ensure that each main cluster
‘contributed’ a comparable number of relationships (see Appendix 2, Supplementary
Section 1.2.2. for the selection procedure). Note that there were no significant
differences between participant expectations for the mother versus father relationships
(see Figure 4 caption for details); these were therefore collapsed for the subsequent
studies into parent-child relationships. The final subset of relationships selected for
use in Studies 2 and 3 consisted of roommates, siblings, parent and over-18 child,
parent and under-18 child, long-term romantic partners, friends, boss-employee,
doctor-patient, friends-with-benefits, and acquaintances. Relational norm profiles for
these relationships are depicted in Figure 4 above.

a.
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b.

1. Sexual relationships
2. Hierarchical care (e.g., parent-child)
3. Hierarchical transaction (e.g., boss-employee)
4. Non-hierarchical (mutual) transaction (e.g., roommates/housemates)
5. Non-hierarchical (mutual) care (e.g., adult siblings)

Figures 5a-5b. Hierarchical relationship clustering. Circular dendrogram visually representing the
mean Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance between relationships in four-dimensional relational norm
space, clustered hierarchically according to the Voorhees method (Voorhees, 1985) (a); relationships
selected for Study 2 are highlighted in a darker shade. Radar plots derived from the hierarchical cluster
model are depicted in the bottom half of the figure (b).

Discussion.
In this first study, we established population-level estimates of current
relational norms in the United States for the cooperative functions of care, hierarchy,
mating, and transaction. Our inclusion of the last of these functions -- transaction -represents a significant departure from, and improvement to, our previously
established estimates (RN 1.0, Earp et al., 2020), which were based in part on
participant ratings of the extent to which each of 20 relationships should ideally serve
a “reciprocity” function, broadly conceived. As transaction is defined more narrowly
to capture the contingent provision (or acceptance) of benefits within exchange-based
relationships -- rather than simply the relatively equal status or power of the
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interaction partners, as in RN 1.0 -- a larger number of relationships in RN 2.0 are
rated as proscribing transaction than was true of reciprocity. Similarly, the mean
normative expectation of hierarchy across relationships is now lower than in our
previous model, as hierarchy also has been more strictly defined to refer to the
unequal authority of interaction partners over one another, rather than simply the
relatively unequal status or power of the interaction partners in general.
An additional consequence of these updated definitions is that, in RN 2.0,
hierarchy and transaction are conceptually independent of one another, whereas in RN
1.0, hierarchy and reciprocity were defined in opposition to each other and were thus
inversely correlated. In the current model, it is now care and transaction that are
defined in opposition to each other, consistent with the existing literature on
“communal” vs. “exchange” relationships (Clark & Mills, 1993). Roughly, this
literature finds that the stronger the communal bond between relationship partners, the
more the partners tend to rely on a care-based cooperative framework. In this
framework, the partners strive to promote each other’s overall well-being by
practicing mutual responsiveness to one another’s needs, to the best of their respective
abilities and in proportion to the degree of responsibility each one has -- or has taken
on -- for securing the other’s welfare. Whereas, the weaker the communal bond, the
more the partners will tend to rely on an exchange-based (i.e., transactional)
cooperative framework or, at times, simply distance themselves from the other. In this
framework, each partner provides benefits, not in response to the real or perceived
needs of the other partner, but rather, in response to a previously received benefit of
comparable value -- or in anticipation of the future receipt of such a benefit -- from
the other partner. Thus, to avoid exploitation, each party keeps a more explicit
tracking of who owes what to whom (Clark et al., 1989).
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As a result of these changes, we find a different configuration of relationship
clusters in relational norm space. Whereas, in RN 1.0, there were four clusters
(roughly: sexual relationships, hierarchical relationships, egalitarian relationships, and
caring relationships), in RN 2.0, there are five clusters, with each set of relationships - apart from the sexual ones -- grouped around at least two main cooperative
functions. This is consistent with our theoretical framework laid out in Figure 2,
which allows for both hierarchical and non-hierarchical caring relationships, and
hierarchical and non-hierarchical transactional relationships -- roughly corresponding
to the new relationship groupings identified by our clustering model (for similar
results drawn from a Taiwanese sample, see Chuang, 1998).
Having used this model to determine which of the 20 overall relationships are
closest to one another in four-dimensional relational norm space (i.e., most
functionally redundant, based on the updated cooperative function definitions), we
opted to select a subset of 10 relationships that are comparatively functionally distinct
for purposes of testing our predictions regarding moral judgment in Studies 2 and 3
(see Appendix 2, Supplementary Section 2.1. for the selection procedure). We turn to
the first of those studies next.

Study 2: Moral Judgments of Function-Weakening Actions

The purpose of Study 2 is to replicate our previous results: predicting moral
judgments of behaviors that characteristically weaken one or more cooperative
functions in relational context, out-of-sample, from a set of previously measured U.S.
nationally-representative relational norms (Earp et al., 2020). Here, however, we do
so with the updated cooperative functions, and with a new bipolar dependent measure
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of moral judgment, ranging from “very blameworthy” to “very praiseworthy.” For
this study, we pre-registered two specific predictions:
First, that blameworthiness/praiseworthiness judgments from the present study
will be predicted directly from Study 1 relational norms in a linear mixed regression
model (described below). Second, that relationship dyads that are relatively similar in
their respective relational norm profiles will also be associated with a similar pattern
of moral judgments regarding actions occurring within them. In particular, we predict
that, for every pairing of relationship dyads (e.g., siblings paired with roommates),
there will be a positive correlation between their distance in relational norm space, as
measured by the Kolmogorov-Smirnov coefficient, and their distance in moral
judgment space.

Method.
Open science. Hypotheses, design, measures, sampling strategy, analysis plan,
and exclusion criteria were pre-registered at aspredicted.org (#63736). All materials,
data, and code are available at https://osf.io/zxjt6/.
Stimulus development. To test the hypothesis that relational norms (from
Study 1) would predict patterns of moral judgments across multiple common
relationships (in Study 2), we first assembled a set of action items describing
behaviors that would plausibly weaken or strengthen one or more of the cooperative
functions. Most of these items were drawn from our previous study (Earp et al.,
2020), however, we also edited or added candidate items to more closely track the
logic of the cooperative functions based on their updated definitions. For example, for
the care function, we made sure to include candidate items that explicitly referenced
non-contingent responsiveness to need; for the new transaction function, we made
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sure to include candidate items that exhibited a tit-for-tat logic, rather than simply a
more general concern for equality or fairness; for hierarchy, we made sure to include
candidate items that implied an asymmetrical authority between the interaction
partners, as opposed to a mere difference in power or status.
Twelve trained judges (6 women, 5 men, 1 non-binary, Mage = 31.92, SDage =
11.51) rated 78 action items with the form “Person A does X to Person B” on the
extent to which each described behavior would characteristically weaken or
strengthen each of the cooperative functions, setting moral questions aside: that is,
the judges were instructed not to consider whether an action might be morally good or
bad in any particular relationship -- or in relationships in general -- but only whether
the action would characteristically weaken or strengthen each function based on its
own operational logic, independent of relational context. Ratings were given on a
sliding scale ranging from -100 (“Would characteristically weaken”) to + 100
(“Would characteristically strengthen”), with the middle of the scale marked 0
(“Neither/It depends”).
There was very strong interrater agreement in these ratings (ICC(3,k) = .95).
Following a similar procedure as in Earp et al. (2020), we entered these data into an
algorithm to select a final set of 12 of the most highly characteristic functionweakening action statements, with 3 statements for each of the 4 dyadic functions (see
Appendix 2, Supplement Section 2.1.1 for details). See Figure 6 for the selected
items.
Participants. Having selected our stimuli for the present study, participants
were then recruited through the CloudResearch platform running on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). To power for the same confidence interval and margin of
error as in Study 1, but this time using a between-subjects design and a convenience
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sample, it was determined that we would need ratings from 1,796 participants, which
we rounded up to 1,800 (see Appendix 2, Supplementary Section 2.1.2. for the full
rationale). Since we used a quality control measure in the CloudResearch platform
("Exclude low-quality participants"), we did not over-recruit to account for potential
exclusions. Ultimately, 1,824 participants completed the survey, each of whom was
paid $1.30. Data from 164 of these participants were excluded prior to data analysis
based on our pre-registered exclusion criteria, leaving us with a final sample of 1,660
participants (see Table 3 below for key demographics; see Appendix 2,
Supplementary Table 4 for exclusion details).

Table 3
Key demographics of Study 2 participants
Age

N (%)

Race

N (%)

Gender

N (%)

18 - 27

305 (18.7%)

White

1,175 (72.04%)

Female

847 (51.93%)

28 - 37

579 (35.50%)

Black/
African-American

177 (10.85%)

Male

778 (47.70%)

38 - 47

360 (22.07%)

Asian

140 (8.58%)

Other

6 (0.37%)

48 - 57

215 (13.28%)

Hispanic/
Latinx

103 (6.32%)

58 +

172 (10.55%)

Other

26 (1.59%)

Missing

0 (0.00%)

American Indian/
Alaska Native

7 (0.43%)

Hawaiian/
Pacific Islander

3 (0.18%)
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Procedure. Participants were assigned randomly 1 of the 10 relationships
previously selected for their functional distinctiveness -- shown in Figure 4 -- and
given brief descriptions of their assigned relationship (the same as in Study 1). They
were told that they would be asked to rate the blameworthiness/praiseworthiness of
various actions within the relationship. To orient them to the rating scale, we clarified
that none of the actions they would see would be extreme (e.g., murder), but would
rather all be actions that might plausibly occur within the course of day-to-day life.
After passing several attention and comprehension checks, participants were
shown, in random order, all 12 function-weakening action items shown in Figure 6
below, tailored to their assigned relationship. For instance, if they were assigned the
long-term romantic partner relationship, one of their items was: “Imagine that
someone chooses not to make time for their long-term romantic partner when their
partner is in need of some company. How blameworthy or praiseworthy would that
be, if at all?” Responses were recorded on a sliding scale from “Very blameworthy" (100) to "Very praiseworthy" (+100). We also asked participants to rate each action on
how likely it would be to occur in real life, in order to be able to control for violations
of nonmoral (i.e., social-conventional) expectations (Turiel, 2008) (see “action
likelihood” variable below). For each participant, we computed the mean moral
judgment rating for each of the 4 cooperative function-weakening categories within
their assigned dyad. We also administered a battery of demographic questions, asking
participants to self-report their gender, age, race/ethnicity, English language fluency,
income, education, social and economic political ideology, and religiosity.
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Results.
Stimulus selection: action item characteristicness. As can be seen in Figure
6, each action was rated by the judges as having both a main (i.e., “target”) effect on a
given function, as well as “side effects” on the other cooperative functions. For
example, “Person A doesn’t invest any time or energy in attending to Person B’s
needs” was rated as most characteristic in weakening the care function (M = -95.42,
SD = 8.85), but also the mating function to a lesser extent (M = -54.25, SD = 37.4). As
another example, “Person A refuses to accept payment or compensation in return for a
valuable resource they provided to Person B” was rated as most characteristic in
weakening the transaction function (M = -59.92, SD = 47.71), but -- consistent with
the oppositional logic of care and transaction, discussed above -- was rated as
strengthening the care function (M = 58.50, SD = 34.83). Of course, the fact that one
and the same action might simultaneously affect multiple cooperative functions is to
be expected, depending on the operational logic of each function and the nature of the
action. To account for the function-affecting specificity of each action, then, we
computed a “target specificity” variable (i.e., main effect minus mean of side effects)
for each action for use in subsequent pre-registered analyses.
Moral judgment ratings. As noted, each participant was asked to rate all 12
action items shown in Figure 6 on their blameworthiness/praiseworthiness in the
context of their assigned relationship. We calculated the mean moral judgment rating
of each subset of 3 actions (resulting in one mean rating per function per participant
for their assigned relationship), with the resulting distributions of moral judgment
ratings for all assigned relationships depicted in Figure 7.
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Actions judged to characteristically weaken
one or more cooperative functions

Care

Hierarchy

Mating

Transaction

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

1

Person A loudly complains about their own troubles
after Person B reveals a sad personal story.

-57.25 (51.15) -14.92 (23.10) -32.42 (34.17)

10.58 (16.92)

2

Person A doesn’t invest any time or energy in attending
to Person B’s needs.

-95.42 (8.85) -20.92 (23.77)

-54.25 (37.4)

-3.17 (32.45)

3

Person A chooses not to make time for Person B when
person B is in need of some company

-73.83 (27.33) -14.33 (17.54) -43.75 (37.26)

0.17 (44.95)

4

Person B openly expresses their disagreement with
Person A’s judgement in front of others.

-24.25 (21.25) -63.08 (40.81) -18.83 (23.46)

-5.17 (18.7)

5

Person B refuses to carry out a task in the manner
Person A instructs

-25.25 (30.54) -83.67 (32.65) -12.08 (13.25)

-24.33 (28.89)

6

Person B pursues their own plan of action, despite
contradictory instructions from Person A.

-26.33 (29.10) -80.75 (26.94) -18.17 (19.53)

-18.67 (29.29)

7

Person A intentionally avoids any kind of sexual
interaction with Person B.

8

8.92 (5.13)

24.08 (34.21)

-87.58 (23.36)

12.33 (28.88)

Person A goes on romantic dates with people other than
Person B without seeking Person B’s permission.

-35.17 (35.98) -18.17 (33.11)

-86.75 (15.8)

-4.58 (11.3)

9

Person A invests time and energy in a romantic
relationship with someone other than Person B

-20.92 (29.89)

-55.92 (50.47)

0 (0)

10

Person A decides not to share a reward with Person B
even though Person B did an equal amount of work.

-36.33 (33.24) -41.92 (27.74) -26.08 (32.65)

-81.50 (25.25)

11

Person A refuses to accept payment or compensation in
return for a valuable resource they provided to Person B.

58.50 (34.83)

1.33 (27.43)

21.33 (26.39)

-59.92 (47.71)

12

Person A doesn’t offer to compensate Person B for the
time Person B spent helping them with a task.

2.17 (41.21)

-11.08 (43.95)

-4.50 (6.36)

-79.67 (24.53)

4.00 (16.26)

Figure 6. Characteristic function-weakening actions. Heatmap showing mean ratings of judges (n = 12) of the extent to which
each action would characteristically weaken or strengthen the care, hierarchy, mating, and transaction functions, respectively,
between any two people. These items were chosen as experimental stimuli from a much larger set by an algorithm (see
Appendix 2, Supplement Section 2.1.1. for details) using the judges’ ratings, where -100 represents the most characteristic
function-weakening effect. Darker shades represent more extreme ratings in the weakening direction. Note: when rating actions
on the “hierarchy” dimension, judges were asked to imagine that Person A was in a subordinate role, specifically; when rating
actions on the “care” dimension, judges were asked to imagine that Person A was in a caregiving (as opposed to care-seeking)
role, specifically. The text for this Figure legend is adapted from a similar legend from Earp et al. (2020).
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Figure 7. Moral judgments of praise and blame for function-weakening actions. Study 2 moral judgments of actions
rated as characteristically weakening one or more cooperative functions in different relationships: kernel density plot of
moral judgments (-100 = very blameworthy, +100 = very praiseworthy). Dot represents the mean, with 95% confidence
intervals. Height of the curve represents density (see Figure 3 for explanation). This experiment was conducted once,
with all data shown here.

Predicting moral judgments: linear regression approach. We turn now to our
main, pre-registered hypothesis. As a first approach, we sought to predict Study 2
moral judgments (i.e., for weakening one or more cooperative functions) directly
from Study 1 relational norms in a linear mixed regression model. Accordingly, Study
2 participants were entered as the highest-level grouping variable, with assigned
relationship dyad entered as a nested random intercept. The mean relational norm
estimates from Study 1 were entered alongside both “action likelihood” and “target
specificity” as continuous fixed factors for the reasons given above.
The results from this model supported our hypothesis for each function. Study
1 relational norms significantly predicted Study 2 moral judgments for care (p < .001,
95% CI [-.27, -.14]), hierarchy (p < .001, 95% CI [-.14, -.07]), mating (p < .001, 95%
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CI [-.36, -.30]), and transaction (p < .001, 95% CI [-.11, -.05]). These results are also
robust when controlling for the following demographic factors: gender, education
level, income, social and economic ideology, and religiosity (see Appendix 2,
Supplementary Section 2.2 for full regression tables).
Predicting moral judgments: K-S distance correlation approach. Having
confirmed that Study 1 relational norms predict between-relationship variation in
moral judgments in the current study, over and above mere uncommonness or
unexpectedness of behavior (see “action likelihood” discussion above), we sought to
further explore this finding with a second pre-registered analysis. Our hypothesis was
that “dyads with similar relational norms within a given society [will be] associated
with similar patterns of moral judgments across actions, whereas dyads with
dissimilar relational norms [will be] associated with divergent patterns of moral
judgments across actions” (Earp et al., 2020, p. 4). Accordingly, we sought to predict
the K-S distance between each pair of relationships in moral judgment space (based
on current ratings) from their corresponding K-S distances in relational norm space
(from Study 1).
To do this, we relied on the same K-S distance approach described earlier,
comparing the moral judgment distributions for each type of function violation for
each possible pair of relationships. We then computed a Spearman’s correlation
between these moral judgment dissimilarity values and the previously computed
relational norm dissimilarity values. As can be seen in Figures 8a-8d, our abovestated hypothesis was confirmed for each function. Thus, we find a positive
correlation between the extent of dissimilarity in relational norms (as measured by the
K-S distance coefficient) and the extent of dissimilarity in associated patterns of
moral judgment for care (r = .34, p = .02; note, however, that this is not statistically
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significant when a Bonferroni correction is applied), mating (r = .86, p < .001),
hierarchy (r = .63, p < .001), and -- in contrast to our inability to predict this
relationship with the reciprocity function in RN 1.0 -- also transaction (r = .41, p =
.006). See Figures 8a-8d.

a. Care

b. Hierarchy
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c. Mating

d. Transaction

Figures 8a - 8d. Relational norm and moral judgment dissimilarity for functionweakening actions. Scatterplots showing the correlation in K-S distance between each
pair of relationship dyads in relational norm space (x-axis) and the K-S distance between
those same dyads in moral judgment space (y-axis) for each cooperative function.
Spearman’s r is reported in each case. Note that the color of each relationship reflects the
cluster within which it is located from Figures 5a-5b.
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Discussion.
In this study, we replicated our previously reported findings (Earp et al.,
2020), while also going beyond them in two key ways. First, whereas in our RN 1.0
study, we were only able to successfully predict moral judgments from relational
norms (using the K-S distance correlation approach) for three of the four functions
(care, hierarchy, and mating, but not reciprocity), in the current study, our predictions
were successful for all four functions (care, hierarchy, mating, and the new
transaction function, replacing reciprocity). Second, whereas in our previous study,
the predicted moral judgments were moral wrongness judgments specifically, in the
current study, we were able to predict moral judgments that ranged from “very
blameworthy” through to “very praiseworthy.” However, consistent with our previous
study, these judgments only pertained to actions that had been rated as
characteristically weakening one or more cooperative functions. It is not yet known
whether our relational norms model can also successfully predict moral judgments
pertaining to actions that characteristically strengthen one or more cooperative
functions. We address this issue next.

Study 3: Moral Judgments of Function-Strengthening Actions

The purpose of Study 3 is to determine whether it is possible to predict moral
judgments of both blame and praise for actions rated as characteristically
strengthening one or more cooperative functions using the same relational norm
approach as in Study 2. As this is an exploratory study, although we pre-registered the
same linear regression and K-S distance analyses used in Study 2, we did not make a
specific prediction about the anticipated results. However, we did pre-register a
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directional hypothesis for a novel analysis, described in more detail below, as follows:
“We predict that the more a function is normatively expected within a cluster of
relationships, the higher the moral judgment rating for strengthening that function will
be on the blame-to-praise scale.”

Method.
Open science. Hypothesis, design, measures, sampling strategy, analysis plan,
and exclusion criteria were pre-registered at aspredicted.org (#69821). All materials,
data, and analysis code are available at https://osf.io/zxjt6/.
Stimulus development. Using the same algorithm described for selecting
function-weakening items in Study 2, but this time operating over candidate functionstrengthening items, we selected 12 such items for use in the present study. See
Figure 9.
Participants. Participant recruitment was the same as in Study 2, with the
same target sample of 1,800 participants. Ultimately, 1,901 participants completed the
survey, each of whom was paid $1.30. Four hundred and seventy (470) participants
were excluded prior to data analysis based on pre-registered exclusion criteria (see
Appendix 2, Supplementary Section 3.1.1 for details), leaving us with a final sample
of 1,431 participants. See Table 4 for key demographics.
Table 4
Key demographics of Study 3 participants
Age

N (%)

Race

N (%)

Gender

N (%)

18 - 27

252 (17.82%)

White

1,017 (71.92%)

Female

712 (50.35%)

28 - 37

542 (38.33%)

Black/
African-American

187 (13.15%)

Male

696 (49.22%)

38 - 47

316 (22.35%)

Asian

120 (8.49%)

Other

6 (0.42%)
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48 - 57

185 (13.08%)

Hispanic/
Latinx

48 (3.39%)

58+

119 (8.42%)

Other

25 (1.77%)

American Indian /
Alaska Native

16 (1.13%).

Hawaiian / Pacific
Islander

2 (0.14%)

Procedure. The procedure was identical to Study 2.
Results.
Stimulus selection: action item characteristicness. Results are displayed in Figure 9.

Actions judged to characteristically strengthen
one or more cooperative functions

Care

Hierarchy

Mating

Transaction

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

Mean (SD)

1

Person A lends Person B an important item that Person B
needs, telling them to use it as long as they require it, with
no questions asked.

80.58 (21.85) 13.92 (27.04) 19.41 (20.37)

-11.42 (63.78)

2

Person A goes out of their way to find a thoughtful gift for
Person B to cheer them up when they are feeling depressed.

85.5 (10.84)

-9.75 (40.91)

3

Person A provides cold-weather clothing for Person B when
82.83 (20.27) 12.42 (24.03)
Person B can’t acquire it for themselves.

4

12.33 (29.68) 38.75 (32.28)
36.08 (35.31)

3.17 (35.29)

Person A takes care to follow Person B’s instructions as
exactly as they can.

30.08 (35.04) 82.08 (30.26) 14.33 (21.03)

16.17 (24.72)

5

Person A agrees to respect Person B’s authority.

2.75 (19.37)

86.92 (22.96)

-1.67 (16.35)

10.08 (27.92)

6

Person A accepts that Person B should have “final say”
about what happens in a given context.

-3 (18.66)

73.33 (24.35)

-5.83 (5.43)

-4.67 (9.02)

7

Person A expresses romantic feelings for Person B.

9.08 (27.99) -20.58 (32.76) 71.58 (29.27)

-6.92 (17.69)

8

Person A tells Person B about a sexual fantasy they had
involving Person B.

-3.33 (5.88) -16.67 (37.01)

80 (25.49)

2.92 (10.32)

9

Person A offers to give Person B a sensual massage.

7.42 (26.77)

82.83 (19.11)

2.67 (19.04)

10

Person A makes a point of returning a favor that Person B
performed the month before.

7.41 (29.74)

23.58 (28.21) 16.42 (15.21)

88.58 (16.18)

11

Person A agrees to help Person B if Person B compensates
them for their time and energy.

-53.67 (43.41) 24.83 (49.29) -36.25 (37.28)

84.83 (18.37)

12

Person A asks Person B for compensation after teaching
Person B a skill.

-47.75 (31.87) 18.25 (37.81)

-7 (39.22)

-24.5 (28.17)

71 (39.42)

Figure 9. Characteristic function-strengthening actions. Heatmap showing mean ratings of judges (n = 12) of the extent
to which each action would characteristically strengthen the care, hierarchy, mating, and transaction functions,
respectively, between any two people. These items were chosen using the same method as used in Study 2, where +100
represents the most characteristic function-strengthening effect. Darker shades represent more extreme ratings in the
strengthening direction.

Moral judgment ratings. Results are displayed in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. Moral judgments of praise and blame for function-strengthening actions. Study 3 moral judgments of
actions rated as characteristically strengthening one or more cooperative functions in different relationships: kernel
density plot of moral judgments (-100 = very blameworthy, +100 = very praiseworthy). Dot represents the mean,
with 95% confidence intervals. Height of the curve represents density (see Figure 3 for explanation). This
experiment was conducted once, with all data shown here.

Predicting moral judgments: linear regression approach. As with Study 2,
we sought to predict Study 3 moral judgments (here, for function-strengthening
actions) directly from Study 1 relational norms in a linear mixed regression model
(same as described above). The results from this model supported a predictive
relationship for some of the functions, but not others. Specifically, relational norms
from Study 1 significantly predicted the moral judgments of Study 3 participants for
care (p < .001, 95% CI [-.14, -.04]), hierarchy (p = .02, 95% CI [.007, .07]; however,
note that this result does not survive a Bonferroni correction), and mating (p < .001,
95% CI [.20, .26]), but not for transaction (p = .13, 95% CI [-.007, .06]). The same
basic pattern of results is observed when controlling for the same demographic factors
as above (see Appendix 2, Supplementary Section 3.2 for the full regression tables).
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Predicting moral judgments: K-S distance correlation approach. As before,
we also sought to predict the K-S distance between each pair of relationships in moral
judgment space (based on current ratings) from their corresponding K-S distances in
relational norm space (from Study 1). As can be seen in Figures 11a-11d, this
predictive relationship holds for some, but not others, of the functions. In particular, it
holds for mating (r = .86, p < .001), and hierarchy (r = .51, p < .001), but not for care
(r = -.05 p = .80) nor transaction (r = .18, p = .24).

a. Care

b. Hierarchy
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c. Mating

d. Transaction

Figures 11a - 11d. Relational norm and moral judgment dissimilarity for functionstrengthening actions. Scatterplots showing the correlation in K-S distance between
each pair of relationship dyads in relational norm space (x-axis) and the K-S distance
between those same dyads in moral judgment space (y-axis) for each relational function.
Spearman’s r is reported in each case. Note that the color of each relationship reflects
the cluster in which it is located from Figures 5a-5b.
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Predicting moral judgments: between-cluster comparison approach. As
mentioned previously, in addition to the linear regression and K-S distance correlation
approaches, we pre-registered a third analysis as follows. “For each function, we are
interested in whether moral judgments will differ for actions previously judged to
characteristically strengthen the function depending on whether the action occurs in
relationships with relatively higher or lower normative expectations for that function
(based on Study 1 ratings). For each function, we will divide relationships into 2+
clusters (e.g., ‘low,’ ‘medium,’ ‘high’) representing relative normative expectations
for that function using [the same hierarchical clustering algorithm from Study 1] and
conduct between-cluster statistical comparisons for moral judgments. We predict that
the more a function is normatively expected within a cluster of relationships, the
higher the moral judgment rating for strengthening that function will be on the blameto-praise scale.”
In adopting this approach, our aim was to test a simpler, exploratory
hypothesis in a relatively straightforward way. Rather than comparing every
relationship to every other relationship in both relational norm and moral judgment
space -- as in the K-S distance correlation approach -- the idea here was to make a
smaller number of comparisons, between groups of relationships, clustered together
on the basis of their relative normative expectations for each cooperative function
(from Study 1).
As noted in the Introduction, we expected that the mating function would
show the clearest between-cluster pattern of results on this approach. This is because
there are 3 highly distinct clusters of relationships spanning the full range of relational
norm ratings for mating, as can be seen in Figure 3 from Study 1. In particular, there
is a small cluster of relationships for which mating is strongly positively expected or
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prescribed (long-term romantic partners and friends-with-benefits), a much larger
cluster of relationships for which mating is strongly negatively expected or proscribed
(e.g., kinship relationships, professional relationships), and a third cluster of
relationships with a relatively large proportion of judgments around the middle of the
scale, representing “It depends” (e.g., acquaintances, close friends). It follows from
our theoretical expectations that strengthening the mating function in the first cluster
of relationships should be seen as morally positive, eliciting judgments of
praiseworthiness, whereas doing so in the second cluster of relationships should be
seen as morally negative, eliciting judgments of blameworthiness, while judgments
for the third cluster of relationships should fall somewhere in between. As seen in
Figure 12a, this is precisely what we find.
In particular, a Mann-Whitney U test reveals a statistically significant
difference in median moral judgments of mating behavior between, on the one hand,
the relatively high-expectation (mating prescribed) cluster of relationships (Mdn =
39.00; that is, mating was judged to be moderately praiseworthy within these
relationships) and, on the other hand, the relatively low-expectation (mating
proscribed) cluster of relationships (Mdn = -66.33; that is, mating was judged to be
highly blameworthy within these relationships), U = 30,270.5, p < .001 (note that all
statistically significant results reported in this section survive a Bonferroni
correction). Moreover, both judgments differ in turn from the median moral judgment
regarding the intermediate cluster of relationships (Mdn = -11.33), that is, between the
low-expectation cluster and the medium-expectation cluster (U = 50,017, p < .001)
and between the medium-expectation cluster and the high-expectation cluster (U =
14,574, p = .003).
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Figure 12a. Mating: moral judgments (y-axis) for strengthening mating across three clusters of
relationships identified by hierarchical clustering analysis as having relatively low, medium, and
high normative expectations for mating based on Study 1 ratings (x-axis). The y-axis runs from 100 (“very blameworthy”) to +100 (“very praiseworthy”). The means displayed under the x-axis
are based on the raw relational norm ratings (normative functional expectations) for the dyads
within each cluster and have been added to aid interpretation; the cluster analysis, by contrast,
was based on the K-S coefficient representing the distance between each pairing of relationships
in relational norm space. The p values reflect the median statistical differences in moral
judgments (y-axis) between clusters, according a Mann-Whitney U test (i.e., they do not represent
differences in the mean normative functional expectations listed below the x-axis).

For hierarchy and transaction (see Figures 12b and 12c), the same basic
pattern is observed, but with proportionally fewer judgments of outright
blameworthiness for strengthening the functions in the ‘wrong’ relationship. This
might be explained by the milder nature of the proscriptions (based on Study 1
relational norm ratings) regarding these functions, compared to the analogous
proscriptions regarding mating, in the relationships for which each function is
relatively non-normative.
In particular, for hierarchy, a Mann-Whitney U test reveals a statistically
significant difference in median moral judgments regarding hierarchical (i.e., selfsubordinating) behavior between, on the one hand, the relatively high-expectation
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(hierarchy prescribed) cluster of relationships (Mdn = 45.33; that is, such behavior was
judged to be praiseworthy within these relationships) and, on the other hand, the
relatively low-expectation (hierarchy proscribed) cluster of relationships (Mdn = 40.5;
that is, the behavior was judged to be less praiseworthy within these relationships), U
= 82,410.5, p < .001. Please note that, for hierarchy, only two groups were identified
by the cluster analysis, as opposed to three, as was the case for mating.

Figure 12b. Hierarchy: moral judgments (y-axis) for strengthening hierarchy across two clusters
of relationships identified by hierarchical clustering analysis as having relatively low versus
high normative expectations for hierarchy based on Study 1 ratings (x-axis). See Figure 12a for
more information.

For transaction, like mating, a Mann-Whitney U test reveals a statistically
significant difference in in median moral judgments regarding transactional behavior
between, on the one hand, the relatively high-expectation (transaction prescribed)
cluster of relationships (Mdn = 38.83; that is, transactional behavior was judged to be
moderately praiseworthy within these relationships) and, on the other hand, the
relatively low-expectation (transaction proscribed) cluster of relationships (Mdn =
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9.00; that is, such behavior was judged to be much less praiseworthy within these
relationships), U = 9,231.5, p < .001. Moreover, the median moral judgment
regarding the high-expectation group differs in turn from the median moral judgment
regarding transactional behavior in the intermediate cluster (Mdn = 14.67), that is,
between the high-expectation cluster and the medium-expectation cluster (U =
16,285.5, p < .001), but, unlike mating, not between the medium-expectation cluster
and the low-expectation cluster (U = 88,289, p = .36).

Figure 12c. Transaction: moral judgments (y-axis) for strengthening transaction across three
clusters of relationships identified by hierarchical clustering analysis as having relatively low,
medium, and high normative expectations for transaction based on Study 1 ratings (x-axis). See
Figure 12a for more information.

Finally, as anticipated in the Introduction, the care function does stand apart.
In Study 1, there were no relationships, apart from the customer-seller relationship
(not included in the subset chosen for Studies 2 and 3), for which the mean relational
norm rating for care was negative rather than positive. Instead, as we noted, care is
typically welcomed in any relational context -- and if anything, it might be seen as
even more praiseworthy to show care in those relationships for which it is least
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normatively expected (as such behavior can plausibly be interpreted as going above
and beyond the call of duty). As can be seen in Figure 12d, no statistically significant
difference in median praiseworthiness ratings could be detected between clusters of
relationships within which care is relatively less (Mdn = 68.00) versus more (Mdn =
77.67) normatively expected (p = .65), possibly due to a ceiling effect.

Figure 12d. Care: moral judgments (y-axis) for strengthening care across two clusters
of relationships identified by hierarchical clustering analysis as having relatively low
versus high normative expectations for care based on Study 1 ratings (x-axis). See
Figure 12a for more information.

Please note: for each of the above figures, the “low,” “medium,” and “high”
designations are relative to each function, and are derived from a hierarchical cluster
analysis of the K-S distances between all included relations in terms of their Study 1
normative expectations for the function in question; whereas, the displayed means
(and SDs) below the x-axis are based on the raw relational norm ratings for each set
of relationships so identified, and have been added solely for the purpose of making
the figures easier to interpret. Finally, to reiterate, the p values relate to statistical
differences in median moral judgment ratings between clusters (the dependent
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measure; see y-axis), not relative strength of relational norms (the independent
measure; see x-axis).

Discussion.
In this study, we sought to determine whether judgments of blame and praise
regarding characteristically function-strengthening actions could be predicted from
previously measured relational norms. In Study 2, which focused on functionweakening actions, we found that we were able to predict such moral judgments for
all four functions -- care, hierarchy, mating, and transaction -- both in a linear mixed
regression model and by correlating K-S distances between relationships in relational
norm and moral judgment space, respectively. In this study, however, which focused
on function-strengthening actions, the predictive relationship between relational
norms and moral judgments was less consistent.
For mating and hierarchy, relational norms did successfully predict moral
judgments using the linear regression, K-S distance correlation, and the new betweencluster comparison approaches. However, for care, only the linear regression
approach was successful, and for transaction, only the between-cluster comparison
approach was successful.
Focusing first on transaction, we found that, consistent with our pre-registered
hypothesis, the most positive moral judgments regarding transaction-strengthening
behavior were observed within the relationship-cluster for which transaction was
rated, in Study 1, as being the most strongly normatively expected (i.e., the
roommates/housemates relationship). We also found that, for the parent-child and
romantic partner relationships (low-expectation cluster, mean expectation of
transaction = -35.96, SD = 63.47), about a third of the distribution of moral judgments
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extends below 0 into “blameworthy” territory. Although the median moral judgment
for this cluster was slightly above zero (with wide confidence intervals), the observed
substantial proportion of blameworthy judgments is consistent with past research
suggesting that exchange-based, transactional behavior in certain paradigmatically
close -- and thus normatively communal -- relationships will in many cases be judged
negatively overall (McGraw & Tetlock, 2005). With respect to the linear regression
analysis, although, for transaction, the result was not statistically significant, the slope
of the relationship between Study 1 relational norms and Study 3 moral judgments
was in the expected direction (i.e., the more transaction is normatively expected
within a relationship, the more praiseworthy it is to behave in a transactional manner).
Turning now to care, it is remarkable that, with respect to the linear regression
model, only care had a negative slope (p < .001, 95% CI [-.14, -.04]). In other words,
only in the case of care did a greater normative expectation for the function
correspond to less positive moral judgment for strengthening the function in the
relevant relational context. Although this result was not statistically significant in the
between-cluster comparison model, that analysis did not allow us to control for the
effect of other variables, such as action likelihood and target specificity. Whereas,
when we do control for these factors in the pre-registered linear regression model, the
negative relationship between normative expectations for care and degree of
praiseworthiness for strengthening care emerges. Again, this finding suggests that it is
less praiseworthy to behave in a caring manner in the context of relationships for
which such behavior is strongly normatively expected than it is to do so in the context
of relationships where care is less normatively expected (consistent with McManus et
al., 2021).
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General Discussion
We had three main goals with this research. The first was to test an updated
relational norms model (RN 2.0), including a new transaction function (replacing
reciprocity in RN 1.0). The second was to see whether we could predict, not only
negative moral judgments regarding various actions in social-relational context, as in
our previous model, but also positive moral judgments of praiseworthiness. The third
was to determine whether our updated relational norms model could predict moral
judgments not only of actions that characteristically weaken one or more cooperative
functions (care, hierarchy, mating, and transaction) but also actions that
characteristically strengthen one or more such functions.
With respect to the first two aims, we showed that moral judgments of both
blame and praise regarding characteristic function-weakening actions can successfully
be predicted from relational norms for all four of care, hierarchy, mating, and
transaction. In particular, the more strongly a given relationship was normatively
expected to serve each cooperative function, the more blameworthy it was judged to
weaken the function; whereas, the more strongly a function was negatively expected
(i.e., proscribed) within a relationship, the more positive the moral judgment for
weakening the function.
With respect to the third aim, we found that, for hierarchy and mating, the
more strongly prescribed the function, the more positive the moral judgment of
function-strengthening behavior, regardless of the analytical approach used; whereas,
the more strongly proscribed the function (e.g., mating within family relationships),
the more negative the moral judgment. The same basic pattern was observed for the
transaction function, but only one pre-registered analysis yielded a statistically
significant result. Finally, for care, a striking departure from the other functions was
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observed: in the pre-registered linear regression model, the stronger the normative
expectation of care in a given relationship, the less praiseworthy it was judged to be to
behave in a caring manner; whereas, the weaker the normative expectation of care
(e.g., in the acquaintance relationship), the more praiseworthy it was judged to be to
show care. This finding is consistent with other recent empirical work in relational
moral psychology, for example, the study by McManus et al (2021), wherein an agent
who helped a stranger (relatively low normative expectation of care) was judged as a
morally better agent than one who helped a family member (relatively high normative
expectation of care).
One immediate lesson from this pattern of results for care compared to the
other cooperative functions is that an overly narrow focus on harming vs. helping
behavior, as is typical for studies in this area, will likely result in an impoverished,
and even potentially misleading, understanding of moral judgment in relational
context. Although care is, on any view, a significant component of human morality, it
is not the only component (Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Rai & Fiske, 2011b; Shweder et al.,
1997). Rather, hierarchy, mating, and transaction are also important cooperative
functions that help us solve common coordination problems. Moreover, as we have
seen, actions that characteristically strengthen these functions do not seem to elicit the
same patterns of moral judgment as do actions that strengthen care in relational
context. Whereas caring behavior was rated as more praiseworthy the less
normatively expected the care function, for the other functions, the opposite pattern
was observed. In other words, hierarchical, mating, and transactional behaviors were
rated as more praiseworthy the more normatively expected the respective function.
Such a finding highlights the need to study multiple cooperative functions together --
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i.e., within a single study or paradigm -- to unearth both similarities and differences
between them while holding all else equal.
Limitations and future directions.
We believe this study marks a significant step forward in our understanding of
how human social relationships shape moral judgment, both negative (as in judgments
of blameworthiness) and positive (as in judgments of praiseworthiness). Yet there are
also significant limitations. One of them concerns generalizability, as our samples
were drawn exclusively from the U.S. population. Accordingly, an important future
direction for this research will be to see how relational norms may differ across
cultural contexts, and, if so, whether these differences can help us model and predict
moral judgments (including potential cross-cultural moral disagreements). Another
potential limitation is the small number of trained judges who rated candidate action
items on their characteristicness (i.e., as function-weakeners or functionstrengtheners). An advantage of the smaller number is that we could ensure adequate
training for the judges, so as to increase the likelihood of getting high-quality ratings;
however, it is unclear how representative these ratings are, even of the U.S. context.
In future work, we plan to develop a larger pool of candidate items and crossculturally validate them, while also recruiting and training a larger number of judges
drawn from representative samples.
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-- for very helpful feedback on this work. Thanks also to members of the Crockett and
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Chapter 4
True Love: A Normative Relational Concept
Abstract
In the previous chapters, we looked at moral norms that are embedded in a wide range
of social relationships, such as siblings, neighbors, acquaintances, and romantic
partners. In this chapter, I will zoom in on the last of these, the romantic partner
relationship – given its special importance to so many of our lives – and explore how
normativity is embedded within the very concepts we use to describe such relationship,
focusing on the ordinary concept of true love.
When we say that what two people feel for each other is ‘true love,’ we seem to
be doing more than simply clarifying that it is in fact love they feel, as opposed to
something else. That is, an experience or relationship might be a genuine or actual
instance of love without necessarily being an instance of true love. But what criteria do
people use to determine whether something counts as true love?
This chapter explores three hypotheses. The first holds that the ordinary concept
of true love picks out love that is highly prototypical. The second, that it picks out love
that is especially good or valuable. The third, that people distinguish between
psychological states that are ‘real’ or not, and that it picks out love that is real. Two
experiments provide evidence against the first hypothesis and in favor of the second
and third. Implications for real-life disagreements about love are also discussed.
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Introduction
There’s a difference, it seems, between love and true love. Just pick your
favorite love story, from a book or a movie, or real life, where you find yourself most
convinced of the special connection between the lovers. Where, however cynical or
unromantic you may be, you might still be tempted to say such things as “They were
made for each other,” and mean it as more than a cliché. And now imagine that one of
them dies. The other one grieves, for a good long while. Enough time passes, and the
living partner starts a relationship with someone new.
Imagine that this new person is no mere rebound. They are deeply kind,
attractive, intelligent, loyal. The surviving half of our original duo falls in love with
them. And suppose they really are in love. In other words, what the two of them feel
for each other, or what they have between them, counts as genuine (romantic) love on
any plausible view. Even so, you might find yourself thinking, with a touch of sadness
perhaps, that no matter how wonderful and worthy this new love-relationship is, the
only time our protagonist experienced true love was with the one who died.
If you can get yourself to think that (you may have to use your imagination to
fill in certain details), then you may be inclined to think that the concept true love is
in some way distinct from the concept love. At least, that is how it seems to us: that
you can have or experience the latter without the former. Indeed, people use the
phrase ‘true love’ in ordinary discourse—in pop songs, poems, and private
confessions—as though it expressed a concept all its own, and they seem to think this
concept is getting at something important. Something that might justify a marriage, or
cause an affair, or inspire a move between countries or a change of careers.
Much seems to hang on this concept, but what are its contours? What (if
anything) does it refer to? There has been a mountain of scholarship, in philosophy
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and other disciplines, on the nature of love, but there has been relatively little work on
true love as a topic in its own right.
Of course, that is not to say that existing philosophical work never uses the
phrase ‘true love.’ This phrase has occasionally appeared within existing work, but
most of these uses are not invoking the concept that will be our primary concern here.
Rather, the aim is often to distinguish actual cases of love from phenomena that may
superficially appear to be love, but which are really something else: lust, say, or
infatuation, or an unhealthy desire to possess the other person. For example, Velleman
(1999) writes: “Students and teachers may of course feel desires for intimacy with one
another, but such desires are unlikely to be an expression of true love in this context;
usually, they express transference-love, in which the other is a target of fantasies” (p.
362). Similarly, Anglin (1991) argues that if an apparent case of love is the result of
some deterministic process, “then it is not true love but mere love-behavior” (p. 20).
In these examples, we suggest, the aim is not to explore a distinct concept of true love
but is rather to understand the concept love and, specifically, to do so by
distinguishing between actual love and the mere appearance of love.
We suspect there is more to true love than this. More, that is, than the mere
marking of a boundary between genuine instances of love and its sundry pretenders.
And if you bought into our opening example, you should agree. But if the ‘true’ in
true love is not a mere synonym for ‘actual’ and suchlike—what is it?
There are various ways of tackling this question. To keep things focused, we
will be looking at one particular kind of love—so-called romantic love—as illustrated
by our opening example. This is not to say that the love between a parent and child,
for instance, could never appropriately be described as ‘true’. Perhaps it could, and
pursuing this suggestion might ultimately shed light on the scope of the concept of

128

true love: that is, on the range of cases or kinds of love to which the concept applies.
But even within the category of romantic love, it seems to us that some examples are
liable to be described as ‘true’, while other examples, though still counting as
legitimate (i.e., actual) cases of romantic love, are not liable to be described that way.
We are interested in what distinguishes these two sorts of cases.
As an additional constraint, we will concern ourselves with one particular
aspect of this puzzle, namely, with the ordinary concept of true love as it applies
within this romantic domain. By this, we mean the concept as it exists in the minds of
everyday speakers of English, as revealed by the criteria they use to determine which
things count as true love and which do not. To make progress on this question, we
will be exploring the patterns in people’s ordinary judgments about true love.
Naturally, this will involve looking both at cases of agreement and at cases of
disagreement in such judgments. In some cases, people overwhelmingly agree as to
whether something counts as true love or not, and in those cases, an account of the
ordinary concept should explain why people make the judgments they do. But of
course, when it comes to questions of true love, we also often find considerable
disagreement. Often -- as we shall see in our results below -- different people look at
the very same phenomenon and make opposite judgments about whether it counts as
true love. An account of the ordinary concept should also help us understand what it
is that people are disagreeing about in these cases. This will be a core aspect of our
inquiry.
If we do successfully uncover at least some of the criteria implicit in the
ordinary concept, we immediately face a further question as to whether these criteria
are the right ones or whether there might be reason to revise them or perhaps to
abandon them, or even abandon the concept itself. These are important questions, and
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we will turn to them in the final section of our paper. But before we can ask whether
the ordinary criteria are right or wrong, we will need to have a better understanding of
what those ordinary criteria actually are.
Three hypotheses
In our attempt to understand the ordinary concept of true (romantic) love, we will
consider three main hypotheses. The first hypothesis says that true love, on the
ordinary concept, is highly prototypical love; the second hypothesis says that it is
especially good, valuable, or praiseworthy love, whether or not it is prototypical; the
third hypothesis says that, independent of goodness or prototypicality, true love is
love that is rooted in the real, in a sense we will be discussing further below. We
begin by simply laying out these three hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Prototypicality. One hypothesis would be that true love is
simply highly prototypical love. On this hypothesis, the criteria associated with the
concept of love itself are best understood as a matter of degree. If a relationship or
experience satisfies these criteria to a certain degree, people might be willing to say
that it is an instance of love. But to count as true love, it would not be enough just to
scrape over some minimal threshold; the relationship or experience would have to
satisfy those criteria to a far greater degree.
According to prototype theory—by way of a brief review—members of a
category are picked out by a number of features, each of which has a certain amount
of weight (the greater the weight, the more important for category membership).
Roughly speaking, the more features with the more weight an entity has, the more
prototypical it is (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Smith & Medin, 2013). So if true love is
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prototypical love, it would be an instance of love that has most or all of the
prototypical features of love that carry the most weight.
As an analogy, think of the concept of a true jock. Plausibly, the concept jock
is a prototype concept. As such, the concept is associated with various features that
count in favor of someone’s being a member of the category (prioritizing athletics
over other activities, holding certain objectifying attitudes towards women, not being
particularly invested in high culture, and so on). One natural hypothesis would be that
to be a true jock, one has to be a prototypical jock. On this hypothesis, if a person
showed many of the features associated with the concept but not most or all, we might
be willing on the whole to consider the person a jock, but we would not be willing to
consider the person a true jock. Only a person who showed most or all of the features,
and showed those features to a high degree, could be a true jock.
A question now arises as to whether a similar approach could be applied to the
concept of true love. In support of the view that it can, research both in philosophy
and in psychology has converged on the claim that the concept love is indeed a
prototype concept (see below). There is now a good deal of evidence in favor of that
claim. The key issue then is whether the concept true love is best understood in terms
of this prototype.
Within philosophy, Chappell (2018) has defended an account of romantic love
that distinguishes ‘paradigm’ cases from what she calls ‘secondary’ or ‘marginal’
cases. She provides strong arguments for the view that this distinction helps us make
sense of certain core questions surrounding love. For example, it helps us tell whether
someone is really experiencing romantic love in the fullest sense. Take a case in
which someone feels strongly benevolent toward another but lacks intimacy or
perhaps commitment. Chappell notes that “benevolence is one thing that we call
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love,” but goes on to argue that benevolence alone would not count as “full-blown
love” (Chappell, 2018). Full-blown or paradigmatic love, she suggests, would require
something more.
Research in psychology has provided evidence that supports this view. Such
research suggests that the ordinary concept of love is indeed a prototype concept, and
that it has a number of features apart from just benevolence. Among ordinary people,
the most significant of these features appear to be intimacy, passion, and commitment
(Aron & Westbay, 1996). Roughly speaking, intimacy involves feelings of closeness
and connectedness, and a motive to promote the well-being of the other (i.e., a motive
of benevolence). Passion encompasses romantic feelings, including physical
attraction and sexual desire. And commitment refers to the promise or intention to stay
together despite obstacles, along with the belief that the relationship will last
(Sternberg, 1986).
What then does it mean for a person or couple to experience true love? In
keeping with the jock analogy, as we noted, one hypothesis is that the person or
couple experiences prototypical love. Perhaps people would be willing to categorize a
relationship that exhibited just a few of the prototypical features of love as an instance
of love, but only a relationship that had all of the features, and to high degree, as an
instance of true love.7

7

Note that this hypothesis is not committed to any specific view about which features are included in
the prototype. For example, there are subtle but real differences between the account in Chappell
(2018) versus Aron and Westbay (1996), and these accounts generate different predictions about which
specific qualities of a relationship will most strongly influence people's judgments about its
prototypicality. The hypothesis under discussion here does not rest on this, however. Rather, it says
that the features of a relationship that influence people’s prototypical love judgments—whatever those
features turn out to be—will be the very same features that influence people’s true love judgments (in
the same way and to the same degree). So, although we happen to use the features of love unearthed by
Aron and Westbay’s classic empirical work to test this hypothesis, we might just as well have used the
features proposed by Chappell, or even other features not included in either account (Earp &
Savulescu, 2020; C. Jenkins, 2017). The key point is that, if prototypical love and true love are in fact
the same concept, then, whatever the effect of a given set of features on judgments about the former, it
should be roughly the same as the effect of equivalent features on judgments about the latter.
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Let’s try this idea out. Imagine a young couple. The partners are consumed by
passionate, sexual feelings for each other, and they can’t imagine the relationship ever
ending. But they don’t really know each other at a deeper level, so their feelings of
intimacy and commitment are not well grounded. It might be right to say that there is
at least some sense in which what they feel for each other is love—perhaps they are
even ‘in love’ in a way that is often valorized in pop songs and movies8—but at the
same time, without their having developed a stronger sense of mutual understanding
and emotional closeness sufficient to ground a more durable commitment, it might be
hard to characterize their relationship as an instance of true love.
Conversely, imagine a long-married couple that has considerable commitment
toward their relationship, as evidenced by its sheer longevity, but who have
emotionally drifted apart over the years and have a waning sense of romantic passion.
Their relationship might well be an instance of love, but again, this would probably
not be the first couple you would choose to illustrate the concept of true love.
By contrast, a couple that is emotionally intimate, profoundly committed, and
smoldering with passion even after the so-called honeymoon phase—that is, a couple
that strongly exhibits each of the most central, prototypical dimensions of the ordinary
love concept—would seem to be a couple that experiences true love on almost any
reasonable conception. Our first candidate hypothesis, then, is that true love is highly
prototypical love.
Hypothesis 2: Goodness. The hypothesis that true love is prototypical love is a
plausible first pass, or so we think. But upon reflection, it may not be the whole
picture. Instead, it seems that we can imagine loving relationships that are not at all
prototypical in the way we just described, but which, if you closely examine them and

8

For a critical discussion of love being conceived this way, see (Cottingham, 2017).
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come to appreciate what makes them valuable, good, or praiseworthy, would still
seem to count as true love.
To illustrate this idea, we will tell you about a couple who escaped to the
United States from Poland together after the invasion of the Nazis. They were set up
by their respective families when they were younger, and went along with what was
expected of them. They got married, moved in together, and developed a simple
routine that became familiar. Their relationship didn’t involve much deep
conversation, and sexual contact was strictly biblical. But by the time the Nazis came,
they had built a contented life together. No passion, not much in the way of (overt)
emotional disclosure, but a committed partnership nevertheless.
Now imagine their harrowing escape; the miles they traveled together under
harsh conditions; what they risked to keep each other alive; what they sacrificed in the
way of personal freedom to make sure they found safety as a couple. At several
points, we can suppose, each one had the opportunity to abandon the other for a more
secure path forward. But they didn’t hesitate to risk their lives to protect their
relationship. Clearly something about their bond was profound.
Now, it seems clear that this is not a prototypical case of romantic love: the
couple never poured their hearts out to each other, and sexual passion was never a
feature of their relationship. But something about their quiet commitment, and the
lengths they went to in order to keep each other safe from harm—and to preserve their
way of life in a new country—might seem to warrant the claim that what they had
between them was, nevertheless, true love. If our intuitions about this case are not
idiosyncratic, there must be more to the concept of true love than mere
prototypicality.
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What might that something more be? One possibility is that it is something
normative: something tied to the notion of goodness or praiseworthiness. In other
words, when we say that what this couple has is true love, we are, perhaps among
other things, expressing a favorable moral attitude toward their love or toward their
relationship more broadly.
The notion that love simpliciter might be a normative concept has support
from the existing literature. As Jenkins (2017) has noted, “the word ‘love’ packs a
powerful rhetorical punch [and] its associated valence is typically positive rather than
negative.” To use the word ‘love’ in reference to an unhealthy or otherwise
dysfunctional relationship, Jenkins argues, can be a “dangerously rhetorically
effective way of concealing how bad” the relationship really is (pp. 94-95). Espousing
a similar view, hooks (2000) argues that love requires honesty, trust, and respect, and
is fundamentally inconsistent with certain negative attitudes or behaviors: “Abuse and
neglect,” hooks argues, “negate love” whereas care and affirmation, which are “the
opposite of abuse and humiliation, are the foundation of love. No one can rightfully
claim to be loving when behaving abusively” (p. 22).
Inspired by these ideas, one natural hypothesis would be that people reserve
the phrase ‘true love’ for instances of love that excel along this normative dimension.
In other words, perhaps people use this phrase only for instances of love that are
especially admirable, or that most fully embody what is valuable, good, or
praiseworthy about love. Beyond that, perhaps any clearly negative characteristic of a
relationship rules out the applicability of the label “true love.”
This hypothesis immediately generates predictions for our question about
when people will agree versus disagree about whether something counts as true love.
In certain cases, almost everyone will think that a certain instance of love manifests
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something of deep value (perhaps our story about a couple escaping the Nazis would
generate this reaction), and in those cases, the hypothesis predicts that almost
everyone should agree that this instance counts as true love. By contrast, in other
cases, people with opposing values will have correspondingly opposing views about
whether a given instance of love manifests something of deep value. In those cases,
the hypothesis predicts that different people should have very different judgments
about whether the instance counts as true love. Those people who think that the case
manifests something of deep value should say that it is true love, while those who
think that it does not should disagree and say that it is not true love.
Importantly, however—and this something we will be testing below—the
hypothesis predicts a substantial amount of agreement about whether something is
true love among those who agree about whether it is good or bad. For example,
among those people who think that a given instance of love is wrong or depraved,
there should be strong agreement as to whether that instance of love counts as true
love (i.e., agreement that it does not).
Hypothesis 3: Realness. Although there is certainly something tempting about
the hypothesis that people use the phrase ‘true love’ only for relationships that they
believe to be valuable, good, or praiseworthy, certain strands within existing research
suggest a subtler view. As May (2013) has argued, there is a rich tradition in Western
thought according to which love, and romantic love in particular, may be risky and
all-consuming: dangerous to oneself or others and even threatening to the very fabric
of society. Love can be a sort of madness. In fact, the idea that a bond must be
‘healthy,’ consistent with the well-being of the lovers, or something that is fit to be
praised to count as love is in some respects a recent innovation. Could there be

136

relationships that are not good—or even highly dysfunctional in certain respects—
where it would still be right to say that the couple experienced true love?
Consider Morgan and Robin. Until meeting one another, each of their prior
romantic relationships had all been fairly uninspired. Suddenly here was a person who
made them feel totally alive, filling them with an electric, almost addictive desire.
They were that couple at the party who seem so in tune with one another that it makes
you wonder about your own relationship. And yet, their love was also tumultuous. A
day might begin happily and end in a bitter argument. Their fights occasionally spun
out of control (once, Morgan had all the locks changed and Robin couldn’t get back
into the apartment for three days). But even in the darkest of times, they felt a
passionate connection. Both were convinced that no one else could ever understand
them—in all their unique peculiarity—quite so well; and they felt that if they weren’t
together, they would be missing out on what was most essential in life.
Suppose that, one day, exhausted from all the drama, they decide to break up
for good. They both feel it is time to start building a stable future—to start looking for
the kind of partner of whom their parents would approve. They don’t feel an
immediate connection to these new prospects, and they find themselves putting a lot
more effort into enjoying one another’s company. (Is it really necessary to spend
multiple weekends together going in detail over potential mutual funds?) Although
these relationships lack the intensity they once felt for each other, they are invested in
making things work, and over the years, they come to really value their new lives.
They can’t help but marvel at how much happier they are now. And they aren’t faking
their feelings: they have in fact grown to love their new partners. Even so, we can
imagine them thinking to themselves from time to time, perhaps lying awake at night
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reflecting on old memories, that the other was their ‘one true love.’ Like the couple
from the beginning of this paper.
If they would be reasonable in thinking that, how could this be explained? We
can imagine different potential answers, but here is one to try: Although their
relationship was in many respects unstable and unhealthy, what Robin and Morgan
felt for each other was very real. Indeed, one can imagine them looking back at the
time they spent together and thinking: “That was such a painful period, but even so, it
was the only time in my life I felt fully in touch with something real.” Perhaps this
notion of what we will call ‘realness’ plays a role in people’s ordinary concept of true
love.
In saying this, we do not mean to be introducing a new technical term. Rather,
the suggestion is that people ordinarily distinguish between psychological states, ways
of relating, or even periods of their lives that are, in a particular sense, ‘real’ and those
that are not. People might mark this distinction by using sentences like: “I was so
angry about what happened, but at least I was feeling something real.” Or: “I thought
I was doing something meaningful with my life, but it was only when I quit that other
job and started working full-time as an artist that I truly experienced anything real.”
Although this distinction can be applied to the case of love, or so we propose, the
distinction itself does not seem specific to that emotion. Instead, it is a distinction that
people can apply to a range of phenomena, including different psychological states
(desire, happiness, sadness, hatred, and so forth).
Suppose we go with this hypothesis for the moment. The question that
immediately arises is: How do people distinguish between those experiences, for
example of love, that are real as opposed to not real—or perhaps less real? One
approach to answering this question might be to invoke the notion of a ‘true self.’ A
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body of empirical work suggests that people quite naturally think that some emotions,
thoughts, or actions reflect an agent’s true self, while others do not (Christy et al.,
2019; De Freitas & Cikara, 2018; Strohminger et al., 2017). Very roughly, this
research suggests that a person’s true self is typically regarded as some fundamental
part of who they are: not something due to mere socialization, or a desire to fit in, for
example.
If people think that a given psychological state does not reflect the agent’s true
self, they will see that state as having a peculiar status. Take, for example, the
experience of happiness, where this is judged not to reflect the agent’s true self.
Typically, people will say that there is a sense in which the agent is in fact happy—
they don’t deny that basic description—but they will also say that there is a deeper
sense in which she isn’t happy: the happiness is not rooted in her truest self.
Researchers have not reached a consensus about how best to make sense of
this sort of judgment, and, beyond that, it is an open question whether judgments
about the ‘realness’ of an experience should be understood in terms of the true self at
all. We will not be attempting to address those issues here. Rather, we are raising the
notion of a true self to give a sense of how one might try to explain what people mean
when they judge that a psychological state is (or isn’t) ‘real’. But giving such an
explanation is not the aim of this paper. Instead, our focus is on the more basic
question of whether people’s ordinary concept of true love is structured around such
realness judgments.
Even in the absence of a detailed account of what realness is, however, the
realness hypothesis makes certain testable predictions. Suppose people agree that
what Robin and Morgan feel for each other is love, and our goal is to predict whether
they will think it counts as true love. According to the realness hypothesis, their
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judgments about this question should be predicted by their judgments about the
realness of what Robin and Morgan feel. Moreover, judgments of realness should
predict judgments of true love even controlling for prototypicality and goodness. To
see this, suppose that people determine that Robin and Morgan’s relationship is not a
prototypical example of love and that, ultimately, it is not even good. It might seem,
then, that they should also fail to regard the relationship, or perhaps what Robin and
Morgan feel for each other within the context of the relationship, as an instance of
true love. But the realness hypothesis makes a different prediction. It holds that there
is a further sort of judgment people can make—a judgment about the realness of what
Robin and Morgan feel—and to the extent that people judge this feeling to be real,
they should judge that it is true love after all.
To bring out what is surprising and important in this hypothesis, it might be
helpful to contrast the phrase ‘true love’ with other phrases that use the word ‘true.’
Suppose that John appears to be in some sense a jock, and we are wondering whether
people will agree that he is a ‘true jock.’ Clearly, people’s judgments about this would
have nothing to do with whether they agreed with a statement like: ‘John is real.’ It is
perfectly obvious that John himself is real, and the only question is whether he falls
into a certain category. Thus, the best way to predict whether people think John is a
true jock might be to see whether they agree with a statement like: ‘John is an
especially clear and paradigmatic example of a jock.’
On the realness hypothesis, the phrase ‘true love’ should be understood very
differently. Suppose again that what Robin and Morgan feel for each other is in some
sense love, and we want to predict whether people will judge that it is true love. The
realness hypothesis predicts that such judgments will not turn on whether people think
their feelings fit into some category (e.g., the category of love). Instead, it predicts
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that people’s judgments will depend on whether they think the feelings Robin and
Morgan have for each other are real. In other words, people’s judgments would not
best be predicted by their agreement with a statement like: ‘What Robin and Morgan
feel for each other is an especially clear and paradigmatic example of love.’ Rather,
they should be predicted by agreement with a statement like: ‘What Robin and
Morgan feel for each other is real.’

The Present Studies

We have presented three hypotheses. The first is that true love, on the ordinary
concept, is highly prototypical love. The second is that true love is love that is
fundamentally good. The third is that true love is love that is real.
Although these three hypotheses differ from one another at a deeper
theoretical level, they will often overlap in practice. For example, since the
prototypical features of love are themselves typically considered good, our first and
second hypotheses will lead to similar predictions in most cases. And our second and
third hypotheses will lead to similar predictions in most cases as well: presumably,
people will think that if a couple is experiencing love that is real, they are
experiencing something good. They might even think that experiencing something
real is good in itself.
To tease these hypotheses apart, then, it will be necessary to examine certain
cases where prototypicality, goodness, and realness do not coincide, or where they
independently vary, and assess the relative contribution of each dimension to intuitive
judgments about the existence of true love in a given relationship. That is what we set
out to do in a pair of empirical studies.
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Study 1
Our first study looked at prototypicality and realness. We manipulated three
features that were associated with prototypical love in previous studies (intimacy,
passion, commitment) and also independently manipulated realness. Participants were
then asked (a) whether the relationship was an example of prototypical love and (b)
whether the relationship was an example of true love.
On the prototypicality hypothesis, according to which true love just is
prototypical love, judgments about true love should show the same pattern as
judgments about prototypical love. By contrast, on the realness hypothesis, judgments
about true love might come apart from judgments about prototypical love, and we
should instead find that such judgments are especially influenced by realness.

Method.
Open science. This study, including planned analyses and exclusion criteria,
was pre-registered at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=z68ka6. The open data and
materials are available at https://osf.io/ezysq.
Participants. Eight hundred and four US participants were recruited on
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and received $0.35 for their time. Participants were
excluded from the final sample prior to data analysis if they completed the survey in
under 100 seconds (n = 74), provided an incorrect answer to a comprehension check
(n = 269), or provided an incorrect answer to a test to ensure the participants were
human rather than a ‘bot’ (n = 50). Our final sample included 481 participants (228
female, 248 male, 5 other; Mage = 35.94, SD = 11.06).
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Procedure. Participants completed an online survey with a between-subjects
design. In the first section, we familiarized participants with the notion of a
“prototype” by presenting them with examples of more or less prototypical chairs (see
the exact study materials online at the above link for specifics). In the next two
sections, they read descriptions of hypothetical entities and judged the extent to which
each entity is a prototypical example of a certain concept. They rated prototypicality
on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 = Not at all a prototypical x; 100 = Completely
prototypical x). Participants also were asked to make an additional judgment about
each entity unrelated to prototypically (also using a 100-point sliding scale). The
purpose of these two sections was to ensure that participants were comfortable
making prototypicality judgments before moving onto the main section of the survey.
We also wanted them to expect a second, variable question that was unrelated to
prototypicality so that the “true love” question would not stand out when they came to
it. In the main section of the survey, participants read about a hypothetical
relationship between Mario and Jasmine. Each participant was presented with one of
sixteen conditions, which varied along four dimensions – intimacy, passion,
commitment, and realness. See Table 1.

Table 1
Vignettes used in Study 1. Each participant was randomly assigned to receive one version of
each of the four paragraphs, yielding sixteen different possibilities in total.
Intimacy

High
Mario and Jasmine have a warm,
close, and comfortable relationship,
where they trust each other and
actively support each other’s
emotional needs. They communicate
well and know they can count on each
other when times get tough. And they
often share deeply personal
information, so they feel they really
understand each other.

Low
Mario and Jasmine don’t always feel that
warm and close in their relationship. They
definitely care about each other’s emotional
needs, but they tend to wait for specific
problems to come up before offering their
support. They also struggle a bit with
communication, and have some trust issues
around this, mostly to do with feeling
misunderstood. So sharing information that
is too deep or personal can feel
uncomfortable.
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Passion

On top of that, they find each
other very physically attractive. Even
just seeing each other fills them with
excitement – it feels almost magical.
So they’re always on each other’s
minds and they often fantasize about
each other when they’re apart. They
have a hard time imagining life
without each other, or anyone who
could make them happier.

On top of that, they aren’t particularly
attracted to each other physically. They
definitely enjoy seeing each other – it just
doesn’t have that sense of magic or
excitement about it. So, while they have
fond thoughts now and then when they
cross each other’s minds, fantasies are
pretty rare. Sometimes, they find
themselves imagining what a relationship
would be like with someone they had more
romantic feelings for.

Commitment

When they reflect on things, they
realize they are committed to
maintaining their connection, despite
potential temptations, and even when
they find each other hard to deal with.
They feel confident in their love for
each other and, somewhere deep
down, believe it will last for the rest
of their lives. At the end of the day,
they feel a strong sense of
responsibility for each other and plan
to continue their relationship as long
as they can.

When they reflect on things, they
realize they are somewhat unsure about
their actual commitment to the relationship.
They understand that things might get
rocky, or that others might come between
them, and they don’t want to set unrealistic
expectations. Still, they love each other, and
things feel pretty stable for now. But who
knows about the rest of their lives? At the
end of the day, they feel a certain amount of
responsibility for each other, and they plan
to continue their relationship as long as it
works out.

Realness

One day, Mario was talking with
his best friend Aaron. Aaron was
telling him about an important event
in his life from a couple of years
back. “It’s the only time in my life
where things just felt really real, you
know?” Aaron then asked Mario if his
relationship with Jasmine made him
feel that way. “You know what? Yes.
Looking back on everything I’ve
experienced in my life, I sometimes
feel like my relationship with Jasmine
is the only thing that’s real.”

One day, Mario was talking with his
best friend Aaron. Aaron was telling him
about an important event in his life from a
couple of years back. “It’s the only time in
my life where things just felt really real,
you know?” Aaron then asked Mario if his
relationship with Jasmine made him feel
that way. “You know what? That’s a good
question. I guess I need to think about it a
little bit.”

After reading the vignette, participants were asked to judge the extent to which
Mario and Jasmine’s relationship is an example of prototypical love, and the extent to
which their relationship is an example of true love. Both questions were presented at
the same time on the same page.

Prototypicality. To what extent would you say that Mario and Jasmine’s
relationship is an example of prototypical love?
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True Love. To what extent would you say that Mario and Jasmine’s
relationship is an example of true love?
Participants rated prototypicality on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 = Not at all
prototypical love; 100 = Completely prototypical love). Similarly, they rated true love
on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 = Not at all true love; 100 = Completely true love).
Participants then completed a comprehension check in which they were asked
whether Mario felt certain that his relationship with Jasmine was ‘real.’ They could
either answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No.’ Because we are interested in the effect of realness on true
love judgments and prototypicality judgments, it was essential that participants
answered this question correctly for their given vignette. Those who answered
incorrectly were excluded from the final sample, as noted above.
Finally, participants provided information about gender, age, and political
orientation. They also completed a test to prove that they are human. Those who
answered incorrectly were excluded from the final sample.

Results.
Although these data could be analyzed in a number of different ways, our
concern here was with one specific question. The study looked at the influence of four
different factors (intimacy, passion, commitment, realness) on judgments about two
different questions (prototypical love, true love). For each of the different factors, we
wanted to know whether it had the same impact on the two questions or whether it
had different impacts.
We therefore used a mixed-model repeated measures ANOVA, with question
type (prototypicality vs. true love) as a within-subjects factor and intimacy, passion,
commitment, and realness as between-subjects factors. Our pre-registered prediction

145

was that the effect of realness would be greater on true love judgments than on
prototypicality judgments.
There were significant main effects of question type, F(1,464) = 6.55, p =
.011, ηp2 = .014, intimacy, F(1,465) = 31.95, p < .001, ηp2 = .064, passion, F(1,465)
= 54.31, p < .001, ηp2 = .105, and realness, F(1,465) = 91.63, p < .001, ηp2 = .165.
These were qualified by significant two-way interactions between intimacy and
passion, F(1,465) = 5.64, p = .018, ηp2 = .012, and passion and realness, F(1,465) =
10.94, p = .001, ηp2 = .023. There were no other interactions nor main effects for the
between-subjects comparisons.
Turning now to the key research question, we looked to see whether there
were any interactions between question type and the other factors. As predicted, there
was a significant interaction between question type and realness, F(1,465) = 16.716, p
< .001, ηp2 = .035. There was also an interaction between question type and intimacy,
F(1,465) = 7.34, p = .007, ηp2 = .016. To decompose these interactions, we conducted
two separate 2 (realness: high, low) x 2 (intimacy: high, low) x 2 (passion: high, low)
x 2 (commitment: high, low) ANOVAs on each question type (prototypicality, true
love).
The effect sizes for each factor on judgments of prototypicality and true love
are depicted in Figure 1. The panel on the left shows the degree to which each factor
impacted people’s judgments about prototypical love; the panel on the right shows the
degree to which each factor impacted judgments about true love.
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Figure 1. Effect sizes (ηp) of realness, passion, intimacy, and commitment on
judgments of prototypicality and trueness in Study 1. Error bars show 95%
confidence interval.

As the figure shows, the effect of intimacy on true love judgments, F(1,465) =
43.30, p < .001, ηp2 = .085, was greater than its effect on prototypicality judgments,
F(1,465) = 10.35, p < .001, ηp2 = .022. And as predicted, the effect of realness on true
love judgments, F(1,465) = 118.08, p < .001, ηp2 = .203, was much greater than its
effect on prototypicality judgments, F(1,465) = 32.46, p < .001, ηp2 = .065.

Discussion.
In this first study, we found that the pattern of people’s judgments about true
love was quite different from the pattern of people’s judgments about prototypical
love. This finding provides strong evidence against the prototypicality hypothesis.
Given the substantial difference between the pattern found for true love judgments
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and the pattern found for prototypical love judgments, it is unlikely that the concept of
true love is simply the concept of prototypical love.
Our data revealed two different respects in which the pattern of people’s true
love judgments departed from that of their prototypical love judgments. First, as
predicted, realness had a far larger impact on true love judgments than on prototypical
love judgments. Second, intimacy had a somewhat larger impact on true love
judgments than on prototypical love judgments. It is possible that these are best
understood as two independent effects, but it is also possible that the effect for
intimacy could be understood as a byproduct of the effect on realness. That is, it
might be that intimacy has a somewhat larger impact on true love judgments because
intimacy is itself regarded, at least to some extent, as a cue to realness.
The fact that realness had such a large impact on true love judgments—far
larger than the impact of any other factor—provides at least some prima facie support
for the realness hypothesis. However, one might also think that this result is
misleading. After all, as we alluded to above, realness could itself be regarded as
something good, at least within the domain of love, so even if the goodness
hypothesis were correct, one might still expect to find an impact of realness on true
love judgments. We explore this issue more directly in the next study.

Study 2

In this second study, we turned to a different approach. We constructed a set
of cases about which we expected to find a large amount of disagreement, with some
participants saying that a given case was clearly an example of true love and other
participants saying that the very same case was clearly not an example of true love.
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We then asked whether each individual participant’s true love judgment in these cases
could be predicted by that participant’s own judgments of goodness and of realness.
This method allows us to disentangle these two factors in a way that would not
be possible with the method used in our previous study. If we simply tell participants
in one condition that a couple is experiencing something real, the participants in that
condition will presumably show a tendency on the whole to infer that the couple is
experiencing something good, and vice versa. This fact limits our ability to
distinguish the influence of these two factors. By contrast, in the present design, we
can take advantage of the natural variance across participants in judgments of
goodness and realness. In some cases, for example, we might find that some
participants agree about whether a given case exhibits goodness, but disagree about
whether it exhibits realness. We can then ask whether this natural variance in each
type of judgment predicts attributions of true love.
The design of this second study sets up three potential predictions. One
possibility is that, once one controls for goodness, the effect of realness on true love
judgments is no longer significant. This would suggest that it is really the goodness of
a relationship, rather than its realness, that is at the heart of such judgments. A second
prediction is the inverse: that once one controls for realness, the effect of goodness
disappears. This would suggest that realness is the driving factor. A third possibility is
that each factor has an independent effect, even when controlling for the other. This
would suggest that both factors actually play a role.
Method.
Open science. This study, including planned analyses and exclusion criteria,
was pre-registered at http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=sr2ri7. The open data and
materials are available at https://osf.io/ezysq.
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Participants. Three hundred and fifty US participants were recruited on
Mechanical Turk (Mturk) and received $0.35 for their time. Data from were excluded
from the final sample prior to data analysis if they failed to complete the survey (n =
0), provided an incorrect answer to a comprehension check (n = 60), or provided an
incorrect answer to a test to ensure the participants were human rather than a ‘bot’ (n
= 11). Our final sample included 285 participants (134 female, 150 male, 1 other; Mage
= 34.43, SD = 11.17).
Procedure. Participants were assigned randomly to one of three vignettes
detailing a hypothetical relationship between Mario and Jasmine. The abuse vignette
describes a passionate relationship interspersed with physical aggression. The puppy
love vignette describes a simple but happy relationship between two elementary
school children, unencumbered by the complexities of adult relationships. The age
difference vignette describes a forbidden relationship between a professor and a
student who seem to understand each other on a deeper level. The actual text of these
vignettes was as follows:

Puppy Love. When Jasmine was in 6th grade, she fell head over heels for a boy
named Mario. Every day after school, they would take a walk in the park and let their
imaginations run wild. Seeing each other was always the highlight of their day. Their
bond was solidified during a school trip to France. They would sneak out in the dead
of night and explore the streets of Paris together. Near the end of the trip, after a
string of exhilarating escapades, they shared their first kiss. It felt so natural, so safe.
Simultaneously innocent and totally electric.
Nothing about their relationship was ever complicated. They never had to
endure hardships together or make real sacrifices for each other. They never worried
about whether they shared the same values or whether their life trajectories were in
line. Such things never occurred to them. At that young age, the notions of sexual
intimacy and long-term commitment weren’t even on their radar. Just being together
in the moment was enough. Everything was so simple and felt so fun and beautiful.
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Now Jasmine is an adult, and in a committed relationship with a man named
Jim. With Jim, things are not so simple. They care deeply about each other and feel
warmly about each other on most days. They support each other through difficult
times. But there is the usual mess of adult life to deal with: paying bills, getting along
with in-laws, quarreling over little things after a long day at work. When she finds
herself exhausted from all the tensions and complexities of her current relationship,
Jasmine often thinks about her relationship with Mario from all those years back. She
knows it seems silly, but sometimes, she feels as though her relationship with Mario
was the only time she was ever really in love. It was pure in a way her adult
relationships never were, or even could be.
Abuse. Jasmine has been in a romantic relationship with Mario for seven years.
Mario is tough. It’s part of why she was attracted to him in the first place. His
brooding eyes, his physical strength. She knows that he would protect her from
danger. When other men objectify her or make suggestive comments, Mario steps in
without hesitation, and sends them scampering away at the mere sight of his imposing
frame. He is loyal. A man of few words. But when he speaks, it is with intention. He
also has deep practical knowledge, a way of being in tune with the environment.
When Jasmine and Mario make love, it’s like two parallel universes coming together
and they lose themselves in the ecstasy of connection. Jasmine has never felt this
alive with another man—a feeling of intensity and fullness that infuses her life with
indescribable energy and meaning.
Mario is completely devoted to Jasmine. He has never had eyes for anyone
else. He is usually kind and gentle, but sometimes, his emotions get the better of him.
He punched a wall in their apartment once, breaking through the plaster (he quickly
apologized and then repaired the wall himself). On another occasion, he knocked over
a piece of furniture in frustration, causing a piece to crack. One time, Mario even hit
Jasmine when he was really angry about something she had said, leaving a scar above
one of her eyebrows. At first, she was in shock. She considered leaving him. But she
decided to stay when he broke down and told her about his own abusive childhood
and agreed to work on his anger.
In time, Jasmine came to think of Mario’s aggressive episodes as somehow
bound up with his protective nature. A kind of misdirection of the very strength and
decisiveness that made her feel so safe when they weren’t fighting. She even grew to
like the little scar above her eyebrow—a reminder of Mario’s ability to overpower
her. This makes her feel vulnerable in a way that resonates with something deep
inside her. His unpredictable aggression, interrupting long periods of quiet care and
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companionship, makes her want to surrender herself to him, to give herself over to
him completely. There is an ever-present, charged tension between them, part
eroticism, part fear, part mutual obsession.
Age Gap. Mario is a 50-year-old professor at a prestigious university. He recently got
to know a very bright 21-year-old undergraduate student from one of his classes
named Jasmine. When they first met to discuss her senior thesis research over coffee,
they immediately realized just how much chemistry they had, despite their very
different ages and life experiences. Throughout his whole career, Mario has always
felt distant from other people given his eccentric personality and unusual worldview.
Most of his colleagues don’t know what to make of him, but Jasmine seems to
understand him on a deeper level.
Everything he says just clicks with her and she appreciates all of his strange
idiosyncrasies. Furthermore, Mario is incredibly impressed by Jasmine’s insight. (Her
friends have always called her an ‘old soul’ and consider her wise beyond her years.)
He often forgets that he is in the presence of an undergraduate student and views her
as an equal. He has always fantasized about being with a much younger woman, and
Jasmine has always had a thing for older men. Every time they met up, there was
sexual tension in the air. One thing led to another, and now they’re in a discreet
romantic relationship.
Mario and Jasmine both know that they are violating university policy –
especially given Mario’s supervisory role over Jasmine – and they go to great lengths
to conceal their relationship from other students, colleagues, and administrators.
Ultimately, they feel that whatever might be met with disapproval about their
relationship is overshadowed by the level of sync they feel together – intellectually,
emotionally, spiritually, and physically.

After reading one of the above vignettes, participants were asked to judge the
extent to which the relationship between the couple, named Mario and Jasmine in
each vignette, was an example of true love.

True Love. To what extent would you say that Mario and Jasmine’s
relationship is an example of true love?
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Participants made their ratings on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 = Not at all
true love; 100 = Completely true love). On the next page, they were asked to judge
the extent to which Mario and Jasmine’s relationship was characterized by realness
and goodness.

Realness. When thinking about Jasmine and Mario’s relationship, people
might have different intuitions. Some people might think that their relationship
is, in some respects, unconventional, but still that what they have between
them is ultimately real. Others might disagree and say that, despite
appearances, Jasmine and Mario aren’t actually connecting on a real level.
What do you think? Do you think that what Jasmine and Mario have between
them is real?
Goodness. When thinking about Jasmine and Mario’s relationship, people
might have different intuitions. Some people might think that there are certain
flaws in how they relate to each other, but that, ultimately, their relationship is
good. Others might disagree, and say that, although their relationship is
positive in certain ways, ultimately, they have a bad relationship. What do you
think? Do you think that what Jasmine and Mario have between them is good?

Participants rated realness on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 = Completely not
real; 100 = Completely real) and goodness on a sliding scale from 0-100 (0 =
Completely bad; 100 = Completely good). Participants then completed a
comprehension check in which they were asked to judge whether a statement about
the vignette was true or false. Those who answered incorrectly were excluded from
the final sample. Finally, participants provided information about gender, age, and
political orientation. They also completed a test to prove that they are human. Those
who answered incorrectly were excluded from the final sample.
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Results.

Data were analyzed using linear mixed effect models, with goodness and
realness as fixed effects and vignette as a random effect (random intercepts only). All
analyses were conducted in R using the lme4 and lmerTest packages.
There was a significant effect such that participants who gave higher goodness
judgments also gave higher true love judgments, B = 0.54, SE = 0.06, t = 8.91, p <
0.001, CI = [0.42, 0.66]. However, even controlling for the effect of goodness, there
was still a significant effect of realness on true love judgments: B = 0.40, SE = 0.05, t
= 7.32, p < 0.001, CI = [0.29, 0.50].
Figure 2 shows the results for all three variables. Looking at this figure, one
can get a more qualitative sense of the patterns in people’s judgments. For example,
consider the puppy love vignette. In that vignette, almost all participants thought that
the relationship was a very good one (i.e., the vast majority of points are toward the
right-hand side on the x-axis). However, even among these participants, there was
considerable disagreement about whether the couple had true love (as seen in the
large amount of spread on the y-axis). Judgments of these cases were then predicted
by realness (shown in the color of each point). That is, even among participants who
agreed that the relationship was a good one, those who thought the couple were
experiencing something real tended to say that they had true love, while those who
thought that they were not experiencing something real tended to say that they did not
have true love.
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Figure 2. Scatterplot showing results from Study 2. X-axis shows goodness. Y-axis shows true
love. Color shows realness.

Discussion.
In this second study, we looked at cases in which there was substantial
disagreement between different participants as to whether something was an example
of true love. We then asked whether participants’ judgments in those cases were
predicted by their goodness judgments and by their realness judgments. The results
showed two different effects.
First, true love judgments were predicted by goodness judgments. This effect
is very much in keeping with existing theoretical work on love (hooks, 2000; C. S. I.
Jenkins, 2017) and provides evidence that existing theories are getting at something
important about people’s ordinary attributions.
Second, and notably, even controlling for goodness judgments, true love
judgments were predicted by realness judgments. So we can tentatively conclude that,
over and above the role of goodness in people’s ordinary judgments of true love, there
is also an important role for realness.
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General Discussion
We began by noting that there is a conceptual difference between love and
true love. Although the phrase ‘true love’ may sometimes be used to distinguish
actual cases of love from merely apparent ones, we argued that true love is a concept
in its own right, and a seemingly important one in many of our lives. How should this
concept be understood? To answer this question, we tested three main hypotheses.
First, the hypothesis that true love is simply prototypical love. As we noted in
the Introduction, previous work in both philosophy and psychology has argued that
love is a prototype concept. The results of Study 1 strongly support this view: the
more a relationship was characterized by paradigmatically loving features, the more
the relationship was judged to be an instance of prototypical love. But equally
strongly, the results of our first study contradict the hypothesis that true love and
prototypical love are themselves the same concept: rather, these concepts are
markedly distinct. Most notably, our manipulation of realness had very different
effects on judgments about whether a relationship was an instance of prototypical
versus true love. Since people’s application of these concepts responded differently to
the same manipulation, we have reason to reject the view that they are the same
concept.
Second, the hypothesis that true love is love that is especially good or
valuable. We found that perceived relationship goodness positively predicts
judgments of true love, even controlling for perceived realness. This is exactly what
should be expected given existing accounts of the normative significance of
describing something as ‘love’ (hooks, 2000; C. S. I. Jenkins, 2017). Our results
provide support for these accounts, and also for the claim that this same point applies
to people’s use of the phrase ‘true love.’ Further research should continue to explore
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this effect. One key question will be whether the effect of goodness is best understood
as reflecting something about the nature of people’s very concept of true love or
whether it is more a matter of people simply being reluctant to apply the words ‘true
love’ to something they regard as bad.
Third, the hypothesis that true love is love that is real. The present findings
provide strong support for this third hypothesis. In Study 1, the manipulation of
realness had by far the largest effect on judgments of true love, going beyond such
features as intimacy, passion, and commitment. In Study 2, realness judgments
predicted true love judgments even when controlling for goodness judgments. Taken
together, then, the results of these studies suggest a link between the ordinary concept
of true love and judgments of realness.
Note that our results point to something distinctive about phrases like ‘true
love’ that would not be seen with other sorts of phrases that include the word ‘true.’
For example, in Study 2, participants were not asked to judge the extent to which
Mario and Jasmine have ‘real love.’ Instead, they were simply asked whether what
Mario and Jasmine have between them is ‘real.’ In other words, participants who did
not see their relationship as an instance of true love tended to think that what they had
between them was just not real. By contrast, this sort of judgment would not make
sense for other phrases that include the word ‘true.’ As we noted above, if people
think that John is not a true jock, this would not be explained by their thinking that
John himself is not real. Similarly, if people think that a certain sculpture is not a true
work of art, it is likely not because they think the sculpture itself is not real, and so on.
It is an open question how we should understand people’s judgments that
certain emotions or experiences are not ‘real.’ We suggested earlier that one way to
understand such judgments could be in terms of the notion of a ‘true self’ and we
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sketched out a potential explanation along those lines. But we also noted that
researchers disagree about how best to interpret ‘true self’ judgments, and we stated
that we were not proposing to take a stand on whether people’s ordinary judgments of
realness should actually be understood in terms of this notion. We expect that the best
approach to addressing such questions will be to expand the inquiry beyond the
concept of true love and explore judgments of realness in other domains, or with
respect to other kinds of emotions. That is, instead of just looking at judgments of
realness insofar as they are relevant to the concept of true love, one might want to
explore more generally why people see certain experiences as ‘real’ and others as ‘not
real’ (or ‘less real’). This is an important issue for further research.9
However, even in the absence of a fully worked-out account of realness, it
seems that we can use the observed link between judgments of realness and
judgments of true love to explain certain otherwise puzzling aspects of the ordinary
concept of true love. Consider the different examples of true love we sketched out at
the beginning of this paper: between the Polish couple and between Robin and
Morgan. A remarkable fact about these relationships is that they had very different
features, even seeming to be near-opposites. The Polish couple had little in the way of
emotional closeness or intimacy, and virtually no romantic passion, yet were
extraordinarily committed to the relationship. Robin and Morgan, by contrast, were
extremely close emotionally and practically burning with romantic passion, yet
ultimately, chose to end the relationship in order to find stability and calm with
others. If we assume that the concept of true love is closely linked to judgments of

9

In particular, it might be helpful to look at judgments of realness insofar as they are related to
people’s ordinary judgments of happiness. Existing studies show that people are reluctant to say that an
agent is happy when that agent has a morally bad life (Phillips et al., 2017) and studies find that this
tendency is mediated in part by judgments about whether agents actually are happy deep down in their
true selves (Newman et al., 2015). This effect seems likely to be related in some important way to the
ones we have been exploring in the present paper. For further discussion, see: (Phillips et al., 2011).
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realness, we can begin to see why these apparently radically different relationships
may both be seen as examples of true love. Though the two relationships differ when
it comes to many of their salient features (intimacy, passion, commitment, and so on),
there is another respect in which they are deeply similar. In both cases, the love that
the people feel for each other seems to be real.

Conclusion.
The concept of true love is important. It matters to people’s lives, and it is
often cited as a justification for decisions or behaviors that might (otherwise) be seen
as extreme or unwarranted. “Why did you leave your spouse of thirty years?”
“Because I found true love with someone else.” “Why did you quit your job and move
to Europe?” “Because I found true love with someone who lives in Portugal.” People
will disagree about whether, or to what extent, such appeals can in fact justify certain
acts or choices. And they will disagree about which relationships qualify as true love.
The present findings do not directly resolve these disagreements, but they do
shed light on the nature of the disagreements themselves. Moreover, as we will
discuss in the following chapter, these findings help us understand the criteria
underlying the disagreements found in ordinary life, and they help us understand what
we would be seeking to modify if we sought to modify those criteria. Putting this
point in a slightly different way: the findings help us understand what we disagree
about when we disagree about true love.

Acknowledgments. See the online, published version, available at
https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199395729.001.000
1/oxfordhb-9780199395729-e-38.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Abstract
In this conclusion to the dissertation, I attempt to tie together the previous chapters,
summarizing major findings from this line of work, discussing key limitations, and
pointing to future directions. I also explore how empirical findings in relational moral
psychology, such as those described in the present dissertation, can contribute to the
analysis of normative questions (i.e., substantive moral questions of right and wrong)
regarding social relationships and concepts used to characterize such relationships, such
as the concept of ‘true love.’
With respect to the last of these aims, I begin by noting that the dissertation has
advanced a descriptive account of the sorts of moral judgments people make in different
relationships, both positive and negative; and it has offered a functional explanation as to
why they make those judgments. But are those the right judgments to make? How, if at
all, can experimental moral psychologists help in answering such a value-laden question?
One possibility is: by identifying factors that influence or underpin people’s moral
judgments about various cases, we may provide a basis for philosophers to determine
whether these judgments should be accorded substantive normative weight, for example
as part of a process of reflective equilibrium.
However, as I will discuss, making such a determination always requires granting
certain prior, or more basic, moral and philosophical commitments, and/or assumptions
that are held constant for the sake of the analysis or which are not in question in the given
discourse. For example, it might be granted that the most prevalent moral judgments of a
group of stakeholders should be accorded at least some prima facie normative weight in
formulating a moral argument. Then, if a philosopher decides to reject such a common,
robust moral judgment, she will have to provide an adequate error theory: i.e., an
explanation of why people make the judgment despite its failure to yield (what the
philosopher takes to be) the right normative conclusion. Here, I summarize and evaluate
some recently proposed strategies for negotiating such decisions, highlighting potential
pathways for reaching substantive normative conclusions from argumentative premises
that include empirical claims about the moral-relational mind.
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Introduction

Recent years have seen an explosion of research on the psychology of human
moral judgments. Such judgments of right and wrong, good or bad, and
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, shape individuals and institutions regarding
matters of great consequence, such as decisions to marry or divorce, decisions to hire
or fire employees, criminal sentencing, foundational legal frameworks, political
polarization, and global policy priorities. Most extant research on moral judgments
has relied on paradigms that examine intergroup conflict versus cooperation or
“prosocial” versus “antisocial” behavior. These paradigms involve, for example,
decisions made in the context of economic games between anonymous strangers, or
judgments about hypothetical agents, often taking place in unusual or life-threatening
circumstances (as in the case of extensively studied moral dilemmas concerning the
sacrifice of one individual to save many others).
Of course, many important moral judgments do concern ingroups and
outgroups, and people do sometimes encounter strangers in need of help, albeit not
usually in life-or-death situations. However, as emphasized in this dissertation, most
of our everyday moral judgments concern actions (or failures to act) taking place
between specific individuals who occupy a range of more or less well-defined social
roles. Typically, these individuals know each other and interact repeatedly, and they
stand in particular relationships with one another (such as boss-employee, spouses,
student-teacher, parent-child, customer-seller, and so on). Moreover, moral judgments
in different relational contexts expectably will differ from one another in systematic
ways, such that one and the same action might be judged quite differently depending
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on the relational context. Any adequate theory of moral psychology must be able to
explain these differences precisely and systematically.
In this dissertation, I have presented work proposing that particular social
relationships (like those between romantic partners, housemates, or siblings) are
widely expected to serve one or more distinct cooperative functions – including care,
transaction, hierarchy, and mating – to different degrees. Such multi-dimensional,
relationship-specific patterns of prescribed cooperative functions (“relational norms”)
were hypothesized to influence downstream moral judgments: both moral wrongness
(or blame) judgments in response to norm-violating actions, and judgments of praise
for actions that fulfil or strengthen prescribed relational norms.
My collaborators and I found support for these hypotheses across a series of
studies. In Chapter 2, I reported that relational norms for care, hierarchy, reciprocity,
and mating allowed for highly precise out-of-sample predictions of moral wrongness
judgments for norm violations in relational context. Moreover, our model explained
more of the variance in relationally-situated moral judgments than models relying on
other features of social relationships including genetic relatedness, social closeness
(i.e., the depth of mutual understanding and acceptance between partners and the
strength of their motivation to promote each other’s well-being), or interdependence
(i.e., the strength, breadth, and frequency of influence each partner has on the other’s
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors). Then, as reported in Chapter 3, we tested an
improved model that replaced the reciprocity function with a more carefully defined
‘transaction’ function, allowing us to successfully predict out-of-sample judgments of
both blame and praise for actions rated as characteristically weakening one or more
cooperative functions.
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When turning to moral judgments for actions rated as characteristically
strengthening one or more cooperative functions, however, we found a striking
inconsistency between functions that was not observed in the previous studies
centered on function-weakening actions. In contrast to mating, hierarchy, and
transaction, in the case of care, we found that the more strongly this function was
normatively expected, the less positively it was judged to be to strengthen the
function in the relevant relational context, when controlling for other relevant factors
(e.g., the likelihood of the behavior in question). Put the other way around, the less
that care was normatively expected within a relationship, the more positive the moral
judgment for providing care in that relationship. How might this seeming paradox be
explained? Perhaps such ‘unexpected’ provision of care within the relatively socially
distant relationships (e.g., among acquaintances) was seen as superogatory behavior –
that is, going above and beyond the call of duty – prompting more positive moral
judgments. This is something we would like to test directly in future work.
Another issue that requires further analysis is the different patterning of
judgments we observed for praise and blame in Chapter 3: although it was evident
from our results that praise and blame are not simply mirror images of each other
(consistent with Anderson et al., 2020), we were not able to make systematic
statistical comparisons between praise and blame judgments across samples (i.e.,
controlling for relationship type while comparing moral judgments for weakening
versus strengthening behavior). This leaves many open questions ripe for
investigation. We might expect, for example, that providing care in a relationship for
which care is strongly proscribed (e.g., the parent-child relationship) will not be seen
as positive/praiseworthy to the same extent that failing to provide care in the same
relationship would be seen as negative/blameworthy. This prediction is based on the
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idea that merely adhering to what is normatively expected should not be as surprising
as failing to adhere to, or actively violating, what is normatively expected, consistent
with the “bad is stronger than good” dynamic of social cognition (Baumeister et al.,
2001). How this predicted asymmetry in praise/blame judgments plays out across
different relational contexts – for example, in the case of relationships for which a
given cooperative function is more versus less strongly prescribed – will be an
important research question going forward.
As we noted in Chapters 2 and 3, a major limitation of the current work is that
all samples were drawn from the U.S. population, preventing assessment of crosscultural generalizability of the findings. Moreover, most analyses focused on grouplevel responses (taking the mean or median rating, for instance), with less attention
paid to individual differences in normative expectations or moral judgments. In the
following section, I will consider some potential future directions for this work that
would allow us to expand, and evaluate, our model along both cross-cultural and
individual-difference dimensions. I will begin by considering individual differences.

Similarities and Differences Between Individuals and Cultures

Our model of multiple cooperative functions prescribed for various social
relationships – and how these prescriptions shape relationally contextualized moral
judgments – would be incomplete without accounting for variation that exists
between individuals in both cooperative expectations and associated moral judgments.
One possibility is that such variation will be systematically related to existing
individual differences that characterize beneficial or harmful interactions within
different types of relationships.
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In Chapter 4, for example, we addressed the romantic partner relationship,
finding substantial disagreement among participants as to the qualities such a
relationship should have for it to count as an instance of ‘true love’ (a normative
concept that we found tracks, in part, the extent to which a relationship is seen as
morally good). Strikingly, some participants were willing to characterize even a
physically abusive relationship in such terms, while others refused such a
characterization. Given that the romantic partner relationship is, as our data show,
strongly normatively expected to be governed by a norm of care, with very little
variance in this judgment across participants (see Chapters 2 and 3), perhaps the
observed variance in ‘true love’ ascriptions for the relationship described in our abuse
vignette (Chapter 4) has to do with individual differences in beliefs about the extent to
which abuse and care can coexist within a loving relationship (hooks, 2000; Taylor,
2017). Exploring such potential differences could shed light on how abuse is
sometimes rationalized within romantic partnerships (Earp et al., 2017; Jenkins,
2017).
We will return to this question of disagreement about the moral status of
romantic relationships later on, when discussing in more detail our ‘true love’
findings from Chapter 4. First, however, we will consider how individual differences
in personality traits might relate – more generally – to differences in normative
expectations for a wider range of social relationships. Consider individual differences
in attachment style as an example. One plausible prediction is that the construct of
avoidant attachment (Wei et al., 2007), which indexes abnormally low desire for
dependency on others and avoidance of others’ dependence on oneself, will predict
variation relevant to the care function. For example, individuals who are high on
avoidance might have lower functional expectations of care across a range of
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relationships as compared to the group norm. This difference, in turn, might have
downstream consequences for how these individuals perceive the moral status of
behaviors that strengthen or weaken care in the relevant relationships. For example,
they might regard a failure to show care within family relationships as less morally
wrong than would those who are more securely attached.
We might also predict that social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto et al.,
1994), which indexes abnormally high desires for dominance over other individuals
and groups, will predict variation relevant to the hierarchy function. Here, we might
predict that individuals high in SDO will view hierarchy as more appropriate across a
broad range of relationships compared to the group norm, with analogous downstream
consequences for moral judgment. Finally, individual differences in sociosexuality
(Simpson & Gangestad, 1992), which indexes sexual engagement with multiple
partners and low commitment to them, might predict variation relevant to the mating
function. For example, for individuals high in sociosexuality, we might expect that
relationships such as close friends, colleagues, or acquaintances will be seen as
appropriate candidates for serving the mating function to a greater degree than the
group norm. This, in turn, might lead to less negative moral judgment of attempted
mating behavior within such relationships (e.g., asking a colleague to go on a
romantic date).
Beyond demonstrating an ability to predict variation on these measures, it will
also be important to consider the implications of such variation for an individual's
social and interpersonal functioning. Does having functional expectations for social
relationships that more closely adhere to the group-level cooperative norm predict
better social adjustment and well-being? Literature on the concept of cultural fit, or
the relative match between a person’s individual characteristics or attitudes and their
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cultural group (Searle & Ward, 1990), is suggestive. For example, cultural misfit of
values (Stephens et al., 2012) and emotional responses (De Leersnyder et al., 2014)
are predictive of poor adjustment and well-being. Here we might propose to approach
the relational norms of individuals from a cultural fit perspective. That is, we could
examine whether individuals whose personal relational norms fit better with those of
their cultural group are better adjusted, both overall and in the context of particular
social relationships.
Finally, what about differences between cultures? Societies across the globe
vary in their patterns of relational norms: i.e., in how cooperative functions
normatively are ‘distributed’ across, or embedded within, different social
relationships (Miller et al., 1990; Miller & Bersoff, 2016). Indeed, there is a growing
awareness of the limitations of psychological science which almost exclusively
focuses on participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich Democracies
(WEIRD; Henrich et al., 2010). Work in certain non-WEIRD contexts10 reveals that
people vary systematically across societies in the meaning structures and values that
they use to guide social-relational behavior, including in the moral domain (e.g.,
Awad et al., 2018). As Fiske and Rai (2014) argue, “The most fundamental finding of
anthropological research is the descriptive fact that morals are culturally relative …
many actions that people judge to be right in any given culture are judged to be wrong
in many others” (p. 7). This is no less true, of course, for relationally-situated moral
judgments as it is of other potential kinds of moral judgments.
At the same time, at least some relational moral judgments are also shared
across cultures: for example, the judgment that it is typically wrong for parents to fail
to care for their child (assuming they are in a position to do so). Examining how

10

For a critique of the “WEIRD vs. non-WEIRD” dichotomy, however, see Ghai (2021).
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social relationships shape moral judgments across different societies thus represents
an important opportunity to examine both cultural universals and cultural uniqueness
in relational moral psychology. In future work, we propose to test the robustness of
our model by sampling participants from a variety of cultures in which, we believe,
all of the cooperative functions we include in our model must be served somehow or
to some extent, but with variance in how each function is distributed between and/or
embedded within relationships according to the culture.
Previous work has characterized several important cultural dimensions on
which societies differ. Intriguingly, several of these dimensions show striking
parallels with the cooperative functions that our findings suggest are important for
explaining moral judgments in relational context. We plan to sample societies varying
along the dimensions of relational mobility (Thomson et al., 2018),
individualism/collectivism (Triandis & Gelfand, 1998), power distance (Hofstede,
1979; Rinne et al., 2012), and gender egalitarianism (McDaniel, 2008). We will also
sample societies that vary along the dimension of tightness-looseness, which reflects
the extent to which a society is characterized by strong norms that are enforced
(Gelfand et al., 2006, 2011).
We anticipate that the relationships examined will be normatively expected to
characteristically serve at least one cooperative function, demonstrating the universal
nature of these dyadic functions. To illustrate, a relationship such as the one between
neighbors might primarily be expected to serve the care function in one society and
the transaction function in another society, but it will be expected to serve at least one
cooperative function in all societies sampled. In addition, we predict that the specific
patterns of cooperative functional expectations (i.e., relational norms) for each
relationship will vary cross-culturally. For example, in highly relationally mobile
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societies, in which individuals are easily able to select in and out of relationships
based on their personal preferences, we would expect the care function to apply to a
more diverse set of relationships. This is because, in such contexts, it is relatively
risky to rely on too narrow a set of relationships for having one’s needs met, as these
relationships might change, end, or be replaced by others (Kito et al., 2017). Finally,
we predict that, within each culture, moral judgments across relationships will track
with the extent to which behaviors violate the relational norms of each relationship as
prescribed by the culture in question (as we have found in our preliminary studies of
U.S. participants). In this manner, our model holds promise for predicting variation in
moral judgments both within and between cultures by identifying the culture-specific
structure of relational norms.
To summarize, our broad predictions for future work are as follows: we expect
that the “fit” between individual-level functional expectations and group-level
cooperative norms will have consequences for social adjustment and well-being. And
we expect that, across societies, we will be able to replicate the general finding that
cooperative-functional similarity between relationships corresponds to similarity in
moral judgments between relationships. Alongside this universal relationship, we also
expect to observe variation across societies in cooperative relational norms and
corresponding moral judgments, and that this cross-cultural variation, in turn, will be
predicted by variation in broadscale cultural dimensions (e.g., relational mobility,
individual/collectivism, power distance).
Of course, another way to describe such predicted ‘variation’ between cultures
in prevailing relational norms and associated moral judgments is to speak of crosscultural disagreement about substantive questions of right or wrong. Such substantive
moral disagreements can occur within a single society as well, as we saw in the case
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of between-participant differences in ‘true love’ ascriptions applied to an abusive
relationship (Chapter 4). In the following sections, I will consider whether empirical
work in relational moral psychology – such as that what has been presented in this
dissertation – can contribute, not only to understanding the nature of such
disagreements (i.e., what is at stake in them), but also, perhaps, to resolving them in
certain cases by factoring into arguments for moral conclusions. Put differently, how,
if at all, can experimental moral psychologists fruitfully contribute the project of
answering substantive moral questions about (behavior within) relationships?

Normative Implications

The dissertation has, so far, advanced a descriptive account of certain
characteristic moral judgments – both positive and negative – that people make in
different social relationships; and it has offered a scientific, cooperative-functional
explanation as to why it is they make those judgments. But are those the right
judgments to make? The question is not straightforward. As Farber (1994) notes, “to
go beyond description, to enter the arena of the normative, that is, to say what ought
to be, involves an important shift that requires justification” (p. 156, emphasis added).
But, he argues, scientific-explanatory accounts of people’s moral judgments – the
kind put forward in this dissertation – offer “no new basis, no new foundation, no new
hope” of providing such “normative” justification (Farber, 1994, p. 156). Or as
Korsgaard (1996) puts it: “When we seek a philosophical foundation for morality we
are not looking merely for an explanation of moral practices. We are asking what
justifies the claims that morality makes on us” (pp. 9-10, emphasis added). She argues
that when we engage in moral philosophy, “[we] do not merely want to know why

170

those peculiar animals, human beings, think that they ought to do certain things. We
want to know what, if anything, we really ought to do” (Korsgaard, 1996, p. 13).
Consider our finding from Chapters 2 and 3 that U.S. participants, on the whole,
believe that certain social relationships, such as the parent-child relationship, should be
governed by certain cooperative functions (e.g., care), more so than should other social
relationships, such as the one between strangers. We might predict, then, that on pain of
inconsistency, they would agree with the following statement as well: “Holding
everything else equal, such as the magnitude of the need in question and the capacity of
the individual to meet it, it would be morally wrong for a parent to care for stranger in
need instead of caring for their very own child” (consistent with the findings of
McManus et al., 2021). This is just another way of saying that, when forced to choose
between helping a stranger or helping their own child in such a circumstance, a parent
ought to help their child. What should we say about such a belief?

Two types of projects.

If we accept the concerns of Farber and Korsgaard, in confronting such a belief,
there are two distinct projects we could pursue: an explanatory project (asking why
participants would be inclined to believe such a thing), and a justificatory project
(asking whether such a belief is justified from a moral perspective – or perhaps more
controversially, whether such a belief is true). They are right that these are two different
projects. The first one, presumably, would involve an appeal to evolutionary theory,
possibly as inflected by biocultural psychology (Barrett et al., 2015). Something like:
ancestral parents, from whom we have inherited certain relevant dispositions and/or
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associated cultural practices,11 who held such a belief and found it motivationally
compelling would have had on average more offspring survive to sexual maturity. They
would, therefore, have had a greater chance, compared to those ancestral parents who
lacked such a belief or motivational pull, of passing on the relevant phenomena (genes,
dispositions, motivations, cultural practices, and so on) (Bloom, 2011; Gellner et al.,
2020). But what might the second sort of project involve?
One potential answer comes from an essay by Curry (2006) entitled, “Who’s
afraid of the naturalistic fallacy?” I discuss this fallacy in the following section.

Avoiding the naturalistic fallacy.

The naturalistic fallacy has been described and interpreted in many different
ways over the centuries, but a common formulation holds that there is no logically valid
way to reason directly from empirical facts (such as facts about what people believe a
parent is morally required to do in the above situation) to moral or so-called ‘normative’
conclusions (such as what, if anything, a parent is in fact morally required to do in such
a situation). Suppose we grant that, Curry (2016) says. We can still engage in meansends reasoning to arrive at normative conclusions, so long as we assume the validity of
at least some moral ends that are not likely to be in dispute.
To take a non-moral example, suppose we want to get to Grand Central Station
within the hour, and the only way to do this is to take the Number 4 train. Well then – if
we are going to satisfy our valued goal, namely, arriving at Grand Central Station on
time – we ought to take the Number 4 train. That much should be uncontroversial.

11

That is, practices we are disposed to develop and pass down.
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Now let’s try a moral example. Suppose that, instead of getting to Grand Central
Station, what we want (i.e., our valued goal) is to adopt a set of social practices that will
maximize our ability flourish together, given the kinds of creatures that we are. Further
suppose that a major impediment to our flourishing is a suite of recurrent coordination
problems that, if left unsolved, will reliably undermine our well-being (e.g., by
preventing us from meeting our needs without the constant threat of violence or other
harm due to competition over limited resources).
Finally, suppose that the only (or best) way to effectively solve these recurrent
coordination problems – i.e., in a manner acceptable to all concerned12 — is to imbue
the various social-relational roles we occupy with certain patterns of prescribed13
cooperative functions (i.e., relational norms); and, moreover, to distribute these norms
among our various relationships in a way that accommodates to the particular constrains
and affordances (economic, geographical, institutional, historical, political, etc.) our
group faces. Well then, it follows that we ought to adopt – and indeed follow – the
relevant set of relational norms.

Critiquing relational norms.

An advantage of this approach to grounding normativity (in the philosophers’
sense), is that it gives one a potential foothold for critiquing certain relational norms as
they exist in a given society. Suppose that a society has developed, through a
combination of passive learning/cultural evolution and also social activism/political
agitation, a set of relational norms that are distributed in a particular way at a given

12

Or, perhaps, in a manner that would be acceptable to all concerned, if they were perfectly rational
and well-informed and deciding about such matters from behind a veil of ignorance as to (among other
things) the social roles they would end up occupying in a given society (Rawls, 1999).
13
And as necessary, socially policed.
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historical moment. If one assumes that the general flourishing of society members is a
legitimate moral goal, and if this goal is stymied by persistent failures of cooperation in
the face of recurring coordination problems, then it may be the case that the currentlyprevailing relational norms for certain social roles (and/or how these norms are
distributed among the various available social roles), are functionally deficient – that is,
they do not successfully solve one or more coordination problems in a mutually
satisfactory way.
Imagine, for example, that the teacher-student relationship in this society is
prescriptively extremely hierarchical, with students normatively expected to follow the
teacher’s instructions in every situation regardless of the apparent cost. And now
suppose, for the sake of argument, that such a prescription could in principle be
functionally successful under very specific historical or group-survival conditions (i.e.,
conducive to the flourishing of all concerned, all things considered), but that those
conditions no longer apply. Well then, it might be the case that students in such a
situation ought not to follow every instruction their teacher gives them, but rather
practice a kind of ‘civil disobedience’ in hope of changing the norm.
Again, such an analysis assumes that we are entitled to take for granted certain
moral ends, and then use these to justify (or refute) more specific moral claims or
behaviors as they apply to a given situation. But, it might be protested, why should we
think we are in fact so entitled? Just because we human beings may believe that we
ought to adopt social practices that will maximize our ability flourish together, this does
not necessarily mean that the belief is justified in the sense demanded by Farber and
Korsgaard. Why should we think that the promotion of human well-being, or the
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avoidance of human suffering,14 is morally significant – the sort of thing we can use to
justify other, ‘downstream’ moral conclusions (e.g., about what we ought to do, or
refrain from doing, in a given social-relational context). Put another way: just because
we may value our own well-being (an empirical claim) does not mean that our wellbeing is in fact valuable in some ultimate moral sense (a normative claim). How might
we respond to such a challenge?

Naturalizing ethics.

The challenge is, of course, an old one. As Hume (1777) famously argued:
Ask a man why he uses exercise; he will answer, because he desires to keep
his health. If you then enquire, why he desires health, he will readily reply,
because sickness is painful. If you push your enquiries farther, and desire
reason why he hates pain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is an
ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. . . And beyond this it is
an absurdity to ask for a reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in
infinitum; and that one thing can always be a reason why another is desired.
Something must be desirable on its own account, and because of its immediate
accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection. (Hume, 1777,
quoted in Curry, 2016)

Hume’s approach to morality can be seen as a precursor to what is now called “ethical
naturalism,” the position that “any prescriptive ethics must be based on the needs,
desires, and goods that people are naturally predisposed toward” (Fiske & Rai, 2014,
pp. 289-290). According to Fiske and Rai (2014), for ethical naturalists, “empirical

14

Much less the well-being or suffering of non-human animals – with whom, it should be noticed, we
also stand in a kind of relationship and to whom we presumably have certain obligations. However, the
ethics of human and non-human animal relations goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.
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science plays a crucial role in any prescriptive ethics because it has the power to
identify the basic human goods that people are naturally predisposed toward, as well
as the conditions that support those goods” (p. 290). To support this point, they quote
Flanagan et al. (2008): “the ends of creatures constrain what is good for them …
morality cannot seek to instantiate behavior that no human beings have the propensity
to seek [and] there are a limited number of goods that human beings seek given their
nature and potentialities” (pp. 15-16).
Suppose we agree with all of that (as in fact I do). It still leaves open many,
more specific questions, about how experimental moral psychologists who are
interested in the normative structure of social relationships can summon the relevant
data, i.e., to aid moral philosophers in the kind of project described (above) by
Korsgaard. Recall, she said that those who take up moral philosophy “do not merely
want to know why those peculiar animals, human beings, think that they ought to do
certain things. We want to know what, if anything, we really ought to do” (Korsgaard,
1996, p. 13).
Let us, then, consider the practice of moral philosophy and how it might relate
to psychological phenomena of the sort that are amenable to scientific study.

‘Doing’ moral philosophy.

Typically, when moral philosophers come up with their accounts of right and
wrong, they rely on their own psychological intuitions and judgments – invariably
formed within a particular cultural context with its attendant relational norms – about
what their normative account entails in particular cases (Kagan, 2001). If it seems that
their account yields a highly counterintuitive answer (for example, that it’s morally
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permissible for a mother to enact the mating function with her child), they will often
go back and revise their account to get the intuitively ‘right’ answer. Other times,
their commitment to a philosophical principle will force them to relinquish or
override their intuitive judgment about a particular case; and back-and-forth they may
go, trying to reach a reflective equilibrium (Cath, 2016). What, if anything, can
experimental psychologists contribute to this process?
Here is one possibility: by giving an explanation of why certain relationallysituated moral judgments seem intuitive in a given context, psychologists may provide a
basis for philosophers to determine whether a given judgment should in fact be given
substantive normative weight – granting, of course, certain prior, or more basic, value
commitments that are not in question in the given discourse (or which are held constant
for the sake of argument). We will consider some examples of this below.
Alternatively, if a philosopher decides to reject a common, robust moral
judgment shown to hold among a relevant group of stakeholders, she will have to give
an adequate error theory: i.e., an explanation of why people have such a strong and
consistent moral intuition despite its failure to yield (what the philosopher takes to be)
the right normative conclusion (Singer, 2005).
In what follows, we will look at some recently proposed strategies for
negotiating these kinds of decisions (adapted from Earp et al., 2020), highlighting
potential pathways for reaching normative conclusions from argumentative premises
that include empirical claims about the moral mind in relational context. First, however,
we will return to our discussion of normative disagreements regarding one particular
kind of relationship, namely the romantic partner relationship, based on our work on the
ordinary concept of true love.
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Normative Disagreements and Romantic Relationships

In Chapter 4, we noted that people often disagree about whether a given
romantic relationship is an instance of true love, where this concept is at least partly
normative: our findings demonstrated that the perceived goodness of a relationship is
one important factor for grounding membership in the ‘true love’ category. The other
important factor we identified was perceived realness – which we speculated might
have to do with the sense that a given mental state is rooted in one’s true self
(Strohminger et al., 2017). What should we say about cases in which, even within a
given society or culture, two people look at the very same romantic relationship –
possessed of the very same facts about it – and yet reach opposite conclusions about
whether it is morally good or exhibits realness and (hence) whether it is an instance of
true love?
In subsequent sections, as I mentioned earlier, I will go beyond merely
attempting to understand such disagreements to discussing strategies for potentially
resolving them (i.e., on the way to reaching substantive moral conclusions). As a
more modest aim, however, I will start here by discussing a role for empirical studies
into ordinary people’s use of relational concepts in allowing us to better pinpoint –
and understand – the nature of such normative disagreements, using the example of
romantic relationships.

Understanding relational moral disagreements.

People, we have said, often disagree about true love: what it is, whether it
exists, who has it, and so on. For a concrete example, consider our age difference

178

vignette (from Chapter 4), which concerns a relationship between an older professor
and his young undergraduate student. Many people responded that this was clearly a
case of true love, while many others responded that it was clearly not a case of true
love. Disagreements like this one seem to point to something fundamental about the
concept of true love and the role it plays in the way people understand the normative
dimensions of their lives and relationships.
The data from our empirical studies cannot directly tell us which of the
opposing views in such cases is the correct one, but they can provide valuable insight
into the nature of the disagreement itself. Imagine a person who accepts that there is
something very wrong in the relationship described by the age difference vignette, but
who nevertheless maintains that the characters in it are experiencing true love. Now
imagine a critic who disagrees with this person, asserting that what the characters feel
for each other in the vignette is not true love. In light of our reported findings, it
seems that there are two distinct ways in which such a critic could argue for her view.
One approach would be to draw on the criteria associated with the ordinary
concept of true love. In this first approach, the critic would accept the criteria revealed
in the studies we reported, and she would then argue that the case in question doesn’t
actually fulfil those criteria. For example, focusing on the realness criterion (see
above), she could say: “You may think that they are experiencing something real, but
you are suffering from a delusion. No relationship between an older professor and a
much younger student—especially one he directly supervises—can be rooted in the
kind of realness that is necessary for true love.”
Alternatively, the critic could argue against the criteria themselves. For
example, she could argue that the ordinary criteria for applying the concept of true
love are themselves flawed, and that we should instead adopt criteria according to
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which nothing can count as true love without being (sufficiently) good. She might
then say: “It may well be that their feelings for each other are real. And I recognize
that realness is one of the main criteria we ordinarily use to decide whether something
counts as true love. But their relationship is deeply wrong, and for that reason, we
should reject any criterion according to which their feelings for one another count as
true love.”
In short, there are at least two different ways in which people might disagree
about true love. First, they might disagree about whether a particular relationship or
experience fulfills the criteria associated with the ordinary concept. And second, they
might disagree on a deeper level: they might disagree about the criteria themselves.
Let us now take a closer look at each kind of disagreement in turn.

Disagreement about fulfilling criteria. The results of our empirical studies
shed at least some light on the sorts of disagreements about true love that are rife in
ordinary life. In Study 2 of Chapter 4, we found considerable disagreement between
participants about whether the characters in each vignette were experiencing true
love, but most of this disagreement simply mirrored the disagreement they showed on
the questions about goodness and realness. Among participants who agreed about
those other questions, there was relatively little disagreement about whether what the
characters had between them was an instance of true love.
These results provide some support for a broader picture of the nature of
ordinary disagreements regarding true love. On this picture, most of the disagreement
is of the first of the two types described above. People share an understanding of the
criteria that a relationship has to fulfill to count as true love, but they disagree about
whether individual cases do or do not fulfill these criteria. When it comes to
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judgments of goodness, for example, this disagreement would be straightforward. We
can easily imagine a case in which two people agree that the criteria involve a role for
goodness but just have radically different views about which things are good. On this
view, people could have quite different views about which individual things count as
‘true love’ – but this would not simply be because they were using the phrase in
completely different ways. Rather, it seems that people can share certain criteria for
the use of this phrase, while being engaged in a substantive disagreement about which
things fulfill those criteria.
We suggest this is something to look out for in cases of apparent moral
disagreement, not only in relational contexts, but generally: Is the disagreement
normatively substantive, or are the opposed parties simply employing moral concepts
in different ways, thereby effectively talking past one another? Empirical studies can
help to answer this question.

Disagreement about the criteria themselves. Now suppose that two people
disagree, not about whether a given relationship meets some shared criterion for true
love, but about whether a given criterion, such as realness, is the right criterion for
picking out category members. There are at least two ways in which someone might
take issue with the ordinary concept of true love by disagreeing about one or more of
its criteria. Specifically, there could be a naturalistic disagreement about the criteria,
and there could be a normative disagreement about the criteria.
A naturalistic disagreement would be premised on the belief that there really
is such a thing as true love in the word, and that the ordinary concept of true love, in
placing so much emphasis on realness, say, does not succeed in uniquely picking it
out. A scientific reductionist, for example, might identify true love with some
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biological process related to reproduction, or a particular brain state, and argue that it
is this feature which ought to be central to the concept on grounds of descriptive
accuracy. A proponent of this view, then, might then wish to engage in what has been
called naturalist conceptual engineering (Veit & Browning, 2020). That is, the
proponent might try to promote what they take to be a more accurate or finely
discriminating conception of true love and encourage its wider adoption among
ordinary people.
A normative disagreement would be premised on a different kind of belief.
This would be a moral or sociopolitical belief that the ordinary concept of true love is
not desirable in its current form, given certain normative ends. As Haslanger (2012)
argues, the operative concept of X may be different from what she calls the ‘manifest’
concept (the concept people explicitly take themselves to be applying when they pick
out X); and this in turn may be different from what she calls the ‘target’ concept—the
concept people should apply when picking out X, all things considered (Haslanger,
2012).
To see what a normative disagreement about the concept of true love might
look like, let us imagine someone speaking to a troubled friend, perhaps one of the
characters in our abuse vignette (see Chapter 4). “If your partner abuses you,” we’ll
imagine this person saying, “no matter how much you may feel affection for each
other ... what you have between you is not true love.” Now suppose this was a direct
response to the other person saying: “I know the abuse is wrong, but what we have is
true love and that is more important than anything else.” We would have two different
uses, then, of the same concept that are mutually incompatible.
Suppose that both of these (hypothetically) operative uses were circulating in
the language community. Depending on our aims and values, we might think that it

182

would be normatively better—all things considered—if the use that excludes abuse
became more intuitive and widely employed, while the use that is compatible with
abuse became counterintuitive among most ordinary language users. Supposing that
was our goal, we might wish to undertake what Haslanger calls an ‘ameliorative’
project, or what has recently been termed moral conceptual engineering (Veit &
Browning, 2020). That is, we might try to promote the first use of true love and
encourage its greater uptake among ordinary people.
Notice the phrase “Depending on our aims and values” in the previous
paragraph. What this phrase indicates is that one can’t reach a normative conclusion
about how some relational concept – such as ‘true love’ – should be used in a given
discourse unless one takes for granted certain moral norms or values as an
argumentative starting point. In other words, recalling the above-stated concerns
about the so-called ‘naturalistic fallacy’ (Frankena, 1939), there is no way to reach an
‘ought’ directly from an ‘is’ without smuggling in some normative premise along the
way. However, some normative premises are more reasonable or widely shared than
others, and these may serve as useful candidates for anchoring a moral argument
regarding relational concepts or norms. Again, empirical studies may be useful for
identifying which relational norms are in fact widely shared among a group of
stakeholders (either within or between cultures) for purposes of grounding a more
productive moral dialogue. In the following section, we will look at this process in
greater detail.

Resolving Disagreements
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Within moral philosophy, a common strategy for reaching normative
conclusions – for example, about the moral duties implied by a given social
relationship – is to take a coherence-seeking approach in which the practitioner tries
to achieve a kind of “reflective equilibrium.” That is, the moral philosopher attempts
to “harmonize all the elements contributing to moral judgment, including intuitions
about cases, moral principles, moral theories, and background theories of moral
agency and social organization” (Arras, 2016, n.p.). Within this method, moral
theories and principles function to “organize, explain, criticize, and extend our
intuitive responses to cases,” while at the same time, “those very responses can, in
turn, help us to amend and sharpen our principles and theories when they prove
inadequate to the complexities of emerging cases” (Arras, 2016, n.p.).
To better appreciate this general strategy, however, it is necessary to ask who
the implied “we” is in the reference to “our” intuitive responses to cases. For the sake
of clarity, the responses of interest here are moral judgments regarding particular
relationally-situated behaviors—for example, judgments that it is worse for someone
to fail to feed a hungry individual when that person is their child than when the person
is a non-paying customer at a restaurant (Earp et al., 2021). In developing substantive
normative theories, these sorts of judgments have, traditionally, been those of the
moral philosopher considering various cases. In this way, the judgments of particular
individuals have long provided a key source of data for “armchair” approaches to
moral philosophy, including the coherence-seeking kind described above. But what if
the judgments of moral philosophers differ from those of lay people within a given
society (or from those of other moral philosophers in different societies)?
One possibility is that a philosopher’s speculative reflection, especially on
abstract or idealized cases, might fail adequately to capture the concrete normative
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and empirical issues at stake in a given social-relational context (Mills, 2005; Tobin
& Jaggar, 2013). This, in turn, might call into question the real-world relevance of
such reflection for reaching normative conclusions. If the goal is to develop a
normative position regarding actual social relationships as they are widely conducted
within a society, might the judgments of ordinary individuals constitute equally, if not
more, relevant data? And supposing that we have identified relevant empirical data
pertaining to various stakeholder judgments: (how) can we draw normative inferences
on the basis of that data?
Within the field of bioethics, which can be considered an applied branch of
moral philosophy, several strategies have been developed toward this end. According
to a recent systematic review (Davies et al., 2015), most methodologies employed in
the field can be classed as either “dialogical” or “consultative.” Dialogical approaches
involve actual dialogues between researchers and stakeholders to reach a shared
understanding and a joint resolution to a particular moral problem. Consultative
approaches involve collecting empirical data relating to stakeholder views, attitudes,
and experiences, and then using these as a basis for drawing normative conclusions.
In terms of the majority of consultative approaches, the end goal is either the
achievement of coherence between stakeholder data and moral theory (“narrow
reflective equilibrium”) or between stakeholder data and broader considerations, such
as background theories, moral principles, “expert” intuitions, morally-relevant facts,
and considered judgments (“wide reflective equilibrium”).
According to Davies and colleagues (2015), the key difference between
dialogical and consultative methods is the role of participants: whereas participants in
dialogical approaches work together with researchers to analyze stakeholder data and
develop normative conclusions regarding discrete problems on the basis of consensus,
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participants in consultative approaches do not take part in the analysis or the process
of forming normative conclusions (Davies et al., 2015). Furthermore, the aims of
consultative approaches vary, “ranging from theory development to the generation of
concrete answers to discrete problems" (Davies et al., 2015, p. 7). In addition, when
consultative approaches aim to deliver normative conclusions regarding a specific
problem, they tend to employ a coherence-based methodology like the ones described
above (Davies et al., 2015).
Experimental philosophy (x-phi) is another field in which practitioners have
attempted to glean (meta)philosophical insights, including but not limited to
normative inferences, from empirical data. How they do this depends on how the
practitioners interpret the purpose or function of x-phi in general. At least two main
purposes have been identified, corresponding to two separate research programs, each
of which can be understood in relation to the tradition of conceptual analysis in
analytic philosophy (Alexander et al., 2010; Fisher, 2015; Knobe, 2016; Machery,
2017; Mukerji, 2019; Sosa, 2007).
The first program aims to make a positive contribution to conceptual analysis,
though not necessarily through the provision of necessary and sufficient conditions
for concept application. The second program engages negatively by providing
evidence against the intuitive assumptions of more traditional approaches to
conceptual analysis. However, as Knobe (2016) argues, regardless of which program
they may claim to be pursuing, what experimental philosophers typically do in their
studies is a kind of cognitive science: they investigate effects on psychological
structures thought to underpin judgments held by participants (Knobe, 2016, p. 42). It
is this characterization of x-phi as cognitive science that is especially useful for
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understanding what the following strategies have been trying to achieve in terms of
generating normative conclusions from premises that include empirical data.

Inferential Strategies

Within the strategies for drawing normative inferences discussed below, the
running theme is that if we can get a deeper understanding of the criteria underlying
stakeholder moral judgments regarding social-relational cases (e.g., Person A does X
to Person B), this understanding can help us to address substantive normative
questions about the actual moral status of the behavior or behaviors in question.
But we must start by dealing with a couple of red herrings. First, it should be
uncontroversial that the most ethically justified conclusion – for example, about how
one party to a given social relationship should behave toward the other – is not
always, or simply, the most popular one based on common opinion within a given
society (cue references to Nazi Germany). However, I will argue that, when certain
conditions are met, researchers can legitimately appeal to the presence of prevalent or
highly consistent stakeholder judgments revealed by an empirical study as one
(ultimately defeasible) reason that counts in favor of a particular normative claim.
At the same time, it should be obvious that simply deferring to “ethical
experts” such as trained moral philosophers – especially when their judgments or
associated normative conclusions defy those of other, “ordinary” stakeholders – can
also be problematic. For example, such knee-jerk deferral to a circumscribed group of
people can enshrine prejudices and lead to dogmatism and parochialism (Machery,
2017). As Savulescu and colleagues observe (Savulescu et al., 2019), some laws and
policies regarding, for example, the doctor-patient relationship do in fact run counter
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to public preferences: bans on voluntary assisted dying in the U.S., U.K., and
Australia, for instance, have been put in place despite large majority preferences for
permitting assisted dying. Other laws and policies, however, may be grounded in
“mere” public sentiment without necessarily appealing to more principled normative
considerations.
Typically, neither a direct appeal to an argumentum ad populum nor a simple
appeal to a single set of “expert” judgments will provide reliable guidance toward
normative conclusions. To get out of this bind, Savulescu and colleagues have offered
some preliminary proposals. First, they suggest that we need to identify the moral
judgments and intuitions of those who have been careful in their reasoning and have a
“clear understanding of the issues” (Savulescu et al., 2019, p. 1241). But, we might
ask, who are these careful and reliable reasoners and how do we find them? They
might be those “ethical experts'' we have been alluding to: professional moral
philosophers, bioethicists, legal professionals, and the like. However, members of
these groups make up a tiny fraction of the population, and between them they may
have idiosyncratic perspectives, conflicting judgments, moral disagreements, and
incompatible moral inferences. Furthermore, debates regarding a specific moralphilosophical issue may have reached a stalemate with good reasons for adopting
several positions and/or no adequate way for the “experts'' to agree upon which
position should be implemented in practice. Consequently, Savulescu et al. suggest
that we need “refined expert intuitions” (along with guidance from formal ethical
theories) as well as “widespread public responses” (Savulescu et al., 2019, p. 1242).
A potential problem with such proposals is that they do not spell out what to
do when widespread public responses, such as common moral judgments, and those
of putative experts diverge or, indeed, what to do when they seem to agree. More
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generally, how do ethical theories, expert judgments, and the judgments of ordinary
people relate to one another, and how can this information be integrated to draw
normative conclusions about appropriate moral behavior in relationships? I will
briefly discuss four potential strategies (summarized in Earp et al., 2021), as follows:
parsimony, debunking, triangulation, and pluralism.

The Parsimony Approach:
Appealing to Robust Effects or Consistent Judgments

The first strategy is based on a principle of parsimony. This view assumes that
ordinary people’s judgments about certain cases carry significant (albeit defeasible)
normative weight, such that experts who wish to make claims about what ought to be
done should begin by carefully studying those judgments. The strategy is
parsimonious, then, in that it relies on the simplest possible model for deriving
normative content from the moral judgments of ordinary people: it holds that those
judgments should be given at least some positive normative weight. In short:

Parsimony. If relevant stakeholders consistently make a judgment p which
encodes moral claim M, then M has prima facie normative weight.

One of the aims of studies employing this strategy is to gather data relating to
stakeholder judgments, often with the assumption that no matter what these
judgments are, they are normatively significant. Once the data have been gathered, a
proponent of the parsimony strategy might then identity the most consistent (e.g.,
common or robust) moral judgments revealed by a study and give these prima facie
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normative weight when deciding on a solution to an associated normative question.
Note that the normative weight accorded to such judgments need not be especially
strong. The parsimony strategy requires only that these judgments, to the extent that
they are consistent or prevalent, be viewed as providing some normative weight in a
moral-philosophical argument. They will never be enough on their own to deliver an
all-things-considered normative conclusion.
In this way, studies that employ the parsimony strategy are consistent with
consultative approaches in bioethics, mentioned earlier, insofar as the latter rely on
the robust judgments of some group of stakeholders as a basis for arbitrating between
competing normative claims. However, consultative approaches in bioethics tend to
be concerned with identifying the most prevalent judgments (or attitudes, preferences,
etc.) of the group, primarily through observational or cross-sectional methods. By
contrast, experimental studies that adopt a parsimony strategy might look beyond the
mere prevalence of a judgment and instead emphasize the robustness of an
experimental finding (e.g., across methods, materials, or operationalizations of a
causal stimulus) regarding a given effect on participant responses (see Rueda et al.,
2020). For an example applied to the parent-child relationship, where the moral
question at stake concerns the nature of a parent’s duty to care for a child by donating
tissue to meet the child’s health-based needs, see Case Study 1.
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Case study 1. Parsimony. What grounds moral duties in the parent-child
relationship with respect to the care function, in the case of meeting certain
medical needs of the child?
Consider a child who needs a tissue donation to survive. Suppose that their biological
parent could donate the needed tissue. Insofar as it seems intuitive that the parent has
a moral responsibility to donate the tissue, what drives this judgment? Is it the
biological relation between the donor and recipient (McMahan, 2003) or the fact that
the donor is uniquely suited to provide tissue that will work for the recipient
(Beverley, 2016)? Beverley and Beebe, in a study involving a series of contrastive
vignettes, found that “unique ability rather than biological relatedness was the
primary predictor of people’s judgments of moral responsibility” (Beverley & Beebe,
2018, p. 92). To distill the normative relevance of this finding, the authors adopt a
meta-philosophical stance: folk judgments need not “rigidly constrain philosophical
theorizing” but counterintuitive normative views (e.g., that moral responsibility
stems from biological relatedness) carry an explanatory burden (Beverley & Beebe,
2018). As such, the “parsimony” model would advocate that the “unique ability”
judgment be assigned prima facie normative weight.

There are two interrelated concerns with employing this approach that critics
might think to raise. First, it is highly likely that traditional moral philosophers would
hesitate to accept such a method on the basis that it seems to derive normative
conclusions from empirical premises without necessarily appealing to more principled
normative considerations. This relates to a second potential concern, which is that the
“parsimony” approach seems to reduce moral reasoning about contested socialrelational issues to a popularity contest.
We think this concern is unwarranted. As already observed, the mere fact that
consistent judgments are revealed by a study does not entail that the associated moral
issues are conclusively settled. Rather, the identification of consistent judgments is
just one factor that counts in favor of the relevant moral claim, and the normative
weight accorded need not be strong. Indeed, reasons for granting more normative
weight to a particular set of judgments are, ultimately, defeasible if, for example, it
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can be convincingly shown that these judgments are unreliable (see below). In short,
this approach puts the burden of proof on those who would claim that we should not
respond to the particular ethical issue in question by according at least some
normative weight to the most consistent judgments of relevant stakeholders.

The Debunking Approach
In contrast to the “parsimony” approach, which assigns prima facie (though
necessarily not strong) normative weight to stakeholder judgments, one might wish to
argue that a certain judgment should not be accorded normative weight when
considering a solution to a social-relational moral problem. And one might do this by
testing whether the judgment is the output of a psychological process that, for
example, has been substantially influenced by prejudice, bias, or morally irrelevant
differences in the ways in which a moral dilemma is presented (e.g., it is subject to
misleading “framing effects”) (Demaree-Cotton, 2016; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996).
To investigate whether a judgment should not be accorded normative weight in a
moral argument, one might wish to pursue a “debunking” strategy derived from the
following general argumentation scheme (Mukerji, 2019, pp. 31-56).

Debunking.
(P1)

Judgment p is the output of a psychological process that possesses the
empirical property of being substantially influenced by factor F.
(Empirical premise)

(P2)

If a judgment is the output of a psychological process that possesses
the empirical property of being substantially influenced by factor F,
then it is pro tanto unreliable. (Bridging normative premise)
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(C)

Judgment p is pro tanto unreliable.

Such an approach can be employed to assess whether ordinary people revise
their judgments under various “treatment” conditions. Take, for example, exposure to
a particular philosophical argument: say, the famous argument of Singer (1972) that
we are no less obligated to help distant strangers in far off lands than we are to help
members of our own community, assuming we are equally capable of providing the
requisite help in either case. Most people are likely to find this claim counterintuitive, consistent with our findings (from Chapters 2 and 3) that participants
consistently evinced a stronger normative expectation of care for socially close
relationships (e.g., family members) compared to socially distant ones (e.g.,
strangers). But if people were to update their judgment about this case having
reflected on a philosophical argument (see, for a related approach, Schwitzgebel et al.,
2020), then at least two points might follow: (1) they had not previously considered
the philosophical argument in question; and (2) once they did, they abandoned their
original judgment. This might suggest that their original judgment was not
particularly robust – or was insufficiently informed by careful reflection – and this
could be a reason to downgrade its normative significance.
The susceptibility of a moral judgment to so-called framing effects also has
been proposed as a factor that should weaken our confidence in the judgment from a
normative perspective. As Andow (2016, p. 908) observes, the substantive influence
of morally irrelevant factors – such as a mere change in logically-equivalent framing
of a case – on judgments is important because “it is capable of radically altering the
moral position that one ends up endorsing.” And the claim here is, if a person’s
judgment about some case is the output of a psychological process that has been
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substantively influenced by such a morally irrelevant factor, then we have a prima
facie reason to doubt the judgment. But more than this, we have a reason to believe
that a process of reflection based on this judgment “will only lead one deeper into
error” (Wedgwood, 2007, p. 244). At least, the pro tanto unreliability of a judgment is
one factor that counts against accepting it as a premise in a normative argument.
But we must remain cautious. Even if stakeholders hold a judgment that has
been shown to be pro tanto unreliable in a specific instance, alternative explanations
should be explored for why the target population holds that judgment. After all, we
can never be sure that a particular judgment can be debunked in general: debunking
proceeds by looking at isolated, specific ways in which the psychological processes
outputting certain judgments can be deficient. Thus, experimentalists can play a
valuable role in cases where there are plausible alternative explanations for what
appears to be a normatively unjustified judgment. In particular, they can conduct
experiments to test the alternative explanation(s), often by carefully manipulating
relevant cognitive factors. For example, they might see whether a pro tanto unreliable
judgment persists when participants are asked to consider a hypothetical society in
which a given social-relational norms differ in some relevant way from their own.
Depending on the results, such an experiment could provide evidence for or against
the alternative explanation for the original suspect judgment.
In the next two examples, we will see how the debunking approach might be
pursued in practice, using two separate case studies focused on the doctor-patient
relationship: (1) an apparently failed debunking attempt (providing evidence that
ordinary people’s judgments, in a specific instance, are not largely biased by a
particular factor that would have made the judgments unreliable; however, see the
footnote at the end of this paragraph for some qualifications) (case study 2); and (2)
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an apparently successful debunking attempt (providing evidence that ordinary
people’s judgments, in a specific instance, are largely biased by a particular irrelevant
factor, and so should not be trusted at least in this instance) (case study 3).15

Case study 2. Debunking: failed. What grounds moral duties in the doctorpatient relationship regarding killing vs. letting die?
Laypeople distinguish killing and letting die by evaluating the morality of the
physician’s intervention (Cushman et al., 2008). For example, doctors who observe a
terminal patient’s wishes are seen as allowing them to die, whereas doctors who
disregard the patient’s wishes are seen as killing them (Rodríguez‐Arias et al., 2020).
The judgments of ordinary people may afford little normative insight here, in part
because they lack the requisite understanding of the medical and clinical issues in
play. This objection makes a straightforward empirical prediction: if laypeople
acquired the relevant medical knowledge, they would abandon their untrained
judgments in favor of the canonical distinction between killing and letting die as
commissive versus omissive life-ending acts, respectively. However, RodríguezArias and colleagues found no evidence of this: doctors, medical students, and
laypeople revealed strikingly similar judgments about end-of-life cases (Rodríguez‐
Arias et al., 2020). The determining factor appears to be whether the patient wished
to live or die, and not how the patient’s death was brought about (i.e., via action or
omission). Thus, the ordinary judgment could not be debunked on grounds of
ignorance of clinically relevant details.

15

There is an asymmetry between these two cases. If there really is conclusive evidence that a popular
judgment is grounded in some factor that undermines its normative force (successful debunking
attempt), then the judgment should be set aside or discounted. But if one fails to debunk a given
judgment, this does not automatically entail that it should be trusted. Rather, it might still be
normatively suspect on other grounds that have not yet been tested. So, one should try to test, and rule
out, the most plausible debunking explanations, and if one reliably fails in this, it becomes reasonable
to treat the judgment as carrying prima facie normative weight (a process akin to Popperian
falsificationism, notwithstanding its various shortcomings; see, e.g., Earp (2020); Lakatos (1970).
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Case study 3. Debunking: successful. Within the doctor-patient relationship,
(when) is it morally wrong to treat the patient differently on account of their sex
or gender?
For another example concerning the doctor-patient relationship, it is relevant to
determine whether people have a gender bias in assessing children’s pain. We
conducted an experiment in which we manipulated the perceived gender of a young
child getting a finger-stick to draw blood (Earp et al., 2019, based on Cohen et al.,
2014). To keep the experiment as controlled as possible, participants viewed a single
video stimulus of a child whose sex could not be visually determined (i.e., the same
video in both conditions). In one condition, participants were told the child’s name
was “Samuel,” and in the other, “Samantha.” Participants then watched the video and
rated how much pain the child experienced. We found that participants rated the child
named “Samuel” as experiencing more pain than the child named “Samantha.” Thus,
perceived gender alone appeared to bias observer interpretations of felt pain (for
alternative explanations, see Earp & Boerner, 2019). Such evidence plausibly
undermines the trustworthiness of a physician’s moral judgments that, say, boys and
girls should receive different pain treatment given a comparable injury.

The Triangulation Approach
Suppose that the normative judgments of moral philosophers differ from those
of lay people with respect to some social-relational dilemma (e.g., Peter Singer’s
judgment about our relative duties to family members versus strangers, compared
with the typical judgment of ordinary people regarding this case). Or suppose that
moral philosophers from different cultures disagree with one another. What should be
done about such divergences? In such cases, experimental findings could be
employed as part of a coherence-seeking strategy of “narrow” reflective equilibrium
discussed previously. Here, the coherence being sought is between competing expert
judgments and/or between expert judgments and those of lay stakeholders. We refer
to this approach as a type of triangulation:16

16

Scientists and certain philosophers of science employ the term “triangulation” to refer to the use of
multiple and independent sources of evidence to generate causal inferences from data to phenomena (as
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Triangulation. Divergence among the judgments of various groups of experts
and/or between expert and lay judgments requires the following: adjusting,
pruning, or supplementing the normative conclusions derived from either
expert or lay judgments in order to accommodate the normative implications
of the opposing views.
Experimentalists can perform three important roles in pursuing a triangulation
strategy: first, using empirical means, they can identify the judgments of various
experts and lay stakeholders in response to a specific normative problem, ensuring
that the judgments respond to relevant features of ecologically valid contexts. Second,
using the aforementioned argumentation strategies, they can experimentally
investigate the cognitive mechanisms underpinning these judgments, ensuring that
various expert and lay judgments are not pro tanto unreliable (and/or setting aside or
discounting those judgments that are convincingly shown to be pro tanto unreliable).
Finally, they can help to execute trade-offs among the respective pro tanto reliable
judgments, revising normative conclusions as coherence and mutual support seem to
require.
According to the standards of reflective equilibrium, the normative
conclusions arrived at through this process, together with the revisions to the
competing judgments, will be justified if and only if there is reason to believe that
they will maximize the coherence of the overall set of relevant considerations.
However, in order to avoid the standard objection that the equilibrium arrived at “may
be no more than a reshuffling of moral prejudices” (Brandt, 1979, p. 21), the
triangulation approach might better be characterized as a coherence-seeking
opposed to phenomena-to-theory deductive inferences) (Kuorikoski & Marchionni, 2016).
Analogously, triangulation in psychologically empirically informed moral philosophy is one of the
means by which normative inferences might be generated on the basis of multiple, independent, and
pro tanto reliable pieces of empirical evidence.
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methodology based on a “moderate foundationalism” (BonJour, 1985, pp. 26-30). The
problem that Richard Brandt identifies is that the coherence constraint on its own may
not succeed in correcting for all the errors or biases in the respective judgments (R. B.
Brandt, 1979). As already observed in the section on debunking, it will not succeed if
the antecedent judgments are so unreliable that further reflection on these judgments
will only lead moral philosophers deeper into error. As a result, proponents must also
explain how it is antecedently or independently rational for us to regard some or all of
these competing judgments as (pro tanto) reliable (Wedgwood, 2007).
According to Scanlon, in carrying out the process of reflective equilibrium, we
should ask whether there is more reason to revise a normative conclusion in the light
of conflicting judgments, or to give up the judgments that conflict with it (Scanlon,
2014). Ultimately, as Ralph Wedgwood suggests, what is being proposed is a
thoroughgoing form of fallibilism (Wedgwood, 2007, pp. 64-65). On this approach,
we can never have any guarantee that we will not be rationally required to revisit and
reconsider, and perhaps revise, the normative conclusions derived from the process of
triangulation if and when further reliable empirical evidence is identified. However, in
practical moral decision-making, we will often have to “bite the bullet” and commit to
a specific normative claim based on available empirical data and the degree of
coherence we have been able to achieve. As Scanlon suggests, such a commitment
must be based on the best reasons for counting in favor of a specific claim (Scanlon,
2014).
When proceeding with a triangulation strategy, it will not necessarily be as
straightforward as seeking a simple compromise or accommodation. Rather, it will
often be necessary to ask, in the case of judgments about normative relational
concepts – such as ‘true love’ – what we want the concept to do, that is, its (desired)
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function (as opposed to meaning) (Lewis, 2020a). As Haslanger asks, “what is the
point of having these concepts? What cognitive or practical task do they (or should
they) enable us to accomplish? Are they effective tools to accomplish our (legitimate)
purposes; if not, what concepts would serve these purposes better?” (Haslanger, 2000,
p. 33).17
Once again, we can envisage a vital role for experimentalists in answering
these questions. As Nado argues, “the experimental philosopher’s focus on underlying
psychological mechanisms seems to be a promising route (though of course not the
only possible route) for discovering the purposes our concepts serve, and the means
by which these purposes are achieved” (Nado, 2019, pp. 16-17). On this approach, we
should empirically investigate our judgments about a normative concept because we
want to know whether the normative concept in question is already fulfilling its
intended functions to a reasonably good degree.
Take, for example, the concept of parent. Originally, this concept might have
served the function of picking out those individuals who stand in a biological parentchild relationship with an offspring. However, nowadays, we recognize that
individuals who adopt a child to whom they are biologically unrelated should also be
counted as members of the ‘parent’ conceptual category, perhaps in part because they
serve the cooperative functions that are normatively embedded within the ‘parentchild’ relationship in most societies. Thus, it seems that a social-functional
understanding of ‘parent’ helps us to identify those individuals who play a particular
role in bringing up vulnerable members of society, whether or not they are
biologically related to one another.

17

For other broadly functionalist, experimentally-based approaches to navigating conceptual
disagreement, see: (Fisher, 2015; Lindauer, 2020; Machery, 2017; Nado, 2019; Thomasson, 2012).
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The Pluralism Approach

This brings us to a final strategy. Suppose that the best reasons count in favor of
preserving two diverging expert judgments (e.g., across cultural contexts) or the
competing judgments of experts and lay stakeholders (e.g., within a given culture). In
other words, there are equally good reasons for adopting two or more judgments as
the basis for (competing) normative conclusions with no better reasons for adjusting,
pruning, or supplementing the different positions. In some cases, such a scenario
might justify a pluralistic response:

Pluralism. In cases where expert and lay stakeholders hold conflicting, yet
pro tanto reliable, judgments or where multiple and independent communities
each reveal persistent disagreement between two or more conflicting, yet pro
tanto reliable, judgments, these judgments may all have comparable normative
weight.
The pluralism approach is similar to, and consistent with, the Shared Decision
Making approach that has recently become an important part of clinical practice and
health policy – another example centered on the doctor-patient relationship. To be
successful, Shared Decision Making relies on two sources of expertise: (1) the health
professional as an expert on the effectiveness, probable benefits, and potential harms
of different treatment options; and (2) the patient as an expert on themselves, their
social and personal circumstances, attitudes to illness and risk, tolerances for pain and
discomfort, long-term outlooks, broader values, and preferences (Lewis, 2020b). As
Lewis notes, Shared Decision Making is most appropriately applied under conditions
of uncertainty, which arise because a treatment decision is preference-sensitive, that
is, because medical evidence and clinical expertise suggest that there is more than one
medically reasonable option, and the choice of which option is best for a given patient
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depends on their values and preferences (Lewis, 2020b). In short, according to this
approach, so long as the patient can fulfil certain conditions of autonomy, then she
should choose the particular intervention that best satisfies her attitudes and
preferences (Lewis, 2020b; Notini et al., 2020).
There is a more general lesson here: in many cases, there may be no single
‘best’ answer to a normative question about, for example, what course of action is
morally preferable to take within a given social relationship. Often, there will be a
number of options that different stakeholders favor, or to which they assign
comparable weights, and we should be open to the possibility that more than one
option is normatively justifiable.
For example, consider the boss-employee relationship, which, in our studies,
was consistently rated as being normatively expected to serve a hierarchical
cooperative function. This means that, ideally, the individual in the boss role exercises
good leadership (e.g., being appropriately decisive as called for by the situation) while
the individual in the employee role exercises good followership (e.g., ultimately
deferring to the boss’s instructions, even if the employee might have preferred to
perform a task a different way). But even granting this general framework, there
might be conflicting visions – between individuals or cultures – as to what good
leadership or followership actually looks like or entails in practical terms.
For example, in one society (or company-specific subculture), good
followership might be thought to require a highly deferential attitude toward one’s
superiors (e.g., bowing upon seeing them and adopting a formal manner of address);
whereas, in another society or company subculture, good followership might be
characterized by a more relaxed mode of relating (e.g., greeting one’s boss with a
wave or a handshake and calling them by their first name). When making a moral
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judgment about, for example, whether an employee’s behavior is disrespectful, it will
often be necessary to relativize the judgment to the society or company-culture in
question. Trying to determine whether there is one normatively preferable standard
for how to exhibit followership, by contrast, would likely not be justified in such a
case.

Final Thoughts

After giving an overview of the dissertation and discussing some key findings,
limitations, and possible future directions for empirical work on relational moral
psychology, I turned to an examination of potential normative implications of this
work. Noting that people often disagree, both within and between cultures, about
substantive moral issues in relational context, I explored a number of strategies for
achieving two mains aims: (1) better understanding the underlying nature of such
disagreement, including by experimentally probing people’s ordinary language use of
normative relational concepts (such as ‘true love’), and (2) potentially resolving such
disagreement, using parsimony, debunking, and triangulation strategies – or adopting
a pluralistic attitude which escapes the need to resolve certain moral disagreements by
finding a single normative solution. This discussion has by no means been exhaustive,
but I hope to have given a sense of some of the exciting work on relational morality –
both empirical/scientific and normative/philosophical – that lies ahead in the coming
years.
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Appendix 1
Supplementary information for:
How Social Relationships Shape Moral Wrongness Judgments
Stage 1
Method.
Pre-registration #26400 on aspredicted.org. Full materials, raw data, and code
available at https://osf.io/zxjt6/?view_only=66c1211300974dd68e97b88269fec4a3.
1.1. Participants. Using an online polling software
(https://www.nbrii.com/our-process/sample-size-calculator/), we calculated that 385
participants would be required to have a representative U.S. sample with a 5% margin
of error and 95% confidence level. Based on exclusion rates of previous studies
conducted in our lab, we over-recruited by about 15% and recruited 450 U.S.
participants representative for age, race, and gender via the Prolific Academic
platform (Prolific). Ultimately 493 participants took some portion of the survey; not
all of them finished. Participants were paid $0.60 to complete a training session in
which they learned about the relational functions of care, coalition, hierarchy,
reciprocity, and mating, plus a $2.00 bonus for completing the rest of the survey
(rating each relationship on the extent to which it should ideally serve or not serve
each function). To ensure high quality data, we included several attention,
comprehension, and bot checks. Seventy (70) participants were excluded based on
pre-registered exclusion criteria (see Supplementary Table 1). This left us with a final
sample of 423 participants (217 female, 201 male, 4 other/nonbinary) ranging in age
from 18 to 79 (Mage = 44.25, SDage = 15.67); see Supplementary Table 2 for complete
demographic information.
1.1.1. Supplementary Table 1
Summary of pre-registered exclusion criteria for Stage 1
Exclusion criteria met

Type of check

Excluded N

Did not reach main portion of survey (i.e.,
did not pass training)

Comprehension check

10

234

Did not type in the word ‘FRIDAY’

Bot check

6

Did not move slider to (at least) 1 of 2
specified positions

Attention check

54

Note: some participants met more than one criterion.

1.1.2. Supplementary Table 2
Demographics of Sample 1 participants
Age

N (%)

Race

N (%)

Gender

N (%)

18 - 27

82 (19.39%)

White

296 (69.98%)

Female

217 (51.30%)

28 - 37

78 (18.44%)

Black/
African-American

60 (14.18%)

Male

201 (47.52%)

38 - 47

70 (16.55%)

Asian

29 (6.86%)

Other/
Non-binary

4 (0.95%)

48 - 57

75 (17.73%)

Hispanic/Latinx

21 (4.96%)

58+

117 (27.66%)

Other

10 (2.36%)

Missing

1 (0.24%)

American Indian/
Alaska Native

4 (0.95%)

Hawaiian/
Pacific Islander

2 (0.47%)

1.2. Procedure. Participants completed a brief online survey through the
Qualtrics interface. Before getting to the main part of the survey, participants were
shown the full descriptions of each of the five main cooperative functions, as shown
in Supplementary Table 3.
1.2.1. Supplementary Table 3:
Descriptions of relationship functions
Function

Description

Care

Full version: The main purpose of this kind of relationship is to make sure that a person’s
basic well-being is secure, without any strings attached to the giving or receiving of support
(like expecting compensation or favors in return, or feeling a debt). In other words, it is to
make sure that people have someone in their corner on whom they can truly count for care
and support, in good times and bad.
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Note that there are two roles assumed by this relationship: the caregiving role (the person
that can be truly counted on), and the care-seeking role (the person who may need
unconditional support).
Brief version: the function of giving or receiving unconditional support
Hierarchy

Full version: The main purpose of this kind of relationship is to help coordinate behavior
between people with different status (often they have unequal power or responsibility). In
many situations, it is most effective for one person to be the 'leader' or have final say about
what happens.
So, hierarchical relationships involve assigning people to different roles based on their
status or power in a given situation, to help coordinate behavior and accomplish goals.
There are two main roles in such relationships: the leader role and the follower role. The
person in the leader role has 'final say' over what happens, while the person in the follower
role ultimately must go along with what the leader decides.
Brief version: the function of coordinating behavior between people of different status,
power, or responsibility

Mating

Full version: The main purpose of this kind of relationship is to find and maintain a sexual
partner. For our ancestors, the ultimate point of mating was to produce healthy offspring, so
that we could pass on our genes and continue as a species.
Of course, today we have birth control, and people often have sexual relationships without
consciously planning to have children. But the underlying "logic" of the mating relationship
-- in terms of the feelings and motivations it tends to inspire -- remains the same: to attract
and secure a mate and stay with that person long enough to at least potentially have children
together.
Brief version: the function of establishing and maintaining a sexual partnership

Reciprocity

Full version: The main purpose of this kind of relationship is to coordinate behavior
between people who can mutually benefit, where they each have equal say in a given
situation or activity.
So, this can be a kind of ‘tit-for-tat’ arrangement between people, where each one says, “I'll
scratch your back if you scratch mine.” It can also be a way to keep things fair between
people exchanging favors, goods, or services. It can even be a way to coordinate activities
for mutual enjoyment, such as playing a game together. In any case, it involves making sure
that the scales between people don't get too far out of balance.
Brief version: the function of coordinating behavior between people with equal say in a
situation and keeping things fair

Coalition

Full version: The main purpose of this kind of relationship is to form and maintain a group
identity, so group members can work toward a common goal. People in the same group look
out for each other and try to promote their own group's interests over the interests of
competing groups: “us versus them.”
This involves having shared expectations for what's normal or appropriate behavior and
potentially making sacrifices for the good of the group, especially when it's in danger.
Brief version: the function of forming and maintaining a group identity for a common goal:
us versus them
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To ensure that participants were paying attention and were thinking of the
functions in the way we wanted them to, each description was followed by a multiplechoice question about the definitions of the functions. Participants were not allowed
to advance to the main part of the survey if they failed to answer this check correctly.
Once we had introduced the participants to the five cooperative functions, we
gave them instructions for the main task of the survey. For each of 20 relationships,
we asked participants how much the relationship ideally should serve each of the five
cooperative functions. We specified that, by ‘ideally,’ we meant that “if this kind of
relationship was the best possible relationship of its kind it could be,” how much
should it serve each of those five functions?
Participants were then presented 20 blocks of questions, one for each
relationship, in random order. For each relationship, we included a specific
description of what we meant by that relationship – see Supplementary Table 4 for the
descriptions. Then, for each combination of relationship and cooperative function,
participants rated how much the relationship ideally should serve the given function,
with the function now presented in its brief form as a reminder (see Supplementary
Table 3). For instance, if the relationship and cooperative function pair was
siblings/care, participants would be asked: “To what extent should the relationship
between siblings ideally serve the function of giving or receiving unconditional
support? (Care function.)” Responses were recorded on a sliding scale ranging from
‘Definitely SHOULD NOT’ (-100) through ‘Neutral’ (0) to ‘Definitely SHOULD’
(+100). Each of the recruited participants responded to questions about all five
functions for all 20 relationships, yielding 100 data points per participant. Finally, we
collected a battery of demographic measures: gender, age, race, ethnicity, income,
level of education, English fluency, political leanings on social and economic issues,
and religiosity.
1.2.2. Supplementary Table 4
Descriptions of relationships
Relationship

Description

Siblings

This refers to brothers and sisters. It includes adoptive as well as biological
brothers and sisters.

Long-term romantic partners

This refers to romantic partners that have a commitment to each other,
meaning they intend to remain together for the long term. It includes married
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partners like spouses, but also long-term romantic partners who aren’t married
but still have a commitment.
Close friends

This refers to people who seek one another out to spend time together, and
who refer to each other as best friends, close friends, or good friends. It
includes two people of any gender combination who are committed to
remaining friends for the long term, and whose interest in each other is NOT
primarily romantic.

Work colleagues or classmates

This refers to people who interact with each other on a regular basis at
work/school or in work/school related activities. It includes only people who
are on the same career or schooling level as each other.

Boss and employee

This refers to any workplace relationship in which one person directly
supervises the other and that same person has some decision-making control
over the other's activities and outcomes. It includes only people who interact
with each other in person in a workplace.

Teacher and student

This refers to relationships in which someone with more experience guides
someone with less experience, such as in school, sports or other
extracurricular activity. It includes teacher-student or coach-player
relationships, for example.

Doctor and patient

This refers to relationships in which one person provides expert medical or
therapeutic services to the other person. It includes medical doctor-patient
relationships or therapist-client relationships, for example.

Extended family members

This refers to relationships with relatives who are not in the immediate family
(so, not parents or siblings). It includes relationships with a cousin, aunt,
uncle, grandfather or grandmother.

Teammates

This refers to a relationship between two people who are in a clearly defined
group together working towards a common goal. It includes teammates on a
sports team or members of a theater troupe, for example.

Customer and seller

This refers to any relationship in which someone sells something and another
person buys that thing, and they interact with each other directly. It includes a
local baker and the baker's customer, or a house cleaner and the person who
owns the house, for example.

Neighbors

This refers to people who live in the same section of an apartment building, or
within the same block of houses on a street. It includes only people who know
each other and at least occasionally interact.

Friends with benefits

This refers to people who know each other and interact sexually on a
somewhat regular basis, but who refer to each other as friends rather than
romantic partners. It includes friends who interact sexually without
committing to a monogamous romantic relationship.

Acquaintances

This refers to people who know each other, and interact now and then, but
don’t consider one another to be friends. It includes people one might know
from work, school, or the neighborhood.

Members of a political party

This refers to people who are active, registered members of the same political
party. They likely hold similar ideological positions and tend to vote for the
same candidates in elections. They may not necessarily know each other for
any other reason than their common political activities and party affiliation.

Roommates/housemates

This refers to anyone who lives together who are not family members or in a
romantic relationship. This includes college room- or suite mates, apartment
mates, or housemates.
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Father and child (under 18)

This refers to fathers and their non-adult (meaning under age 18) children
specifically. It includes both biological and adoptive fathers/children.

Mother and child (under 18)

This refers to mothers and their non-adult (meaning under age 18) children
specifically. It includes both biological and adoptive parents/children.

Father and child (over 18)

This refers to fathers and their adult (meaning over age 18) children
specifically. It includes both biological and adoptive fathers/children.

Mother and child (over 18)

This refers to mothers and their adult (meaning over age 18) children
specifically. It includes both biological and adoptive mothers/children.

Strangers

This refers to people who encounter each other in any setting for the first time.
It includes people who don’t know each other from another context and don't
anticipate interacting again in the future.

1.3. Data preparation and analysis details. Raw data files (.csv) were
prepared and analyzed using Python, within a Jupyter Notebook environment.
Primary packages used: numpy, scipy, statsmodels, matplotlib, seaborn, pandas. For
data files and all coding scripts, see the OSF link above.
1.4. Supplementary results.
1.4.1. Supplementary Table 5
Most to least functionally polarized relationships
Functional Expectations
Care

Hier.

Mate.

Recip.

Across all functions

M

M

M

M

SD

Siblings

84.06

-0.83

-98.47

74.96

74.86

Mother/child (under 18)

95.53

65.39

-98.22

9.05

74.10

Father/child (under 18)

93.99

67.39

-98.37

12.93

73.99

Father/child (over 18)

86.58

35.97

-97.59

53.62

70.32

Mother/child (over 18)

88.05

28.02

-97.69

49.75

69.79

Boss and employee

7.86

84.75

-92.17

29.14

65.45

Extended family members

64.65

15.22

-96.40

57.26

65.00

Teacher and student

42.97

72.77

-95.61

24.49

64.30

Teammates

50.53

31.86

-73.00

75.43

63.72

Doctor and patient

53.75

41.63

-95.31

30.40

61.21

Close friends

79.39

-20.32

-50.31

79.96

59.18
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Members of a political party

7.60

45.24

-66.04

63.82

55.39

Customer and seller

-18.37

22.04

-81.77

60.39

53.16

Colleagues or classmates

17.38

18.92

-60.00

77.29

50.93

Roommates or housemates

24.90

-4.48

-52.39

87.30

50.71

Neighbors

13.08

-16.25

-57.99

67.57

46.35

Romantic partners

92.43

-14.07

95.12

84.95

45.80

Friends with benefits

28.13

-30.36

58.43

59.87

39.87

Acquaintances

-2.74

-3.54

-46.82

51.38

34.85

Strangers

-26.62

-11.00

-55.87

34.95

33.46

1.4.2. Supplementary Table 6
Most to least functionally specific relationships
Functional Expectations

Boss and employee

Care

Hier.

Mate.

Recip.

M

M

M

M

7.86

Highest M
Function

Highest M
Value

Other
Sum

Max Other
Difference

M

84.75 -92.17

29.14

Hierarchy

84.75

-55.17

139.92

Customer and seller

-18.37 22.04 -81.77

60.39

Reciprocity

60.39

-78.09

138.49

Neighbors

13.08 -16.25 -57.99

67.57

Reciprocity

67.57

-61.15

128.72

Strangers

-26.62 -11.00 -55.87

34.95

Reciprocity

34.95

-93.49

128.44

Mother/child (under 18)

95.53 65.39 -98.22

9.05

Care

95.53

-23.78

119.31

housemates

24.90 -4.48

-52.39

87.30

Reciprocity

87.30

-31.96

119.25

Father/child (under 18)

93.99 67.39 -98.37

12.93

Care

93.99

-18.05

112.04

Siblings

84.06 -0.83

-98.47

74.96

Care

84.06

-24.34

108.40

Mother/child (over 18)

88.05 28.02 -97.69

49.75

Care

88.05

-19.91

107.96

Acquaintances

-2.74

-46.82

51.38

Reciprocity

51.38

-53.09

104.47

Colleagues or classmates 17.38 18.92 -60.00

77.29

Reciprocity

77.29

-23.70

100.99

Teacher and student

42.97 72.77 -95.61

24.49

Hierarchy

72.77

-28.14

100.91

Father/child (over 18)

86.58 35.97 -97.59

53.62

Care

86.58

-8.00

94.59

Roommates or

-3.54
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Extended family
members

64.65 15.22 -96.40

57.26

Care

64.65

-23.92

88.57

Doctor and patient

53.75 41.63 -95.31

30.40

Care

53.75

-23.29

77.04

party

7.60

45.24 -66.04

63.82

Reciprocity

63.82

-13.20

77.02

Close friends

79.39 -20.32 -50.31

79.96

Reciprocity

79.96

8.77

71.19

Teammates

50.53 31.86 -73.00

75.43

Reciprocity

75.43

9.38

66.05

Friends with benefits

28.13 -30.36 58.43

59.87

Reciprocity

59.87

56.20

3.68

Romantic partners

92.43 -14.07 95.12

84.95

Mating

95.12

163.31

-68.18

Members of a political

1.4.3. Supplementary Figure 1. Coalition ratings. Kernel density plot of functional
expectations for coalition only for 20 common relationships. Dot represents the mean;
cap represents +/- 1 standard deviation. The height of the curve represents density: the
likely proportions of scores (relative to each function) that fall within the given range
along the x-axis. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
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1.4.4. Supplementary Figure 2. Relational norm profiles: violin plots for all 20
relationships. Error bars represent the mean (dot) and +/- 1 SD (caps). Source
data are provided as a Source Data file.
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1.4.5. Supplementary Tables 7a-7e.
Complete demographic analyses for Stage 1/Sample 1: regression tables
These regression tables show the results of the mixed effects linear regression models
where participant and relationship are random factors, described in the main text.
Note that participants who reported gender as ‘other’ were excluded from the analysis
as this was not a big enough sub-group to make statistical comparisons possible.
Table a = overall model; b = gender and other demographic effects on functional
expectations for mating; c = same for care; d = same for reciprocity; e = same for
hierarchy. Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
a. Overall
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

13.74

1.00

[11.8, 15.69]

< .001

1.00

.84

[-.66, 2.65]

.24

-1.17

.82

[-2.79, .45]

.16

-2.10

1.12

[-4.3, .10]

.06

2.49

1.14

[.27, 4.72]

.03

.61

.88

[-1.13, 2.34]

.49

Gender

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)
Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity
(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .53
Note. LL and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a 95% confidence interval,
respectively. The same applies to all other relevant tables. Here, the coefficients and
confidence intervals are based on the raw data, whereas the corresponding analyses reported
in the main text used functional expectations scaled to each participant.

b. Mating
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

-57.42

1.66

[-60.67, -54.17]

< .001

-7.15

1.40

[-9.9, -4.40]

< .001

-3.61

1.37

[-6.30, -.92]

.01

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
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(High)
Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity

-5.65

1.87

[-9.32, -1.99]

.003

7.23

1.89

[3.52, 10.93]

< .001

-2.99

1.47

[-5.88, -.12]

.04

(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .72
c. Care
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

39.84

Gender

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

1.5

[36.89, 42.78]

< .001

6.36

1.27

[3.87, 8.86]

< .001

-.57

1.24

[-3.01, 1.87]

.65

-2.10

1.70

[-5.43, 1.22]

.22

.64

1.72

[-2.72, 4.00]

.71

5.05

1.33

[2.43, 7.66]

< .001

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)
Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity
(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .62
d. Reciprocity
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

51.10

1.33

[48.49, 53.71]

< .001

4.80

1.13

[2.59, 7.01]

< .001

-1.97

1.10

[-4.13, .19]

.07

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)
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Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity

1.01

1.50

[-1.94, 3.95]

.50

.62

1.52

[-2.36, 3.60]

.68

1.64

1.18

[-.68, 3.96]

.17

(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .37
e. Hierarchy
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

21.46

1.71

[18.10, 24.81]

< .001

-.04

1.45

[-2.88, 2.80]

.98

1.46

1.42

[-1.32, 4.24]

.30

-1.65

1.93

[-5.44, 2.14]

.39

1.48

1.95

[-2.35, 5.31]

.45

-1.27

1.52

[-4.24, 1.71]

.41

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)
Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity
(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .46

Stage 2
Method.
Pre-registration #31592 on aspredicted.org. Full materials, raw data, and code
available at https://osf.io/zxjt6/?view_only=66c1211300974dd68e97b88269fec4a3.
2.1. Materials creation.
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Selection of relationships. In Stage 1, we collected data for 20 different
relationships. Our analysis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) distance between
relationships (see the main text) revealed that several of these relationships were
highly similar in terms of their prescribed cooperative functions (i.e., relational norm
profiles). To avoid redundancy in Stage 2, we decided to use a subset of 10
relationships for the following study that were among the most functionally dissimilar
to each other. Our procedure for selecting these relationships is described next.
As noted in the main manuscript, we first excluded the data pertaining to the
coalition function. We then calculated the mean K-S distance score for every pairing
of relationships across the four remaining functions. We set up 10 slots for "face-offs"
between pairs of relationships with low K-S distances. For each face-off, we dropped
the relationship with the lowest mean K-S distance from all other relationships (i.e.,
the more redundant of the two relationships considered in the context of the entire
set). To enable gender comparisons, however, we first instituted a rule such that, if a
father/mother relationship faced off, each was retained. Then, we moved sequentially
from the lowest K-S score pairings to the highest K-S score pairings until all 10 slots
were filled, dropping relationships along the way according to the first rule (if a
relationship faced off with another relationship that had already been eliminated, it
was retained by default). The final set of relationships identified by this method were:
long-term romantic partners, friends with benefits, boss and employee, colleagues or
classmates, mother/father and under-18 child, siblings, close friends, roommates or
housemates, teammates, and strangers.
Selection of action statements. In this part of the study, we sought to test the
hypothesis that the relational norm profile of a given relationship (based on the
prescribed cooperative functions identified in Stage 1) would predict moral judgments
for violations of associated functions in the context of that relationship. To this end,
we created a set of 86 actions that we thought would plausibly weaken or impair one
or more cooperative functions. To determine the extent to which each action would
characteristically weaken (or strengthen) each of the four dyadic cooperative
functions, we had 15 trained judges rate each of the 86 actions in our set. These
judges were recruited among lab members and colleagues and were given extensive
training either in person or over Skype to ensure that their ratings reflected only the
functional implications of each action (i.e., according to the cooperative logic of the
functions) rather than being about moral judgments of any kind.
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The trained judges completed an online survey, which included the same
descriptions of cooperative functions that we used in Stage 1. After reading these
descriptions and completing multiple comprehension checks, the judges were shown
the 86 action statements, all of which were of the form “Person A does X to Person
B” (see original materials at the OSF link above for the full list of actions). For each
action, the judges were asked about the extent to which the action would weaken or
strengthen each of the five functions. Their responses were recorded on a sliding
scale, ranging from “Would characteristically weaken” (-100) through “It depends /
Would neither weaken nor strengthen” (0) to “Would characteristically strengthen”
(100). Thus, we obtained a mean rating between -100 and 100 for each actionfunction pair.
Based on the judges’ ratings, we used an algorithm (described in the main
text)18 to identify 12 actions (three for each function) that were most characteristic as
individual function-weakeners, while maintaining roughly equal “characteristicness”
of items across functions.19 This process resulted in a final set of 12 functionweakening action statements, depicted in Supplementary Table 8.

2.1.1. Supplementary Table 8
Action statements used in Stage 2
Function

Action

Care

- Person A sees Person B crying and walks away from them
- Person A keeps checking their cellphone while Person B tells a sad personal story
- Person A watches passively while Person B carries several heavy boxes up the
stairs, even though they could easily help

Hierarchy

- Person A refuses to follow a reasonable order from Person B
- Person A repeatedly interrupts Person B while they are speaking
- Person A decides to skip a meeting scheduled with Person B without a good excuse

Mating

- Person A refuses to have sex with Person B
- Person A repeatedly turns down Person B’s offer to go on a romantic date
- Person A invests time and energy in a romantic relationship with someone other
than Person B

18

MATLAB code is available at https://osf.io/j435q/.
Three items from the 86-action set were excluded before running the algorithm due to having
misleading or ambiguous wording. After running the code, we also dropped the item “Person A mocks
Person B for a poor performance, when Person B tried their best,” as we realized that the word
“performance” could have different meanings across relationships (e.g., job performance versus an
artistic performance).
19
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Reciprocity

- Person A decides not to pay Person B back, hoping Person B won’t remember
- Person A decides not to return Person B’s nice favor
- Person A charges Person B $50 for an item worth $25.

2.2. Participants. In Stage 1, we powered for 95% confidence in a 5% margin of error
for a nationally representative sample across age, race, and gender. This required that
we have 385 observations per distribution (with each participant rating all 20 original
relationships on all 5 original functions). To ensure that our Sample 2 distributions
would be comparable to those from Sample 1, we powered for the same confidence in
the same margin of error. In the first sample, every participant gave one rating per
function for all of 20 relationships; in this study, Sample 2 participants would give
three ratings for just one relationship out of a smaller set of 13 relationships (13
because questions regarding the non-symmetrical relationships, e.g., boss-employee,
were asked in both directions). To achieve parity, then, we multiplied the previous
target sample of 385 (per distribution) by 13 (accounting for the switch to a betweensubjects design) and divided by three (accounting for three ratings per function in the
current sample, compared to just one in Sample 1), yielding a required sample of
1,551. As in Stage 1, we over-recruited by about 10%, aiming for 1,706 participants
for Stage 2. Ultimately, 1,822 participants took at least part of the survey (not all
finished).
Once again, the participants were recruited online and were paid were paid
$1.00 to complete the survey. Five hundred and two (502) participants were excluded
based on pre-registered exclusion criteria (see Supplementary Table 9 for criteria),
leaving us with a final sample of 1,320 participants (553 female, 758 male, 6
other/non-binary) ranging in age from 18 to 73 (Mage = 35.32, SDage = 10.56). Se
Supplementary Table 10 for complete demographic information.
2.2.1. Supplementary Table 9
Summary of exclusion criteria for Stage 2
Exclusion criteria met

Type of check

Excluded N

Failed question about survey instructions
OR answered multiple-choice question
incorrectly (correct answer includes the
word “embarrassment”)

Comprehension/attention check

246

248

Did not move slider to (at least) 1 of 2
specified position

Attention check

171

Failed bot-checker test

Bot check

0

Failed text-entry test

Bot check

53

Being younger than 18

Demographic check

2

Not fluent English speaker

Demographic check

12

Finished survey in < 4 min.

Quality check

73

Note: some participants met more than one criterion.

2.2.2. Supplementary Table 10
Demographics of Sample 2 participants
Age

N (%)

Race

N (%)

Gender

N (%)

18 - 27

329 (24.96%)

White

929 (70.49%)

Female

553 (41.96%)

28-37

561 (42.56%)

Black/
African-American

175 (13.28%)

Male

758 (57.51%)

38-47

230 (17.45%)

Asian

92 (6.98%)

Other/
Non-binary

6 (0.46%)

48-57

135 (10.24%)

Hispanic/
Latinx

88 (6.68%)

58+

63 (4.78%)

Other

19 (1.44%)

Missing

0 (0.00%)

American Indian/
Alaska Native

12 (0.91%)

Hawaiian/
Pacific Islander

1 (0.08%)
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2.3. Procedure. Each participant was assigned to one of 13 relationship-pairs
(13 because questions about the non-symmetrical relationships, e.g., boss-employee,
were asked separately in both directions), and were shown a brief description of their
assigned relationship (see Supplementary Table 4). We informed participants that
they would be asked to consider various actions in the context of their assigned
relationship and to answer how morally wrong each of those actions would be. To
orient them to the rating scale, we clarified that none of the actions they would see
would be extreme (e.g., murder), but rather would all be actions that might plausibly
occur within the course of day-to-day life. We then ‘anchored’ their expectations by
showing them a list of actions comparable to the ones included in the task.
Following instructions and attention checks, participants were shown the 12
(three for each of the four functions) hypothetical actions selected by our algorithmic
approach described above. For instance, for the sibling relationship, participants were
asked, e.g., “Imagine that someone keeps checking their cellphone while their sibling
tells a sad personal story. How morally wrong would that be, if at all?” Responses
were recorded on a sliding scale from “Not at all morally wrong" (0) to "Very morally
wrong" (100). Finally, we collected exploratory data about how likely it is that each
action would occur in real life, plus the same demographic measures that we collected
from Sample 1 participants.
2.4. Data preparation and analysis details. Raw data files (.csv) were prepared and
analyzed using Python, within a Jupyter Notebook environment. Primary packages
used: numpy, scipy, statsmodels, matplotlib, seaborn, pandas. For data files and all
coding scripts, see the OSF link above.

2.5. Supplementary results.
2.5.1. Supplementary Tables 11a-11e.
Complete demographic analyses for Stage 2/Sample 2: regression tables.
These regression tables show the results of the mixed effects linear regression models
where participant and relationship are random factors, described in the main text.
Note that participants who reported gender as ‘other’ were excluded from the analysis
as this was not a big enough sub-group to make statistical comparisons possible. For
each set of regression results below, an Anderson-Darling test indicated that the
outcome variable was non-normally distributed (all ps < .001). However, Q-Q plots
of standardized residuals against fitted values indicated that this did not impact model
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performance.20 Table a = overall model; b = gender and other demographic effects on
moral wrongness judgments for mating; c = same for care; d = same for reciprocity; e
= same for hierarchy.
a. Overall
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

39.85

1.35

[37.21, 42.50]

< .001

-.12

1.22

[-2.51, 2.28]

.92

1.49

1.20

[-.87, 3.85]

.22

Economic Ideology
(Liberal)

-.48

1.54

[-3.50, 2.53]

.75

Social Ideology
(Liberal)

1.06

1.55

[-1.98, 4.10]

.50

Religiosity

8.93

1.22

[6.54, 11.32]

< .001

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)

(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .56

b. Mating
Predictor

b

(Intercept)
Gender

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

-.07

1.83

[-3.66, 3.52]

.97

-2.94

1.66

[-6.19, .31]

.08

Fit

(Female)
20

The Q-Q plot (quantile-quantile plot) is a visualization that assesses whether data plausibly came
from a theoretical distribution, such as a normal distribution. Q-Qs can be used to inspect whether the
assumption of a normally distributed outcome measure required by certain statistical tests is violated.
The graph plots two sets of quantiles or percentiles – thresholds below which certain points of our data
fall – against one another: the observed quantiles and those of the theoretical (normal) distribution. If
both sets of quantiles came from the same distribution, the points should form a line that is roughly
straight. In the case of our linear mixed effects model predicting moral wrongness judgments from
functional expectations, the Q-Q plot forms a nearly perfect straight line (see the code listed at
https://osf.io/zxjt6/). This suggests that the observed non-normality of our dependent measure did not
violate the normality assumption of the model. Gelman and Hill (2007) note that the normality or
otherwise of residuals doesn't affect the parameter estimates in multilevel models. They therefore
advise against normality tests of regression residuals (p. 46). Gelman, A., Hill, J., 2007. Data Analysis
Using Regression and Multilevel/Hierarchical Models. Cambridge University Press.

251

Income

5.09

1.63

[1.89, 8.29]

.002

Economic Ideology
(Liberal)

2.00

2.09

[-2.09, 6.10]

.34

Social Ideology
(Liberal)

3.17

2.10

[-.95, 7.30]

.13

16.53

1.66

[13.28, 19.78]

< .001

(High)

Religiosity
(Very Religious)

Conditional R2 = .44
c. Care
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

57.20

2.73

[51.85, 62.55]

< .001

3.51

2.49

[-1.37, 8.39]

.16

.24

2.43

[-4.53, 5.01]

.92

Economic Ideology
(Liberal)

1.65

3.49

[-5.20, 8.50]

.64

Social Ideology
(Liberal)

-.19

3.52

[-7.09, 6.71]

.96

Religiosity

3.52

2.45

[-1.29, 8.32]

.15

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)

(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .42
d. Reciprocity
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

64.27

1.63

[61.08, 67.46]

< .001

.26

1.47

[-2.63, 3.15]

.86

-.95

1.45

[-3.79, 1.89]

.51

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)
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Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity

-2.04

1.86

[-5.68, 1.60]

.27

.20

1.87

[-3.46, 3.86]

.91

4.01

1.47

[1.13, 6.90]

.006

(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .06
e. Hierarchy
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

53.76

3.07

[47.74, 59.78]

< .001

1.51

2.77

[-3.91, 6.93]

.59

.75

2.74

[-4.61, 6.11]

.78

Economic Ideology
(Liberal)

-3.78

3.23

[-10.12, 2.55]

.24

Social Ideology
(Liberal)

-1.34

3.24

[-7.69, 5.01]

.68

8.44

2.81

[2.95, 13.94]

.003

Gender

Fit

(Female)
Income
(High)

Religiosity
(Very Religious)

Conditional R2 = .58
2.5.2. Supplementary Table 11f.
Full regression table for the main analysis, controlling for demographic information
Predictor

b

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

76.95

1.31

[72.94, 79.42]

< .001

Relational Norms

16.26

.32

[15.64, 16.88]

< .001

Action Likelihood

-.20

.01

[-.21, -.18]

< .001

Target Specificity

.37

.01

[.34, .40]

<.001

-.94

.81

[-2.53, .67]

.25

Gender

Fit
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(Female)
Income

.50

.82

[-1.44, 1.98]

.54

2.67

1.05

[.61, 4.71]

.01

-1.86

1.05

[-3.92, .21]

.08

9.16

.82

[7.55, 10.77]

< .001

(High)
Economic Ideology
(Liberal)
Social Ideology
(Liberal)
Religiosity
(Very Religious)
Conditional R2 = .63
2.5.3. Supplementary Figures 3a-3d. Scatterplots of function-specific correlations
between KS distance scores in relational norm and moral judgment space
respectively: a = care, b = mating, c = hierarchy, d = reciprocity. Spearman’s r is the
reported value. For the legend describing the relationship labels and colors, please see
the main text. See next page.

a.
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b.

c.
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d.

Stage 3
Method.
3.1. Participants. For Stage 3, we aimed to have as many observations per
distribution as we had in Stage 1. For Stage 1, which was powered for a nationally
representative sample across age, race, and gender, we recruited for 450 observations
with a final sample of 423 (Sample 1). In the current study, each participant would
have to make three ratings for each measured construct rather than one (as in Stage 1),
so we determined to recruit a third of the number of target participants as we had in
our first sample to achieve similar statistical power. Accordingly, we recruited 150
participants, with 167 participants ultimately taking at least part of the survey (not all
finished). Each participant who completed the survey21 was paid $1.00. Sixty-four
participants (64) were excluded on the basis of the pre-registered exclusion criteria
(see Supplementary Table 12), leaving us with a final sample of N = 85 (38 female,
46 male, 1 other/non-binary) ranging in age from 21 to 69 (Mage = 34.82, SDage =
10.66); see Supplementary Table 13 for complete demographic information.

21

18 “participants” in the raw data file had no location information recorded and the data posted to
Qualtrics nearly a week after the completion of the survey. We assumed these were bots and deleted
those 18 lines of data prior to applying the exclusion criterion. Hence the n = 149 “completed”
participants reported in the manuscript: 167-18 = 149.
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3.1.1. Supplementary Table 12
Summary of exclusion criteria for Stage 3
Exclusion criteria met

Type of check

Excluded N

Did not move sliders to (at least) 1 of 2
specified positions

Attention check

64

3.1.2. Supplementary Table 13:
Demographics of Sample 3 participants
Age

N (%)

Race

N (%)

Gender

N (%)

18 - 27

23 (27.06%)

White

59 (69.41%)

Female

38 (44.71%)

28 - 37

37 (43.53%)

Black/
African-American

12 (14.12%)

Male

46 (54.12%)

38 - 47

14 (16.47%)

Asian

5 (5.88%)

Other/
Non-binary

1 (1.18%)

48 - 57

6 (7.06%)

Hispanic/
Latinx

4 (4.71%)

58+

5 (5.88%)

Multiracial

3 (3.53%)

Native American

2 (2.35%).

3.2. Procedure. We informed participants that they would be shown a set of
relationships and asked some questions about each. Then, participants were shown, in
random order, each of the 10 relationship pairs that were used in Stage 2 along with a
brief description. Because this study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic,
we were concerned that participants’ judgments about relationships might be affected
by the unprecedented circumstances. To address this concern, we included a note
asking participants to think of the relationships as they would be under more ‘normal’
circumstances.
For each of the 10 relationship pairs, participants were asked to rate it along
three dimensions of social closeness and three dimensions of interdependence: see
Supplementary Table 14 for the exact descriptions of each. As an example, for the
sibling relationship and one of the social closeness dimensions, participants were
asked, e.g, “In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between siblings, to what extent
would the relationship be characterized by deeply understanding each other?”
Responses were recorded on a sliding scale from 0 to 100 (see endpoint labels in
Supplementary Table 14 below). Finally, we included similar individual demographic
measures as in the previous samples.
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3.2.1. Supplementary Table 14
Dimensions of social closeness and interdependence
Construct

Dimension

Social
Closeness

- In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between [relationship pair], to what
extent would the relationship be characterized by deeply understanding each
other? (0 = Not at all; 100 = A great deal)
- In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between [relationship pair], to what
extent would the relationship be characterized by accepting and validating each
other's natures? (0 = Not at all; 100 = A great deal)
- In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between [relationship pair], to what
extent would the relationship be characterized by striving to care for and
promote each other's overall well-being? (0 = Not at all; 100 = A great deal)

Interdependence

- In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between [relationship pair], how
frequently would they affect each other's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors? (0 =
Not at all frequently; 100 = Very frequently)
- In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between [relationship pair], in how
many different ways would they affect each other's thoughts, feelings, and
behaviors across different situations? (0 = Very few ways; 100 = A great variety
of ways)
- In an ideal, well-functioning relationship between [relationship pair], how
strongly would they affect each other's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors? (0 =
Not at all strongly; 100 = Very strongly)

3.3. Data preparation and analysis details. Raw data files (.csv) were
prepared and analyzed using Python, within a Jupyter Notebook environment.
Primary packages used: numpy, scipy, statsmodels, matplotlib, seaborn, pandas. For
data files and all coding scripts, see the OSF link above.
3.4. Supplementary results.
3.4.1. Supplementary Table 15
Full-exclusion regression model for Stage 3
This table shows the full results for the mixed effects linear regression model
described in the main text. Note: because there are three samples, the data are not at
the participant level, which precludes controlling for demographic information.
Source data are provided as a Source Data file.
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

103.12

13.15

.12

.01

Relational Norms

Std. Error

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

[44.62, 50.89]

< .001

[-5.23, .07]

< .001

Fit
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Social Closeness

.24

.35

[2.98, 8.87]

.48

Interdependency

-.20

.33

[-2.32, 3.01]

.55

Genetic Relatedness

1.13

3.52

[-1.95, 4.72]

.75

Action Likelihood

-.51

.09

[-6.70, .03]

< .001

Target Specificity

.52

.18

[4.34, 9.75]

< .01

Conditional R2 = .89

3.4.2. Supplementary Table 16
No exclusions regression model for Stage 3.
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

104.38

15.54

Relational Norms

9.36

Social Closeness
Interdependency

95% CI [LL, UL]

p

[74.49, 134.26]

< .001

.96

[7.51, 11.21]

< .001

.44

.73

[-.96, 1.84]

.55

-.36

.70

[-1.71, .1]

.61

.89

3.41

[-5.67, 7.46]

.79

Action Likelihood

-.53

.09

[-.70, -.36]

< .001

Target Specificity

.54

.18

[.19, .88]

< .01

Genetic Relatedness

Std. Error

Fit

Conditional R2 = .90

3.4.3. Supplementary Figure 4: Study 3 results. Kernel density plot of expectations
for social closeness and interdependency for 10 common relationships. Dot represents
the mean, with caps representing +/- 1 standard deviation. The height of the curve
represents density: the likely proportions of scores (relative to each function) that fall
within the given range along the x-axis.
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Appendix 2
Supplementary information for:
Praise and Blame in Relational Context

Study 1
1.1. Method details.
1.1.1. Participants. See main text.
Supplementary Table 1
Summary of pre-registered exclusion criteria for Study 1
Exclusion criteria met

Type of check

Excluded N

Did not reach main portion of survey (i.e., did
not pass training)

Comprehension check

11

Did not move slider to (at least) 1 of 2 specified
position

Attention check

41

Did not type in the word ‘FRIDAY’

Bot check

21

Finished survey in < 15 min.

Quality check

32

Note: some participants met more than one criterion.

1.1.2. Procedure details. Participants completed a brief online survey through
the Qualtrics interface. Before getting to the main part of the survey, participants were
shown the full descriptions of each of the four main relationship functions, as shown
in Table 1 in the main text. To ensure that participants were paying attention and were
thinking of the functions in the way we wanted them to, each description was
followed by a multiple-choice question about the definitions of the functions.
Participants were not allowed to advance to the main part of the survey if they failed
to answer this check correctly.
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Once we had introduced the participants to the four relationship functions, we
gave them instructions for the main task of the survey. For each of 20 relationships,
we asked participants how much a good relationship of that kind would serve each of
the four relationship functions. We specified that, by ‘good relationship,’ we meant:
“it is a relationship that works well for both people, given their respective roles in the
relationship.” Participants were then presented 20 blocks of questions, one for each
relationship, in random order. For each relationship, we included a specific
description of what we meant by that relationship—see Supplementary Table 2 for the
descriptions. Then, for each combination of relationship and relationship-function,
participants rated how much a good relationship of each kind would serve the given
function, with the function now presented in its brief form as a reminder (see Table 1
in the main text). For instance, if the relationship and relationship-function pair was
siblings/care, participants would be asked: “To what extent would a good relationship
between adult siblings typically serve the function of giving or receiving support
based on need, without creating a debt? (Care function.)” Responses were recorded
on a sliding scale ranging from ‘Definitely WOULD NOT’ (-100) through ‘Neutral’
(0) to ‘Definitely WOULD’ (+100). Each of the recruited participants responded to
questions about all four functions for all 20 relationships, yielding 80 data points per
participant. Finally, we collected a battery of demographic measures: gender, age,
race, ethnicity, relationship status, income, level of education, political leanings on
social and economic issues, and religiosity. We also collected individual differences
measures for use in a separate study, namely the Experiences in Close Relationships
questionnaire22 and the Oxford Utilitarianism Scale.23
Supplementary Table 2
Descriptions of relationships
Relationship

Description

Siblings

This refers to brothers and sisters over the age of 18. It includes both
biological and adoptive brothers and sisters.

22

Fraley, R. C., Heffernan, M. E., Vicary, A. M., & Brumbaugh, C. C. (2011). The Experiences in
Close Relationships-Relationship Structures questionnaire: A method for assessing attachment
orientations across relationships. Psychological Assessment, 23, 615-625.
23
Kahane, G., Everett, J. A., Earp, B. D., Caviola, L., Faber, N. S., Crockett, M. J., & Savulescu, J.
(2018). Beyond sacrificial harm: A two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology. Psychological
Review, 125(2), 131-164.
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Long-term romantic partners

This refers to romantic partners that have a commitment to each other,
meaning they intend to remain together for the long term. It includes married
partners like spouses, but also long-term romantic partners who aren’t
married but still have a commitment.

Close friends

This refers to people who seek one another out to spend time together, and
who refer to each other as best friends, close friends, or good friends. It
includes two people of any gender combination who are committed to
remaining friends for the long term, and whose interest in each other is NOT
primarily romantic.

Work colleagues or classmates

This refers to any workplace relationship between people who are on the
same career or schooling level as each other. It includes only people who
interact with each other in person in a workplace or at a school.

Boss and employee

This refers to any workplace relationship in which one person directly
supervises the other and that same person has some decision-making control
over the other's activities and outcomes. It includes only people who interact
with each other in person in a workplace.

Teacher and student

This refers to relationships in which someone with more experience guides
someone with less experience, such as in school, sports or other
extracurricular activity. It includes teacher-student or coach-player
relationships, for example.

Doctor and patient

This refers to relationships in which one person provides expert medical or
therapeutic services to the other person. It includes medical doctor-patient or
therapist-client relationships, for example.

Extended family members

This refers to relationships with relatives who are not in the immediate
family (so, not parents or siblings). It includes relationships with a cousin,
aunt, uncle, grandfather or grandmother.

Teammates

This refers to a relationship between two people who are in a clearly defined
group together working towards a common goal. It includes teammates on a
sports team or members of a theater troupe, for example.

Customer and seller

This refers to any relationship in which someone sells something and
another person buys that thing, and they interact with each other directly. It
includes a local baker and the baker's customer, or a house cleaner and the
person who owns the house, for example.
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Neighbors

This refers to people who live in the same section of an apartment building,
or within the same block of houses on a street. It includes only people who
know each other and at least occasionally interact.

Friends-with-benefits

This refers to people who know each other and interact sexually on a
somewhat regular basis, but who refer to each other as friends rather than
romantic partners. It includes friends who interact sexually without
committing to a monogamous romantic relationship.

Acquaintances

This refers to people who know each other, and interact now and then, but
don’t consider one another to be friends. It includes people one might know
from work, school, or the neighborhood.

Members of a political party

This refers to people who are active, registered members of the same
political party. They likely hold similar ideological positions and tend to
vote for the same candidates in elections. They may not necessarily know
each other for any other reason than their common political activities and
party affiliation.

Roommates/housemates

This refers to relationships between people who live together and are not
family members or in a romantic relationship. This includes college roomor suite mates, apartment mates, or housemates, for example.

Father and child (under 18)

This refers to fathers and their non-adult (meaning under age 18) children. It
includes both biological and adoptive fathers/children.

Mother and child (under 18)

This refers to mothers and their non-adult (meaning under age 18) children.
It includes both biological and adoptive parents/children.

Father and child (over 18)

This refers to fathers and their adult (meaning over age 18) children. It
includes both biological and adoptive fathers/children.

Mother and child (over 18)

This refers to mothers and their adult (meaning over age 18) children. It
includes both biological and adoptive mothers/children.

Strangers

This refers to people who encounter each other in any setting for the first
time. It includes people who don’t know each other from another context
and don't anticipate interacting again in the future.

1.1.3. Data preparation and analysis details. Raw data files (.csv) were
prepared and analyzed using Python, within a Jupyter Notebook environment.
Primary packages used: numpy, scipy, statsmodels, matplotlib, seaborn, pandas. For
data files and all coding scripts, see https://osf.io/zxjt6/.
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1.2. Supplementary results

Supplementary Figure 1. Relational norm profiles for all 20 relationships. Pink represents care, black
represents hierarchy, green represents mating, blue represents reciprocity. The raw data are shown in
individual dots; error bars represent the mean (dot) and +/- 1 SD (caps). Note: Mother/Father and
under-18 child and Mother/Father over-18 child have each been combined into a single plot, because
these relationships were not significantly different from one another in terms of expected cooperative
functions: Mann-Whitney U tests, all ps > .07.

1.2.1. Demographic analyses. In order to determine whether there were
demographic differences in functional expectations for any of the functions, we built a
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mixed linear effects regression model with age, gender, education, self-ascribed
socioeconomic status, romantic relationship status, parental status, religiosity, and
social and economic political ideology entered as fixed effects, and participant and
relationship type entered as random effects. See Tables 3a-3d for the results.
Supplementary Tables 3a–3d.
Complete demographic analyses for Study 1: regression tables
Table a = gender and other demographic effects on normative functional expectations
for mating; b = same for care; c = same for transaction; d = same for hierarchy. LL
and UL indicate the lower and upper limits of a 95% confidence interval, respectively.
a.

Mating

Predictor

b

(Intercept)

-58.02

8.34

[-74.35, 41.69]

Gender
(Male)

8.5

2.59

[3.41, 13.59]

.001

Gender
(Other)

6.71

8.07

[-9.15, 22.58]

.41

Age

-.46

.09

[-.64, -.28]

Relationship
Status
(Yes)

-1.08

2.8

[-6.59, 4.43]

.70

Parental Status
(Yes)

3.27

3.12

[-2.87, 9.40]

.30

Education

3.38

.95

[1.52, 5.25]

< .001

Socioeconomic
Status

.19

.74

[-1.26, 1.64]

.79

-.06

.08

[-.22, .10]

.44

Social
Ideology

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

Fit

< .001

< .001
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Economic
Ideology

.10

.08

[-.06, .25]

.22

Religiosity

.05

.04

[-.02, .12]

.14
Conditional R2 = .89

b.

Care

Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI

p

Fit

[LL, UL]

(Intercept)

48.05

7.28

[33.78, 62.31]

< .001

Gender
(Male)

-.61

2.26

[-5.06, 3.84]

.79

Gender
(Other)

-4.84

7.05

[-18.69, 9.02]

.49

Age

.04

.08

[-0.12, 0.19]

.65

Relationship
Status
(Yes)

.26

2.45

[-4.55, 5.07]

.92

Parental Status
(Yes)

-.26

2.73

[-5.61, 5.10]

.93

Education

-.79

.83

[-2.42, 0.84]

.34

Socioeconomic
Status

.10

.64

[-1.17, 1.36]

.88

Social Ideology

.004

.07

[-.14, .14]

.96
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Economic
Ideology

.03

.07

[-.10, .17]

.61

Religiosity

.03

.03

[-.03, .09]

.38
Conditional R2 = .89

c.

Transaction

Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

12.32

9.83

[-6.94, 31.58]

.21

Gender
(Male)

11.23

3.06

[5.22, 17.23]

< .001

Gender
(Other)

9.04

9.52

[-9.67, 27.74]

0.34

Age

-.52

.11

[-.73, -.30]

Relationship
Status
(Yes)

4.18

3.31

[-2.31, 10.68]

.21

Parental Status
(Yes)

.45

3.68

[-6.78, 7.68]

.90

Education

1.26

1.12

[-.94, 3.46]

.26

Socioeconomic
Status

-.99

.87

[-2.70, .72]

.26

Fit

< .001
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Social Ideology

.11

.10

[-.08, .30]

.25

Economic
Ideology

.01

.09

[-.17, .19]

.94

Religiosity

.11

.04

[.03, .20]

.009
Conditional R2 = .89

d.

Hierarchy

Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

2.5

9.15

[-15.43, 20.42]

Gender
(Male)

9.69

2.85

[4.1, 15.28]

Gender
(Other)

4.98

8.86

[-12.44, 22.39]

.57

Age

-.31

.10

[-.51, -.11]

.003

Relationship
Status
(Yes)

8.38

3.08

[2.34, 14.43]

.007

Parental Status
(Yes)

-.74

3.42

[-7.47, 5.99]

.83

Education

2.03

1.04

[-.02, 4.08]

.05

Socioeconomic
Status

-.42

.81

[-2.01, 1.17]

.60

Social Ideology

.11

.10

[-.08, .30]

.25

Economic
Ideology

.05

.09

[-.12, .21]

.60

Fit

.78
< .001
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Religiosity

.15

.04

[.07, .22]

< .001

Conditional R2 = .88

1.2.2. Selection of relationships for use in Studies 2 and 3. In Study 1, we
collected data for 20 different relationships. Our analysis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
(K-S) distance between relationships (see main text) revealed that several of these
relationships were highly similar in terms of expected cooperative functions. To avoid
redundancy in Studies 2 and 3, and to allow for fewer between-subjects conditions,
we decided to use a subset of 10 relationships for those studies that were among the
most functionally dissimilar to each other. Our procedure for selecting these
relationships is described next.
First, we entered the K-S distance into a hierarchical clustering algorithm as
described in the main text. We then excluded the customer/seller relationship because
it is defined by monetary exchange, specifically, whereas the transaction function on
our conception encompasses a wider range of interactions other than purely
commercial ones. Second, because we are focusing on dyadic relationships for this
study, we excluded relationships primarily defined in terms of group
membership, including political party members, extended family members,
teammates, and colleagues/classmates relationships. As noted in the main text, there
were no significant differences between the mother-child and father-child
relationships, so we collapsed these into parent-child relationships; however, in order
to track potential functional changes in the parent-child relationship over time, we
decided to include both the parent and under-18 child and parent and over-18 child
dyads in our final analysis.
After applying these exclusions, there were 13 relationships remaining. To
ensure we had a representative selection of relationships across all clusters, we
selected the two most distinctive remaining relationships from each cluster. Based on
the previously instituted exclusions, most clusters only had two remaining
relationships. To choose relationships from the highest-level cluster that still included
more than two, we selected those from within the lowest-level clusters that had the
highest K-S distance from all other relationships (i.e., least redundant). After these
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exclusions, we were left with 10 relationships. The final set of relationships identified
by this method were: long-term romantic partners, friends-with-benefits, parent and
over-18 child, parent and under-18 child, doctor-patient, boss-employee,
acquaintances, roommates/housemates, close friends, and siblings.

Study 2
2.1. Method details.
2.1.1. Selection of action statements. After first excluding several items that
we determined were inadequate on theoretical grounds, our algorithm ran for 10,000
iterations. On each iteration, 3 items from the remaining pool of candidate functionweakening items were randomly selected for each function, such that the set of 3
would be among the most characteristic items for weakening the function based on
the judges’ ratings. The algorithm then computed the mean rating for each function
across the set of 3 candidate items, and stored the mean and standard deviation (SD)
of the means across all 4 functions.
We implemented a constraint for the preceding step, such that the mean of the
absolute means for each set of three items had to be less than or equal to 85 and
greater than or equal to 70. We set this floor and ceiling based on exploratory
analyses regarding potential function-strengthening items for use in Study 3, as we
wanted to ensure that the final set of function-weakening and function-strengthening
items would be comparably characteristic across studies. If that constraint was
satisfied, the SD of the means across all functions was compared to the lowest such
value found across the previous iterations of the algorithm; if the new SD was found
to be lower than the previous lowest value, then the randomly-selected items were
stored as a new reference point for subsequent iterations of the algorithm.
At the 10,000th iteration, the algorithm returned the last stored set of items.
This set of 12 items represented those with the lowest SD of means between the sets
of 3 across all 4 functions, ensuring that each set was as similar to all others in terms
of mean characteristicness as possible.
2.1.2. Participants. In Study 1, we powered for 95% confidence in a 5%
margin of error for a U.S. nationally representative sample across age, race, and
gender. This required that we have 385 observations per distribution (with each
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participant rating all 20 original relationships on all 4 original functions). To ensure
that our Study 2 distributions would be comparable to those from Study 1, we
powered for the same confidence in the same margin of error. However, unlike in the
previous study, (1) the present study was not nationally representative; we instead
used a convenience sample through MTurk; and (2) instead of having each participant
give ratings for all 20 relationships as in the previous study, each participant in the
present study gave ratings for just one relationship out of a smaller set of 14
relationships in a between-subjects design (14 because questions regarding the nonsymmetrical relationships, e.g., boss-employee, were asked in both directions). This
means that, theoretically, we would need 14x as many participants for each
distribution of ratings to be comparable to its counterpart from the previous study.
However, in the present study, each participant gave three ratings for each function
(i.e., praiseworthiness/blameworthiness ratings for weakening the function), whereas
in the previous study, each participant gave just one rating for each function (i.e.,
extent to which a good instance of the relationship would or would not serve the
function). So instead of multiplying by 14 to get a comparably powered distribution,
we multiplied by 14 and then divided by 3. Hence: 385 X 14 / 3 = 1,796. We did not
over-recruit this time to account for potential exclusions because we used a quality
control measure in the CloudResearch platform ("Exclude low-quality participants").
We simply rounded up to recruit 1800 participants. Ultimately, 1,824 participants
completed the survey, each of whom was paid $1.30. One hundred sixty-four (164)
participants were then excluded prior to data analysis based on pre-registered
exclusion criteria (see Supplementary Table 4 for details), leaving us with a final
sample of 1,660 participants.
Supplementary Table 4
Summary of exclusion criteria for Study 2
Exclusion criteria met

Type of check

Excluded N

Failed question about survey instructions OR
answered multiple-choice question incorrectly
(correct answer includes the word
“embarrassment”)

Comprehension/attention
check

33

Did not move slider to (at least) 1 of 2 specified
position

Attention check

129
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Failed bot-checker test or text-entry test

Bot check

71

Being younger than 18

Demographic check

36

Not fluent English speaker

Demographic check

8

Finished survey in < 4 min.

Quality check

34

Note: some participants met more than one criterion.

2.1.3. Procedure details. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of 10
relationships, albeit with 14 conditions in total. As noted above, this is because the
asymmetrical dyads were presented separately in both directions (e.g., a boss acting
toward their employee in one condition, and an employee acting toward their boss in a
separate condition). For purposes of analysis, however, only the subordinate-todominant condition was used for hierarchy ratings, and only the dominant-tosubordinate condition was used for care ratings. After condition assignment, each
participant was shown a brief description of their relationship (see Supplementary
Table 2). We informed participants that they would be asked to consider various
actions in the context of their assigned relationship and to answer how blameworthy
or praiseworthy each of those actions would be. To orient them to the rating scale, we
clarified that none of the actions they would see would be extreme (e.g., murder), but
rather would all be actions that might plausibly occur within the course of day-to-day
life. We then ‘anchored’ their expectations by showing them a list of actions
comparable to the ones included in the task. Following further instructions and
attention checks, participants were shown all 12 actions (three for each of the four
functions) in random order, as described in the main text.
2.1.4. Data preparation and analysis details. Raw data files (.csv) were
prepared and analyzed using Python, within a Jupyter Notebook environment.
Primary packages used: numpy, scipy, statsmodels, matplotlib, seaborn, pandas. For
data files and all coding scripts, see the OSF link above.
2.2. Supplementary results.
Supplementary Tables 5a–5d.
Primary regression model including demographic predictors
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a. Care
Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

-55.41

6.38

[-67.89, -42.93]

< .001

Relational
Norms

-.21

.03

[-.27, -.14]

< .001

Action
Likelihood

.39

.03

[.33, .45]

< .001

Target
Specificity

.28

.06

[.17, .39]

< .001

Gender
(Female)

-8.56

2.20

[-12.88, -4.25]

< .001

Gender
(Other)

18.35

23.44

[-27.57, 64.27]

.43

Income

.58

.48

[-.35, 1.52]

.22

Education

4.37

1.36

[1.72, 7.03]

.001

Social
Ideology

.07

.06

[-.05, .19]

.24

Economic
Ideology

.02

.06

[-.09, .14]

.67

Religiosity

.09

.03

[.03, .15]

.005

Fit

Conditional R2 = .54

a. Hierarchy
Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI

p

Fit

[LL, UL]

(Intercept)

-52.63

6.89

[-66.12, -39.14]

< .001

Relational
Norms

-.10

.02

[-.13, -.06]

< .001
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Action
Likelihood

.38

.03

[.32, .45]

< .001

Target
Specificity

.26

.09

[.08, .43]

.005

Gender
(Female)

-2.64

2.00

[-6.57, 1.28]

.19

Gender
(Other)

.44

29.86

[-58.04, 58.92]

.99

Income

-.24

.43

[-1.09, .61]

.58

Education

6.11

1.20

[3.77, 8.46]

< .001

Social
Ideology

-.01

.06

[-.12, .09]

.80

Economic
Ideology

.12

.05

[.02, .23]

.02

Religiosity

.01

.03

[-.05, .06]

.77
Conditional R2 = .39

b. Mating
Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

-91.14

5.46

Relational
Norms

-.33

.02

[-.36, -.30]

< .001

Action
Likelihood

.40

.03

[.34, .47]

< .001

Target
Specificity

-.70

.03

[-.76, -.65]

< .001

Fit

[-101.84, -80.44] < .001
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Gender
(Female)

-.54

1.91

[-4.29, 3.20]

.78

Gender
(Other)

-8.56

24.07

[-55.70, 38.59]

.72

Income

.88

.41

[.08, 1.69]

.03

Education

.36

1.15

[-1.90, 2.62]

.76

Social
Ideology

-.03

.05

[-.13, .08]

.60

Economic
Ideology

.05

.05

[-.05, .15]

.33

Religiosity

.05

.03

[-.0004, .10]

.05

Conditional R2 = .51
c. Transaction
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

-199.01

Relational
Norms

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

4.77

[-208.35, -189.68]

< .001

-.08

.02

[-.11, -.05]

< .001

Action
Likelihood

.38

.03

[.33, .44]

< .001

Target
Specificity

-2.23

.05

[-2.32, -2.14]

< .001

Gender
(Female)

-2.08

1.56

[-5.13, .97]

.18

Gender
(Other)

2.29

19.65

[-36.20, 40.77]

.91

Fit
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Income

.38

.34

[-.28, 1.04]

.26

Education

3.12

.94

[1.29, 4.96]

< .001

Social
Ideology

-.02

.04

[-.11, .06]

Economic
Ideology

.04

.04

[-.04, .12]

Religiosity

.07

.02

[.03, .12]

.64

.32
< .001
Conditional R2 = .43

Study 3
3.1. Method details.
3.1.1. Participants. See main text.
Supplementary Table 6
Summary of exclusion criteria for Study 3
Exclusion criteria met

Type of check

Excluded N

Failed question about survey instructions OR
answered multiple-choice question incorrectly
(correct answer includes the word
“embarrassment”)

Comprehension check

97

Did not move slider to (at least) 1 of 2 specified
position

Attention check

370

Failed bot-checker test or text-entry test

Bot check

232

Being younger than 18

Demographic check

90

Not fluent English speaker

Demographic check

10

Finished survey in < 4 min.

Quality check

61

Note: some participants met more than one criterion.
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3.1.2. Procedure. The procedure was identical to that employed in Study 2.
3.1.3. Data preparation and analysis details. Raw data files (.csv) were
prepared and analyzed using Python, within a Jupyter Notebook environment.
Primary packages used: numpy, scipy, statsmodels, matplotlib, seaborn, pandas. For
data files and all coding scripts, see the OSF link above.
3.2. Supplementary results
Supplementary Table 7a–7d.
Primary regression models including demographic predictors for Study 3
a. Care
Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

1,135.02

159.1

Relational
Norms

-.08

.03

[-.13, -.03]

Action
Likelihood

.37

.03

[.31, .42]

< .001

Target
Specificity

-16.53

2.42

[-21.28, -11.78]

< .001

Gender
(Female)

6.95

1.64

[3.72, 10.17]

< .001

Gender
(Other)

-2.70

13.07

[-28.30, 22.91]

.84

Income

.53

.35

[-.16, 1.21]

.13

Education

-2.56

.99

[-4.51, -.62]

.01

Fit

[823.55, 1,446.49] < .001
.001
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Social
Ideology

.04

.05

[-.06, .13]

.47

Economic
Ideology

.01

.05

[-.08, .10]

.81

Religiosity

-.08

.02

[-.13, -.04]

< .001

Conditional R2 = .45

b. Hierarchy
Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

11.72

7.10

[-2.18, 25.63]

.10

Relational
Norms

.05

.02

[.01, .08]

.005

Action
Likelihood

.66

.03

[.59, .72]

< .001

Target
Specificity

-.24

.07

[-.39, -.10]

< .001

Gender
(Female)

2.74

1.84

[-.86, 6.33]

.14

Gender
(Other)

-3.42

14.51

[-31.85, 25.00]

.81

Income

.20

.38

[-.55, .95]

.61

Education

-1.81

1.11

[-3.99, .36]

.10

Fit

278

Social
Ideology

-.05

.06

[-.16, .06]

.37

Economic
Ideology

.09

.05

[-.02, .19]

.10

Religiosity

.09

.03

[.04, .14]

< .001

Conditional R2 = .40

c. Mating
Predictor

b

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

(Intercept)

-80.22

6.89

[-93.71, -66.72]

< .001

Relational
Norms

.23

.02

[.20, .26]

< .001

Action
Likelihood

.92

.03

[.87, .97]

< .001

Target
Specificity

.24

.07

[.10, .37]

< .001

Gender
(Female)

-12.40

1.91

[-16.15, -8.65]

< .001

Gender
(Other)

-1.22

14.67

[-29.96, 27.51]

.93

Income

-.09

.40

[-.88, .70]

.82

Education

3.05

1.16

[.77, 5.33]

.009

Fit
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Social
Ideology

.08

.06

[-.04, .19]

.20

Economic
Ideology

.01

.06

[-.10, .12]

.87

Religiosity

.15

.03

[.10, .20]

< .001

Conditional R2 = .72

d. Transaction
Predictor

b

(Intercept)

-129.97

Relational
Norms

Std.
Error

95% CI
[LL, UL]

p

4.19

[-138.17, -121.78]

< .001

.03

.02

[-.01, .06]

.11

Action
Likelihood

.84

.02

[.79, .89]

< .001

Target
Specificity

1.60

.05

[1.50, 1.70]

< .001

Gender
(Female)

-6.65

1.54

[-9.67, -3.64]

< .001

Gender
(Other)

-.19

11.80

[-23.30, 22.92]

.99

Income

-0.20

.33

[-.84, .44]

.54

Education

2.73

.93

[.90, 4.56]

.003

Fit
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Social
Ideology

.07

.05

[-.02, .16]

.13

Economic
Ideology

-.004

.05

[-.09, .08]

.92

Religiosity

.08

.02

[.04, .12]

< .001
Conditional R2 = .52
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